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The Effect of Information and Communications Technology (ICT) Diffusion on Corruption and 
Transparency (A Global Study) (May 2013) 
Leebrian Ernest Gaskins, MBA, West Virginia University; 
Chair of Committee: Dr. Nereu F. Kock 
Is the diffusion of information and communication technologies (ICTs) the “magic 
bullet” for effectively reducing corruption? Can government transparency be increased by ICT 
diffusion? Does ICT diffusion increase governmental transparency, thereby reducing corruption? 
A few previous studies have measured the relationship between ICTs, transparency, and 
corruption. Generally, such studies focus on the role of electronic governance (e-governance) in 
facilitating state-citizen interactions and how e-governance acts as a corruption deterrent. This 
study digresses from past literature by directly exploring the effects of the ICT environment, 
using the Networked Readiness Index (NRI), and diffusion of two specific ICTs (e.g. the number 
of Internet users per 100 people and mobile cellular phone users per 100 people) on corruption 
and transparency through structural equation modeling.  
This study also examines how macroeconomic and national sociocultural variables 
mediate and moderate the relationships of ICTs on transparency and corruption. The results show 
that for each increase unit in NRI, transparency increased by 9.423% and corruption decreased 
by 14.017%. Furthermore, increasing access to the Internet by 27 people per 100 persons 
increased transparency by 17.581% and reduced corruption by 15.239%. Additionally, each unit 
iv 
 
increase in per capita GDP results in an increase in transparency by 7.068% and a decrease in 
corruption by 10.507%. Conversely, increases in FDI and mobile cellular diffusion demonstrated 
marginal results on increasing transparency and reducing corruption. Implications of these 
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Corruption, along with possible remedies and measures for fighting corruption, has been 
studied academically in a multitude of ways over the past sixty years (Akçay, 2006; Arvas & 
Ata, 2011; Donchev & Ujhelyi, 2009; Leff, 1964; Macrae, 1982; Mauro, 1995; McMullan, 1961; 
Myrdal, 1970a; Nye, 1967; Rose-Ackerman, 1978, 1999, 2008; Svensson, 2005). The wide-
ranging definition used by the World Bank, Transparency International, and most scholars is that 
corruption is the abuse of public power for private benefit or profit (Amundsen, 1999; Andvig, 
Fjeldstad, Amundsen, Sissener, & Søreide, 2000; Gray & Kaufmann, 1998; Rose-Ackerman, 
1996). Corruption, as similarly addressed in this paper, is the use of public office or power for 
personal gain. In its many forms, corruption leads to the misallocation of public resources, 
thereby creating bias against efficient projects and practices (Macrae, 1982).
Corrupt practices not only make public power and governance less efficient, such as the 
management of public resources, but they also adversely affect countries’ competitiveness and 
human development (Akçay, 2006). Studies have shown that the effect of corruption on human 
development is more evident in some countries than others (Waheeduzzaman, 2005). In some 
countries, for instance, high levels of corruption reduce the productivity of public sector 
investments (Tanzi, 1995). International investment such as Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) 
into countries perceived as “corrupt” is substantially less than in countries without this 
perception (Habib & Zurawicki, 2002). Countries with higher levels of corruption suffer from 
less than optimal economic development (Cuervo-Cazurra, 2008; Habib & Zurawicki, 2002; 




such as Gross Domestic Product (GDP) per capita. Mauro (1995) found that the reduction of 
corruption is associated with a significant increase in GDP per capita. This finding is quite 
important as GDP per capita is one of the most widely used macroeconomic indicators of a 
country’s standard of living (Ringen, 1991). Similarly, as corruption increases, personal income 
decreases (Alam, 1995; Husted, 1999).  
The literature cited above demonstrates that corruption has a diminishing effect on 
macroeconomic variables. Corruption’s effect on macroeconomic variables such as FDI and 
GDP per capita is particularly important since macroeconomic and technology development 
variables are interrelated. For example, there is evidence that FDI impacts information and 
communication technologies (ICTs) proliferation and development (Baliamoune-Lutz, 2003; 
Gholami, Lee, & Heshmati, 2006; Suh & Khan, 2003). Specifically, Lee, Gholami, and Tong 
(2005) demonstrated a dual causal relationship between investments in ICT and inflows of FDI. 
In the study by Lee et al. (2005), the dual causality relationship suggested that increased FDI 
inflows positively affected ICT investment and proliferation, and ICT investment and 
proliferation attracted more FDI inflows. There is reason to believe that any variable affecting 
FDI inflow would, in turn, affect ICT development. For example, FDI is substantially less in 
countries perceived as “more corrupt” (Campos, Lien, & Pradhan, 1999; Habib & Zurawicki, 
2002). Therefore, countries perceived as corrupt would have substantially less FDI inflows. 
These reduced FDI inflows also would negatively affect ICT investment and proliferation. 
A greater percentage of the world’s population now has availability and access to ICTs 
such as Internet and mobile cellular technologies (Haddon, 2004). This increased availability of 
ICTs has inspired researchers to look into ways such technologies can improve economic and 




Access to mobile communications and the Internet has enabled citizens to participate more 
directly in the political and social institutions and environment of their countries. Citizens are 
interacting more directly with their governments, elected officials, and other citizens through 
such means as e-governance (M. Backus, 2001), online political activism (Hill & Hughes, 1998), 
Internet political mobilization (Krueger, 2006), and online information gathering about political 
issues (Krueger, 2002). 
Since corruption negatively affects economic and human development, ICTs have 
fostered academic interest as a tool in reducing corruption and increasing democracy (Soper, 
2007). The Internet’s potential for reducing corruption is “promising and obviously vast” (Vinod, 
1999, p. 10). Past studies have examined the effects of e-governance on corruption (Hoque, 
2005; Pathak & Prasad, 2005; Pathak, Singh, Belwal, Naz, & Smith, 2008; Pathak, Singh, 
Belwal, & Smith, 2007) and the effects of e-governance and social media on transparency 
(Bertot, Jaeger, & Grimes, 2010). These studies suggest that increased access to information 
through ICTs has a positive effect on transparency and reduces corruption. 
While governments and scholars are researching ways to fight corruption, ordinary 
individuals armed with access to cellular phones, personal computers, and the Internet have 
begun a wave of participatory journalism targeted at corruption in society (Katz & Lai, 2009). 
For example, in Goa, India, an anonymous citizen uploaded to the Internet an eight-minute video 
of a drug dealer talking about his connections to high-ranking anti-narcotic police (MSNIndia, 
2010). In Kenya, citizens have caught and filmed traffic cops collecting bribes from motorists 
(NTV, 2010). In the case of India and Kenya, citizens are acting as anti-corruption agents by 
bringing corrupt practices and officials into public awareness. Such cases illustrate that citizens 




found that in the absence of strong governmental anti-corruption efforts, private enforcement by 
citizens becomes a surrogate for public justice. 
Vinod (1999) stated that increasing education and expanding economic freedoms are 
among the top actions in reducing corruption. ICT promotes greater governmental transparency 
by removing information barriers and asymmetry (Sturges, 2004). Mobile technologies and 
Internet access enables citizens to become more informed with relevant information about their 
government and society. The access and expansion of relevant information concerning 
governmental issues promotes greater transparency (García-Murillo, 2010). Also, the diffusion 
of ICTs has been shown to foster civil and political freedoms (Baliamoune-Lutz, 2003).  
The diffusion of ICT affords citizens increased networking capacity and political 
awareness while reducing information transaction costs (Pirannejad, 2011). Usage of ICTs to 
organize, communicate, and raise awareness have been seen in such movements as the Arab 
world’s “Arab Spring” and Mexico’s narcobloggers (Hofheinz, 2005; Shirk, 2010). In countries 
such as India, Kenya, and Mexico, citizens are using ICTs to expose and fight governmental 
corruption and civilian crime (M. Backus, 2001). Indeed, Soper (2007) demonstrated that a 
negative relationship exists between investment in ICT and political corruption levels in 
emerging economies. 
1.2 Research Question 
Some previous studies have examined the relationship between ICTs and corruption. 
Such studies have focused on the role of e-governance facilitating state-citizen interactions, 
thereby increasing governmental accountability and transparency (Andersen et al., 2010; M. 




improve economic and human development by reducing information asymmetry (Forestier, 
Grace, & Kenny, 2002; Gascó-Hernández et al., 2007; Opoku-Mensah, 2000; Rahman, 2007). 
No research has yet examined if the relationship between the ICT environment, diffusion 
of specific ICTs, and the two macroeconomic variables of FDI and Gross Domestic Product 
(GDP) per capita has any potential effects on increasing transparency and reducing corruption. 
Therefore, this study attempts to fill a gap in the literature by directly examining the effects of 
the relationship of the ICT environment, diffusion of specific ICTs, FDI and GDP per capita on 
corruption and transparency through structural equation modeling.  
1.3 Significance and Purpose of Study 
Research on how ICT diffusion and environment can be used to increase governmental 
transparency and reduce corruption is important for several reasons. First, as suggested by Soper 
(2007), research into using ICTs to increase transparency and reduce corruption provides the 
“best scientific advice possible to world leaders who are seeking to lift their citizens…”(p. 8). 
ICTs have the ability to support the free exchange of information, thereby informing citizens 
about their government and society. ICTs promote greater transparency by removing information 
barriers and asymmetry (Sturges, 2004) and fostering civil and political freedoms (Baliamoune-
Lutz, 2003). Indeed, there is a trend in many developed countries towards publishing information 
on the Internet concerning governmental issues (García-Murillo, 2010). 
Secondly, the ability of ICTs to reduce corruption can expand economic freedom. As 
Vinod (1999) stated, increasing economic freedom and education is among the top actions in 
reducing corruption. There is less than optimal economic development in countries with higher 




corruption reduces economic freedoms by placing a burden on the economy. Every dollar worth 
of corruption in developing countries, when viewed as a form of illegal taxation, equates to $1.67 
worth of economic burden (Vinod, 1999). The economic burden of corruption in developing 
countries compounds over time and is more distortionary than actual taxes (Vinod, 1999). 
Therefore, a reduction of corruption would have a significant impact in the reduction of 
economic disparity. 
The purpose of this study is to do as Pirannejad (2011) suggests: future research on how 
specific ICTs affect political development, especially in the context of how people monitor and 
hold their government accountable. First, this study attempts to fill a gap in the existing research 
advocated by Pirannejad (2011) by investigating the effects of the ICT environment and the 
diffusion of two specific ICTs on corruption and transparency. Secondly, this study sets forth a 
robust path model of the ICT environment, the diffusion of two specific ICTs, and two 
macroeconomic variables to examine the relationship among ICTs and macroeconomic variables 
in providing greater government transparency and reducing corruption. As of yet, no other 
research has examined such a relationship using a robust path modeling. Therefore, this study 
attempts to provide a significant contribution to the existing body of research by investigating the 
effect of the ICT environment and the diffusion of two specific ICTs on corruption and 





REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE 
2.1 Corruption 
Corruption has been a topic for writers and scholars since antiquity. The writer of the 
Arthashastra, an ancient Indian text written around 4 BCE, talks about the eventuality of 
corruption and the need to minimize it (Kautalya & Rangarajan, 1992). The academic study of 
corruption has been explored in several different ways over the past sixty years in international 
business, economics, and political science literature (Akçay, 2006; Arvas & Ata, 2011; Donchev 
& Ujhelyi, 2009; Leff, 1964; Macrae, 1982; Mauro, 1995; McMullan, 1961; Myrdal, 1970a; 
Nye, 1967; Rose-Ackerman, 1978, 1999, 2008). Such explorations on the topic of corruption 
have included: what corruption is, what the different types of corruption are, how corruption 
affect governments and their citizenry, and possible anti-corruption remedies and measures. 
According to Myrdal (1970a), sparse serious academic attention was given to the topic of 
corruption prior to his seminal works as the topic was considered “taboo” (p. 227). Myrdal 
(1970a) suggested that empirical research should be done to “establish the general nature and 
extent of corruption… and any trends that are discernible” (p. 231). Earlier examination into 
systemic corruption focused on the moral, cultural, and historical causes and effects of 
corruption, while later studies began to examine institutional and political aspects of corruption 
(Galtung & Pope, 1999). 
Several researchers have previously undertaken the task of defining corruption such as 
Myrdal (1970a), Heidenheimer (1970), Rose-Ackerman (1978), Macrae (1982), Colander 




corruption is difficult, thereby hindering research in the area (Farrales, 2005; Peters & Welch, 
1978). There are a wide range of activities described in the research literature that can be 
classified as corrupt practices, from advantageous influence over and lobbying on government 
and political agents, to outright illegal activities such as bribery, extortion, and fraud. 
Furthermore, operationalizing corruption has proven difficult since corrupt behavior does not 
lend itself to direct, unbiased, and measurable observation (Andvig et al., 2000). Rose-Ackerman 
(1978) stated that corruption must be examined using political science and modern economics. 
This approach combines the economist’s models of self-interested behavior with the political 
scientist’s understanding of bureaucratic incentive structures. 
Rose-Ackerman (1978) examined corruption through extending the principal-agent 
model found in the economics and political science research literature. The principal-agent 
model arises from the division of labor and exchange (Smith, 1776). The principal is someone 
who wishes for some action to be done but cannot or does not perform the action. The principal 
enlists the services of the agent to perform the desired action on the principal’s behalf (Laffont, 
2003). In political science, the principal consists of voters who enlist elected officials as agents 
to govern on the electorate’s behalf. In the Rose-Ackerman (1978) principal-agent model, 
corruption is primarily bribery of an agent who is an elected or appointed official. The principal 
of this agent is the electorate or some supervisor who specifies desired outcomes. As monitoring 
of the agent is costly, in terms of time and resources, the agent has some freedom to place his 
own interest above that of the principal. A third person who can benefit from the agent’s action 
or inaction offers the agent an incentive (e.g. a bribe) to influence his actions. The benefits of 




subvert the principal’s objectives, and in some cases, the principal may be more satisfied with 
the agent’s performance. 
Another relevant model of corruption is that of Macrae (1982) in which corruption is 
defined as an “arrangement” (p. 678) involving “a private exchange between two parties (the 
‘demander’ and the ‘supplier’), which (1) has an influence on the allocation of resources either 
immediately or in the future, and (2) involves the use or abuse of public or collective 
responsibility for private ends” (p. 678). Thus, corruption is the use of public office or power for 
personal gain. In contrast to the Rose-Ackerman (1978) model, which examines corruption 
through the principal-agent problem, Macrae (1982)’s model of corruption explores a supply and 
demand relationship for the reallocation of public resources for private gain. Hence, corruption 
allows the misallocation of public resources, thereby creating bias against technological 
advances and efficient projects and practices (Mauro, 1995). 
Corruption, according to Myrdal (1970a), has one defining aspect being the “difference in 
mores as to where, when, and how to make personal gain” (p. 233). Myrdal (1970a) further states 
that corruption introduces “irrationality” (p. 233) in government planning and fulfillment. Such 
irrationality influences development in such a way as to deviate from the intended plan and 
fulfillment for personal gain. Corruption, thereby, hampers the decision-making and execution 
processes at all levels of government (Myrdal, 1970a). Nye (1967) defined corruption as 
“behavior [that] deviates from the formal duties of a public role of private-regarding … 
pecuniary or status gains; or violates rules against the exercise of certain types of private-
regarding influence” (p. 416). Nye (1967)’s definition speaks of formal rules and duties and is 





A widely utilized definition of corruption put forth by Heidenheimer, Johnston, and Le 
Vine (1989) and Rose-Ackerman (1978) is that corruption is a transactional relationship between 
public and private sector agents by which collective goods or services are converted 
(illegitimately) into private gains. Scholars in the study of corruption focus on one of two types 
of corruption: bureaucratic or political (Farrales, 2005). Furthermore, Huntington (1968a) posed 
that political corruption can exist in two forms. Some scholars propose that any valid assessment 
of corruption must include political dimensions (Hope & Chikulo, 2000; Johnston, 1997). 
Political corruption is generally viewed as the practice of using wealth, power, or status to 
influence the political system in order to gain political advantage. Conversely, another form of 
political corruption is when politicians use political influence and advantage to gain private 
wealth, power, or status. Political corruption usually takes place with highly placed or elected 
officials and is furthered by policy or legislation formation tailored to benefit the corrupt officials 
(Moody-Stuart, 1997). Bureaucratic corruption is the corrupt behavior in the administration of 
public policy. It seeks to influence governmental processes, such as obtaining permits or 
avoiding tariffs, or paying government enforcement officials. 
Corruption can also be defined in economic and social terms. Economic corruption 
involves the exchange of tangible goods in a market-like situation such as bribes or rent-seeking 
(Andvig et al., 2000). Rent-seeking is often classified as a type of economic corruption. This 
type of corruption involves misuse of public power to derive excess earnings by the elimination 
of competition (Ades & Di Tella, 1999). Rent-seeking is not necessarily banned by legislation or 
shunned by society’s moral obligation. However, it reduces public wealth in favor of private gain 
and generally proves economically wasteful and inefficient (Coolidge & Rose-Ackerman, 2000). 




favoritism. In such social corruption, there is an exchange of material benefit based on some 
criteria having a large social or cultural implication (Briquet & Sawicki, 1998).  
Amundsen (1999) put forth five main manifestations of corruption: bribery, 
embezzlement, fraud, extortion, and favoritism. The first and most quintessential manifestation 
of corruption is bribery. Bribery is a payment, usually to a government official, to receive some 
governmental benefit. Bribery has many effective forms such as kickbacks and pay-offs. The 
second manifestation of corruption is embezzlement. While embezzlement is not strict 
corruption, its practice deprives the government of funds. It is similar to bribery except that it 
typically does not involve the private sector. The third manifestation of corruption is fraud. This 
type of corruption involves the manipulation or distortion of information or fact by public 
officials. Fraud, similar to the Rose-Ackerman (1978) principal-agent model, involves an agent 
(e.g. public official) who carries out the directives of his principals (e.g. supervisors). The agent 
manipulates the flow of information for some illegal gain that may or may not benefit the 
principal (Eskeland, Thiele, & World Bank, 1999). The fourth type of corruption manifestation is 
extortion. Similar to bribery, this method extracts benefits by way of coercion, violence, or threat 
of force. Bribery and extortion are equivalent to extra taxes levied by – but not collected for – the 
government (Wei, 1997). The fifth manifestation of corruption is favoritism. This mechanism of 
corruption allows the differential access to governmental power or state resources regardless of 
merit. This method of corrupt behavior can be examined as enfranchising (e.g. preferential 
treatment, cronyism, and nepotism) or disenfranchising (e.g. discrimination) based on some 
criteria having a large social or cultural implication (Briquet & Sawicki, 1998). 
The wide-ranging definition used by the World Bank, Transparency International and 




(Amundsen, 1999; Andvig et al., 2000; Gray & Kaufmann, 1998; Rose-Ackerman, 1996). Most 
literature examines governmental corruption, which is the relationship between the public and 
private entities engaged in corrupt behaviors. However, there exists corruption among private 
businesses and non-governmental organizations (Andvig et al., 2000). This private sector 
corruption exists with or without the involvement of a government official or political advantage. 
Corruption is difficult to measure directly. Peters and Welch (1978) and Farrales (2005) 
noted that defining and conceptualizing corruption is difficult, thus hindering research in the 
area. There are a multitude of activities that can be classified as corrupt practices which makes 
operationalizing of corruption difficult. Corrupt practices would have to be measured by an 
unbiased observer familiar with rules and policies in a given context. Most corrupt behavior does 
not lend itself to such direct, unbiased, and measurable observation (Andvig et al., 2000). 
One observable measure of corruption is court cases. Such judiciary data on corruption is 
collected on an international basis by the United Nations’ Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice 
Division (United Nations, 1999). In such court cases, legal officials determine whether 
transactions or exchanges were actually corrupt. While court cases can provide an observable 
measure, Andvig et al. (2000) pointed out several issues with using such observations. First, 
using such court cases as an indication or prevalence of corruption relies on the honesty of the 
local judiciaries. Intraregional and international differences obviously exist in the honesty of 
judiciaries which make such observations problematic in a cross-country analysis. Secondly, 
local policing, judicial and political priorities usually determine which cases are prosecuted. Goel 
and Nelson (1998) suggest that court cases on corruption represent more of the judicial 
efficiency rather than corruption prevalence in a country. Police and other investigatory agencies 




information from such agencies, however, is quite inconsistent and biased (Andvig, 1995; 
Duyne, 1996). 
News reports and other investigative journalistic methods are another way to measure and 
fight corruption (Reinikka & Svensson, 2005). However, using such news reports and 
investigative journalism as an observable measure of corruption is problematic. News and media 
reports of corruption can show bias in a similar fashion to court cases and policing reports. 
Media and news reports tend to give priority to high-profile or sensational cases. This selective 
priority creates a bias that may not examine or expose the more pervasive everyday corrupt 
activities. Furthermore, reported stories often are a factor of press freedom which are not uniform 
among countries (Nixon, 1960). Therefore, the effectiveness of a free press on reducing 
corruption largely relies on the measure of press freedom (Brunetti & Weder, 2003). Also, public 
exposure of corruption and crime can be dangerous for the reporting journalists (Archibold, 
2012). Corrupt and criminal officials typically do not care for such negative exposure due to 
repercussions from law enforcement or other criminal elements. Sources of corruption are 
strongly influenced by such biases as media attention, public opinion, and press freedom, making 
it difficult to use such stories in a cross-country comparison. 
Though corruption is difficult to define, conceptualize, and operationalize (Farrales, 
2005; Peters & Welch, 1978), there have been attempts to develop an empirical measure of 
corruption. These attempts to develop an empirical measure of corruption as based on the 
perception of corruption rather than the actual instances or experiences of corruption. There is 
some academic debate on whether a perception-based measure can adequately compare to an 




2010). However, the indices listed below became the de facto empirical measures of corruption 
used in academic research (Lambsdorff, 1999a; Lancaster & Montinola, 1997). 
Business International Corporation (BI) created one of the first corruption perception 
measurements. BI was a business advisory firm founded in 1953 which assisted American 
companies in foreign business operations. BI surveyed its network of international 
businesspeople, journalists, and country specialists, determining whether or not and to what 
extent businesses were engaged in corruption transactions. BI also gathered survey data on such 
factors as political risk, commercial hazard, and level of corruption in various countries. This 
perceived level of corruption was measured on a scale from 0 to 10. BI undertook efforts to make 
ranks consistent among respondents. Using the BI data for  fifty-two countries, Mauro (1995) 
conducted the first quantitative study of corruption using an econometric model. Mauro (1995)’s 
study examined the effect of corruption on the economic growth rate. As a result, Mauro (1995) 
found that corruption lowered investment, which in turn lowered economic growth. 
The International Country Risk Guide (ICRG) contains another well-known corruption 
perception measurement. The ICRG has been published since 1980, making it the longest 
country risk analysis dataset. The ICRG measures several country factors, but the one most 
related to corruption is the ICRG bureaucratic quality scale. The scale measures expert opinions, 
from 1 to 6, and shows how efficiently and predictable bureaucrats operate (S. Johnson, 
Kaufmann, & Zoido-Lobatón, 1998). The ICRG is published by the Political Risk Services 
Group and provides a monthly political, economic, and financial risk ranking for 140 countries. 
The Political Risk Services Group, founded in 1979, is one of the earliest commercial providers 




contains the rule-of-law scale, from 0 to 6, measuring the strength and application of law and 
order in the country.  
Arguably the most well-known and widely-used index of corruption is the Corruption 
Perception Index (CPI) by Transparency International (TI) which is an international non-
governmental organization founded in 1993 that monitors and reports on political and corporate 
corruption in international development (Andvig et al., 2000; Brown, 2006; De Maria, 2008; 
Lambsdorff, 1999b; Svensson, 2005). The CPI measures the perceived degree of corruption that 
exists among public officials and politicians (Lambsdorff, 1999a). The CPI is the most widely 
disseminated and popular index among policymakers. It is a composite index including survey 
data from country experts, businesspeople, global analysts, and experts who are residents of the 
evaluated countries (Svensson, 2005). The CPI focuses on perceptions of public sector 
corruption. This index ranks countries on a scale from 10 (representing a very clean/very little 
corruption government) to 0 (representing a highly corrupt government). TI uses 17 different 
surveys and polls from 10 independent organizations: Freedom House (FH); Gallup International 
(GI); The Economist Intelligence Unit (EIU); Institute of Management Development (IMD);  
International Working Group (developing the Crime Victim Survey); Political and Economic 
Risk Consultancy (PERC); Political Risk Service (PRS); The Wall Street Journal - Central 
European Economic Review (CEER); World Bank and University of Basel (WB/UB); and 
World Economic Forum (WEF). The CPI is widely-used as there is a high degree of correlation 
between the 17 polls and surveys used (Lambsdorff, 1999a). The use of several different survey 
instruments and the high inter-correlation between instruments results provide a major strength 
to the CPI. The surveys cover a wide range of corrupt behaviors and practices, and they do not 




The CPI is an index ranking and should be understood as such. Lambsdorff (1999b) 
points out several caveats to understanding the CPI. First, countries for which at least three 
surveys were available are represented in the index. Several countries are not included for lack of 
available data. Secondly, the index is a perception of corruption and not based on a standardized 
estimation of the level of corruption. For example, the 2010 CPI ranked Mexico as 3.1 and 
United Arab Emirates was ranked 6.3. This does not imply that the United Arab Emirates is half 
as corrupt as Mexico. The index is best used in observing trends over time and comparing 
relative positions of countries to one another (Galtung, 1998). 
While corruption is considered difficult to measure, corruption indexes are highly 
correlated with one another. For example, the CPI and BI indexes for 1996 and 1998 were highly 
correlated at 0.967 and 0.966 (Andvig et al., 2000; Treisman, 2000). The BI and CPI indexes 
show a similar high correlation to the ICRG (Andvig et al., 2000). While there are differences 
among the surveys and their methodologies, the high correlation implies that levels of perceived 
corruption are consistent among countries (Lambsdorff, 1999a). 
Some scholars suggest that corruption has been the norm throughout human history 
(Klitgaard, 1988; Neild, 2002). Huntington (1968a) stated that lack of political or economic 
opportunities creates an environment by which people use wealth to buy power or pursue wealth 
by use of political power. One hypothesized cause of bureaucratic corruption is that government 
officials and civil servants maximize expected income (Becker & Stigler, 1974). Corrupt 
behavior is generally punished by job loss which provides a disincentive to engage in such 
behavior. However, bureaucratic corruption is more prevalent when the bribe levels are relatively 
high, the probability of detection is low, and/or the punishment for corrupt behavior is slight 




Another hypothesis, the fair wage-effort, expounds that government officials and civil 
servants may forego corrupt behavior if their official government wages are high enough 
(Akerlof & Yellen, 1990). Tanzi (1995) found that low wages invite corruption and lead to 
societal acceptance of the practice. According to Becker (1968)’s seminar work, “Crime and 
Punishment: An Economic Approach,” individuals, including government officials, make 
rational decisions between criminal and legal actions based on the probability of detection and 
severity of the punishment. Based on Becker (1968)’s considerations, the lack of appropriate 
wages, stronger investigatory agents, and harsher punishments, foster an environment for 
corruption. 
Political science scholars view corruption as being caused by deficits in the democratic 
systems such as power-sharing, accountability and transparency, governmental checks and 
balances (Doig & Theobald, 1999). Corruption, in the view of political scientists, is seen as a 
lack of functioning democratic state, ethical leadership and good governance (Hope & Chikulo, 
2000). Friedrich (1989) stated that corruption is inversely proportional to the amount of 
democracy. There exists a correlation between non-democratic rule and corruption (Amundsen, 
1999). It is important to note that in non-democratic regimes, corruption’s impact is somewhat 
mitigated by the level of functionality and control of the government (Girling, 2002). In regimes 
where the government exercises tighter control over the political environment and economy, the 
level of corruption is also controlled. This control makes the corruption more predictable and 
less economically and developmentally destructive (Campos et al., 1999). 
Political scientists have examined internal and external political factors that cause and 
promote corruption. The internal view put forth by Myrdal (1970b) is that modernization 




a failed or incomplete modernization process which left the countries in a mixed state between 
traditionalism and modernism. Corruption, in this view, would decrease as markets and 
government became more modern and efficient. The external political factor view puts forth that 
corruption is a product of external states and multinational corporations exploiting the 
underdeveloped countries, thereby creating and fostering corruption (Blomström & Hettne, 
1984). 
Another political science area of corruption research has developed called the “neo-
patrimonial” approach. Scholars such as Hope and Chikulo (2000) and Coolidge and Rose-
Ackerman (2000) state that in African and several small countries, the core characteristic of 
governance is founded on personal relationships. These relationships form the foundation of the 
political system, and there exists a weak distinction between public and private interests and 
affairs (Bratton & Van de Walle, 1997; Briquet & Sawicki, 1998). Such government constructs 
are characterized by high-ranking government officials engaging in rent-seeking behaviors that 
produce excessive intervention into the economy. This intervention, thus, creates and prorogates 
monopolies, inefficiencies, contradictory government regulations that obstruct overall economic 
growth (Coolidge & Rose-Ackerman, 2000). 
Most of the world’s current bureaucratic structures existing today are a result of Western 
European influences. The notions of the legal authority model of governance and public office 
are very much European constructs (Weber, 1958). In legal authority governance, there is a 
tremendous non-ambiguous distinction between public office and private interest. This 
distinction is important in the modern study of corruption since the popular definition of 
corruption is based on using public office for private gain. The modern European form of 




as a result of long political struggles that eventually became codified and embedded in European 
cultural and political thought (Scott, 1969). The European model of governance was further 
developed by the late nineteenth century movement for government accountability (Scott, 1969). 
In some cases, the copying or patterning of European government and bureaucratic 
structure to other countries occurred in a “schizophrenic” fashion (de Sardan, 1999, p. 47). Many 
countries, either by choice or by force, adopted European bureaucratic processes such as 
governance through legal authority and accountability through public oversight. However, in 
several of those countries, such methods of governance and accountability were not the norm. 
For example, in Africa and South Asia, such European bureaucratic structures based on legal 
authority were adopted out of the legacy of colonialism in spite of conflicting cultural or political 
norms (de Sardan, 1999). The adoption of such European bureaucratic structures in these 
countries were fraught with problematic issues such as viewing the colonial government as 
illegitimate, mistrusting and becoming increasingly frustrated with government officials, and 
disenfranchising the governed (R. Cohen, 1980). 
The effects of corruption are widely debated in international business literature. Some 
authors suggest that corruption provides some economic benefit (Huntington, 1968b; Leff, 
1964). Some authors have identified corruption as one of the major reasons for the decline and 
fall of the Roman Empire (MacMullen, 1988; Murphy, 2007; Stinger, 1985). Corruption 
produces a heavy burden on the poorest in a society who are less able to navigate the system of 
corruption for equal gains and distorts the state’s ability to operate efficiently and effectively 
(Doig & Theobald, 1999). This excess burden and lack of efficiency and effectiveness manifests 




Corruption negatively impacts foreign and domestic investments, thus hampering 
economic growth and development (Ades & Di Tella, 1996; Macrae, 1982; Mauro, 1995; 
Robertson & Watson, 2004). Vinod (1999) pointed out that every $1 of corruption, when viewed 
as illegal taxation, created a $1.67 burden on the economy. Conversely, some forms of 
corruption have been found to be beneficial. Bribes, for example, can expedite bureaucratic 
processes, improve economic efficiency, and incentivize government employees to work harder. 
Bardhan (1997) stated that corruption might increase bureaucratic efficiency by speeding up the 
process of decision making in the presence of rigid regulation. By bribing government officials, 
firms can avoid such “inconveniences” as import tariffs or license requirements and provide 
“motivation” to hardworking government officials. In this case, corruption can be viewed as a 
tax on business operations. However, the research shows that the disadvantage of this type of 
corruption greatly outweighs its potential benefit. Shleifer and Vishny (1993) demonstrate that 
bribes have a higher cost than taxes due to their inherent uncertainty and secrecy. Firms utilizing 
this form of corruption typically spend more time negotiating with bureaucrats, thereby 
increasing the cost of capital (Kaufmann & Wei, 1999). Corruption, in the form of bribery, 
creates an economic societal gap between those who are financially able to pay for access to 
government resources and those who are not. 
Corrupt practices not only make public power less efficient but also adversely affect 
countries’ competitiveness and human development (Akçay, 2006). The effect of corruption on 
human development has shown to be more evident in some countries than others 
(Waheeduzzaman, 2005). For example, many sub-Saharan peasant farmers engaged in 
subsistence crop production as a means of avoiding corruption which ultimately led to a reduced 




effect on economic development. International investment in the form of foreign direct 
investment (FDI) into countries perceived as “more corrupt” is substantially less than countries 
without this perception (Habib & Zurawicki, 2002). Thus, countries with higher levels of 
corruption suffer from less than optimal economic development. The detrimental effect of 
unpredictable corruption has been found to be economically significant (Wei, 2000). A higher 
level of corruption coupled with higher level of uncertainty caused by the corruption reduces FDI 
inflows (Campos et al., 1999). 
Given the effects of corruption, significant time and energy has been placed into reducing 
or eliminating it. The Chinese Qin dynasty penal code had specific provisions and punishments 
for corruption (Lambsdorff, 1999a). The Council of Areopagus had, among its other duties, a 
requirement to report corrupt behavior (Wilson, 1989). Acemoglu and Verdier (2001), Akerlof 
and Yellen (1990) and Tanzi (1995) suggest that public wage changes should be prominently 
discussed as part of anti-corruption policy. Corruption thrives on information asymmetry. One 
method of reducing corruption has been to reduce the information asymmetry by means of 
newspaper articles informing the public. There is evidence that such methods have a positive 
impact on the reduction of corruption (Chowdhury, 2004; Reinikka & Svensson, 2005). For 
example, a Ugandan newspaper campaign provided parents with public funding information on 
local schools (Reinikka & Svensson, 2005). By providing parents with such vital information 
regarding the handling of public funds, there was a significant reduction in the misallocation of 
such funds and an increase in student enrollment and learning. 
Political scientists see corruption as a lack of democracy (Doig & Theobald, 1999; 
Friedrich, 1989; Hope & Chikulo, 2000). Following this logic, increasing democracy would 




democratic institutions such as legislative and judicial bodies to provide more oversight and 
control, and 2) strengthen the civil and public sectors such as the media. Increasing democracy 
does have a correlation for reducing levels of corruption, but such correlation has proven to be 
weak (Amundsen, 1999; Paldam, 2004). In some countries, the democratization process, moving 
from a controlled authoritarian regime to a loosely controlled quasi-democratic government, has 
led to increased corruption (Harriss-White & White, 1996). Treisman (2000) found that the 
degree of democracy was not correlated to the perception of corruption. Rauch and Peter (2000) 
found that democratization through improving public institutions and bureaucratic processes, 
especially predictability, reduces corruption. 
A view put forth by Myrdal (1970b) suggested that modernization promoted 
industrialization which leads to economic development and growth. The view also holds that 
economic development and modernization would permeate through government and society, 
thus eliminating corruption. This view of modernization is similar to those held by other scholars 
that modern technologies are liberating and democratizing (Khan, 1998; Leon, 1984).  
2.2 Information and Communication Technologies and Corruption 
An important tool in modern communication and information sharing is Information and 
Communication Technology (ICT). ICTs consist of two parts: devices and systems, which are 
used to access, store, communicate, manipulate and share information (Melody, Mansell, & 
Richards, 1986). ICT devices are instruments such as cellular phones, televisions, and computers 
that are used by an individual to communicate over a network or system. ICT systems are 
interconnected devices and associated infrastructure such as networks used to facilitate 




Technological innovations such as mass production and miniaturization have lowered the 
cost of ownership of several ICT devices such as computers and mobile cellular phones. 
Furthermore, technological advances such as proliferation of telecommunication satellites and 
broadband data communications have increased the global reach of ICT networks while reducing 
the cost of access. These reductions in cost have made ownership of ICT devices and availability 
of ICT systems available to a greater percentage of the world’s population. ICT diffusion 
increases knowledge diffusion by facilitating and improving efficiency of communication 
(Jovanovic & Rob, 1989). 
However, the reduced cost and increased availability of ICTs, such as mobile cellular 
phones and Internet access, have not led to uniform adaption throughout the world. This lack of 
uniform adoption is known as the digital divide (Norris, 2001). The digital divide is a term given 
to the inequality between groups in their knowledge of, access to, and use of ICTs (Chinn & 
Fairlie, 2007). There has been much scholarly debate on the exact nature and causes of the digital 
divide (Chinn & Fairlie, 2007; Crenshaw & Robison, 2006; Guillén & Suárez, 2005; Norris, 
2001; Sharma, Ng, Dharmawirya, & Lee, 2008; Warf, 2001; Warschauer, 2002). Some authors 
have put forth such factors as income inequality, regulatory environment, foreign and domestic 
investment, cultural differences and quality of the technology as reasons for the digital divide 
(Dasgupta, Lall, & Wheeler, 2001; Erumban & de Jong, 2006; Jakopin & Klein, 2011; Wallsten, 
2005). For example, Gholami et al. (2006) demonstrated that increases in FDI leads to growth in 
ICT investment and capacity by offering host countries more access to technology (OECD, 
1991) and domestic investment (Agrawal, 2003). Jakopin and Klein (2011) showed that 




Much research and debate exists on the nature, extent, and reasons for the digital divide. 
However, there is more consensus among scholars on the effects of ICTs on improving 
transparency and governance. (Avgerou, 1998; Krueger, 2002; Opoku-Mensah, 2000; Soper, 
2007). ICTs have proven to be tools in democratization (Opoku-Mensah, 2000; Soper, 2007), 
factors in economic growth (Avgerou, 1998), methods to help the poor (Forestier et al., 2002), 
and devices that facilitate and improve political involvement (Krueger, 2002, 2006; Norris, 
2001). Geiger and Mia (2009) showed that mobile phone diffusion has a significant positive 
effect on economic growth and poverty reduction. 
One important use of ICTs, and the main focus of this study, is the reduction of 
corruption. ICTs show great promise in increasing transparency and reducing corruption by 
improving governance. Vinod (1999) stated that the Internet’s potential is “promising and 
obviously vast” (p. 10) for reducing corruption. Research has shown that there is a negative 
relationship between ICT investment and the level of political corruption in emerging 
economies. Soper (2007) showed that a negative relationship exists between the level of ICT 
diffusion and corruption. Additionally, Vinod (1999) stated that the top five actions in reducing 
corruption, in order of importance, are as follows: 1) reducing bureaucratic overhead (e.g. red 
tape), 2) increasing judiciary efficiency, 3) increasing GNP per capita, 4), increasing education 
and economic freedoms, and 5) reducing inequalities in income. ICTs such as Internet access and 
mobile cellular phones have the potential to do several of these actions, including informing 
citizens of relevant information regarding government and society. The trend in several 
developed countries includes having more transparency by publishing information on the 
Internet concerning governmental issues (García-Murillo, 2010). Baliamoune-Lutz (2003) 




showed that access to ICT promotes greater governmental transparency by removing information 
barriers and asymmetry. 
Increased access to the Internet and mobile communications has enabled citizens to 
participate more directly in the political and social matters of their countries. This increased 
participation in government, in the form of e-governance, has reduced bureaucratic overhead 
while increasing governmental efficiency and transparency (Andersen et al., 2010; M. Backus, 
2001; Bertot et al., 2010). In several countries, Internet access has become a surrogate for 
judiciary efficiency. In countries such as India, Kenya, and Mexico, citizens are using ICTs to 
draw attention to governmental corruption and civilian crime that would otherwise go unreported 
or unprosecuted (M. Backus, 2001). 
Citizens engaging in societal participation have used ICTs to organize, communicate, and 
raise awareness in such ways as the Arab Spring Revolution in the Arab world and news 
webloggers who expose Mexico’s narcotic traffickers atrocities. Pirannejad (2011) found that 
diffusion of ICT increases citizens’ networking capacity and political awareness while reducing 
their transaction costs. Soper (2007) showed that a negative relationship exists between ICT 
investment and the level of political corruption in emerging economies. Hay and Shleifer (1998) 
noted that private enforcement of public laws is a market response to poor governmental control. 
Some examples of this participation are e-governance  and news blogging (Katz & Lai, 2009). 
2.3 Research Hypotheses 
Based on the above presented literature review, several research hypotheses were 
addressed in this study. Stated below are those research hypotheses and supporting literature. 




model is presented. This theoretical model shows the specific predicted relationships between the 
independent, mediating, and dependent variables. The expected direction of each hypothesized 
relationship is shown as either positive (+) or negative (-). 
As stated in the above literature, there is a digital divide that exists between groups in 
their knowledge of, access to, and use of ICTs (Chinn & Fairlie, 2007). Foreign and domestic 
investment and income inequality have been contributing factors for the digital divide (Dasgupta 
et al., 2001; Erumban & de Jong, 2006). As shown in previous research, macroeconomic 
variables such FDI and GDP per capita have an impact on ICT investment and capacity 
(Gholami et al., 2006; Kshetri & Cheung, 2002; OECD, 1991; Suh & Khan, 2003). For example, 
FDI presents host countries with access to newer technology (OECD, 1991). The increase in FDI 
inflows also increases domestic investment in ICT (Agrawal, 2003). Furthermore, Gholami et al. 
(2006) demonstrated that ICT investment and capacity increases with the inflow of FDI. 
Similarly, Kshetri and Cheung (2002) showed that rapid mobile cellular phone diffusion in China 
was due to large FDI inflow and rapid economic growth. 
As stated earlier, Vinod (1999) suggested that two of the top five actions in reducing 
corruption were increasing GNP per capita and increasing education and economic freedoms. 
While GNP and GDP are closely related, there are some important differences. GNP measures 
all output generated by a country based on ownership of the means of production. In comparison, 
GDP measures all output generated by a country based on geographic location of the means of 
production. There are some scholars who suggest that the GNP, instead of GDP, is the most 
accurate measure of economy well-being and market activity (Brezina, 2012; Stiglitz, 2009). 
However, the Bureau of Economic Analysis (1991) has stated that “virtually all other countries 




(1991), GDP per capita is the most widely used macroeconomic indicator of a country’s standard 
of living. Dewan, Ganley, and Kraemer (2005) found that GDP per capita had a positive effect 
on ICT diffusion. 
A measure of the ICT environment among countries is the Networked Readiness Index 
(NRI) published in the Global Information Technology Report by the World Economic Forum 
together with INSEAD (French name "INStitut Européen d'ADministration des Affaires", or 
European Institute of Business Administration). The NRI measures the degree to which a country 
is positioned to utilize its ICT infrastructure for international competitiveness (Dutta, Lanvin, & 
Paua, 2003). The NRI is made of two parts: an index score and a rank. The index score is the 
numerical combination of the various ICT-related component and subcomponent indexes. There 
are three major component indexes in the NRI: environment, readiness, and usage (Dutta et al., 
2003). The environment component examines the market, political, regulatory, and infrastructure 
environment that facilitate ICT development. The readiness component index reflects the 
preparedness of individuals, governments, and businesses to employ ICT resources to their 
fullest potential. Lastly, the usage component index indicates the level of usage among 
individuals, governments, and businesses. The NRI rank score is the particular country’s 
numerical rank based on its index score. 
The NRI provides an index for measuring the ICT environment and the level of ICT 
diffusion. GDP per capita and FDI should have a positive effect on NRI based on the research by 
Dewan et al. (2005) and Gholami et al. (2006). This leads to the following hypotheses: 
Hypothesis 1a: FDI has a positive effect on networked readiness. 




As previously stated, the NRI measures the degree by which a country is ready to use its 
ICT infrastructure. A component of the NRI is the usage of ICTs such as computers, telephone, 
and Internet usage. This usage component of the NRI also includes the diffusion of Internet 
access and mobile cellular phone usage among the country’s population.  
Access to the Internet and mobile cellular phone usage are important ways for citizens to 
more readily participate in their country’s political and social matters. For example, e-
governance has reduced bureaucratic overhead while increasing governmental efficiency and 
transparency (Andersen et al., 2010; M. Backus, 2001; Bertot et al., 2010). Furthermore, Geiger 
and Mia (2009) showed that mobile phone diffusion has a significant positive effect on economic 
growth and poverty reduction. 
The difference between Internet access and mobile cellular phone as separate ICT 
modalities is slowly disappearing. Baliamoune-Lutz (2003) stated that differences between 
communication technology (e.g. mobile phones) and information technology (e.g. the Internet) 
have become blurred. While the Internet is an indicator of information technology, consumers 
can access data and information via mobile phones (H.-W. Kim, Chan, & Gupta, 2007). For 
example, in Japan, approximately 40% of the population accesses the Internet via mobile phones 
(Kenichi, 2004). 
Based on the above literature, the state of ICT infrastructure, as measured through the 
NRI, should have a positive effect on the diffusion of Internet access and mobile cellular phones. 
Jakopin and Klein (2011) found that regulatory quality and market environment, two 




Kenichi (2004), mobile cellular phone diffusion should lead to an increase diffusion of Internet 
access. This leads to the following hypotheses: 
Hypothesis 2a: Networked readiness has a positive effect on Internet diffusion. 
Hypothesis 2b: Networked readiness has a positive effect on mobile phone diffusion. 
Hypothesis 2c: Mobile phone diffusion has a positive effect on Internet diffusion. 
ICT has been shown to promote greater governmental transparency by removing 
information barriers and asymmetry (Sturges, 2004). Diffusion of ICTs raises citizens’ 
participation in governance by increasing networking capacity and political awareness while 
reducing their transaction costs (Pirannejad, 2011). ICTs such as Internet access enables citizens 
to stay informed with relevant information about their government and society. E-governance 
and social media, which rely heavily on the Internet, also promote openness and transparency in 
government (Bertot et al., 2010). Additionally, García-Murillo (2010) found that access and 
diffusion of relevant information concerning governmental issues promotes greater transparency. 
S. M. Johnson (1998) and Cuillier and Piotrowski (2009) demonstrated that the Internet 
expands public access to government information. Jakopin and Klein (2011) found that Internet 
diffusion significantly predicts governmental transparency, as measured by the Voice and 
Accountability indicator of the World Bank’s Worldwide Governance Indicators. Based on the 
above cited research, Internet diffusion and mobile cellular diffusion should positively affect the 
level of transparency. These premises lead to the following hypotheses: 




Hypothesis 3b: Mobile phone diffusion has a positive effect on transparency. 
Some authors have put forth the positive effects of ICTs on improving transparency and 
governance (Avgerou, 1998; Krueger, 2002; Opoku-Mensah, 2000; Soper, 2007). ICTs have 
been shown to be a tool in democratization (Opoku-Mensah, 2000; Soper, 2007) and a device 
that facilities and improves political involvement (Krueger, 2002, 2006; Norris, 2001).  
ICTs improve governance by increasing transparency and reducing corruption. There 
exists a negative relationship between ICT investment and the level of political corruption in 
emerging economies (Soper, 2007). Baliamoune-Lutz (2003) showed that ICT diffusion fosters 
civil and political freedoms. Access to ICTs promotes greater governmental transparency by 
removing information barriers and asymmetry (Sturges, 2004). In addition, increased 
government participation by citizens in such forms of e-governance has been shown to increase 
transparency while reducing bureaucratic overhead (Andersen et al., 2010; M. Backus, 2001; 
Bertot et al., 2010). 
Increased transparency through initiatives such as e-governance has been shown to be an 
effective anti-corruption tool (Bertot et al., 2010). A lack of transparency can exacerbate 
corruption-related problems (Kolstad & Wiig, 2009). Similarly, Brunetti and Weder (2003) 
found a strong association between transparency through greater press freedom and less 
corruption. 
The main focus of this study is to explore the relationships between ICT diffusion and 
corruption. Given the above stated research and the goals of this study, the relationship between 
the diffusion of specific ICTs and reduction of corruption will be examined. This leads to the 




Hypothesis 4a: Internet diffusion has a negative effect on corruption. 
Hypothesis 4b: Transparency has a negative effect on corruption. 
Hypothesis 4c: Mobile phone diffusion has a negative effect on corruption. 
The diffusion of ICTs, levels of transparency, and levels of corruption is not uniform 
throughout the world. One common thread set forth in prior research attempting to explain the 
non-uniform diffusion of technology and differences in transparency and corruption among 
countries are national culture differences and technology quality (Erumban & de Jong, 2006; 
Husted, 1999; Kenichi, 2004; Luo, 2008; Moghadam & Assar, 2008; Paldam, 2004). 
In order to account for the effects of national culture differences, various studies 
examining ICT effects use the Hofstede Cultural Dimension framework (Erumban & de Jong, 
2006; Moghadam & Assar, 2008; Straub, Keil, & Brenner, 1997; Stulz & Williamson, 2003). 
The Hofstede Cultural Dimension indices are the result of work by Geert Hofstede involving 
cultural dimensions of a society and how these dimensions affect behavior (Hofstede, Hofstede, 
& Minkov, 2010). Hofstede’s analysis of national cultures identified four anthropological 
systematic differences: power distance (PDI), individualism (IDV), uncertainty avoidance (UAI) 
and masculinity (MAS) (Hofstede, 1984). In 1991, Hofstede added the additional cultural 
dimension of long term orientation (LTO) (Hofstede, 1997). 
The Hofstede Cultural Dimension framework has been used extensively in prior research. 
Erumban and de Jong (2006) found that power distance and uncertainty avoidance, two 
dimensions of the Hofstede Cultural Dimension framework, directly influence ICT adoption. 




account for differences in e-mail usage. Furthermore, de Mooij and Hofstede (2002) state that 
culture replaces such things as personal income and national wealth in consumer consumption 
patterns and that Hofstede’s uncertainty avoidance was related to such things as embracement of 
the Internet and the ownership of computers and mobile cellular phones. Given the potential 
influences of national cultural differences, dimensions of the Hofstede Cultural Dimensions 
framework were used as national culture control variables. 
2.4 Theoretical Model 
The literature cited in the above review suggests there are complex relationships that 
exist between key macroeconomic variables, ICT indices, corruption, and transparency. A deeper 
understanding and explanation of these relationships provide the foundation for this study. A 
brief description of the key and control variables is presented below. These key and control 
variables are discussed in further detail in section 3.3 Variable Description. 
This study used seven key variables and five control variables in the theoretical model. 
The independent macroeconomic key variables in the theoretical model are Foreign Direct 
Investment (FDI) and Gross Domestic Product per capita (GDP per capita). The independent 
macroeconomic key variable of FDI is the net inflow of investment (measured in current U.S. 
dollars) into a domestic economy by foreign investors. The independent macroeconomic key 
variable of GDP per capita measures the gross domestic product divided by the midyear 
population. 
The intervening key ICT variables in the theoretical model are Networked Readiness 
Index (NRI), Internet diffusion, and Mobile diffusion. The intervening key ICT variable of NRI 




international competitiveness. The intervening key ICT variable of Internet diffusion measures 
the distribution of Internet access within a country. The intervening key ICT variable of Mobile 
diffusion measures the dispersion of mobile cellular phone access within a country. The 
intervening and dependent governance key variable of Transparency measures the degree to 
which governmental officials and processes are visible and accountable to those who are 
governed. This study’s main dependent governance key variable of Corruption measures the 
degree of corrupt practices in a country’s public sector.  
This study also utilized five control variables. Four of these control variables were used 
as national culture control variables to examine potential cultural factors influencing the main 
dependent variable. These national culture control variables included the Hofstede Cultural 
Dimension indices of Power Distance, Individualism vs. Collectivism, Long- vs. Short-Term 
Orientation, and Uncertainty Avoidance. The national cultural control variable of power distance 
(H-PDI) measures the extent to which less powerful members of society accept and/or expect 
unequal distribution of power. The national cultural control variable for individualism versus 
collectivism (H-IDV) measures the extent to which individuals are incorporated into groups. The 
national cultural control variable for long- versus short-term orientation (H-LTO) measures the 
future orientation of a society. The national cultural control variable for uncertainty avoidance 
(H-UAI) measures the degree of tolerance for uncertainty and ambiguity. The year was also used 
as a control variable. The control variable of year was included as a twelfth variable in order to 
control for potential multiple year effects. The control variable of year is not considered to be a 
key variable, but it is shown in the theoretical model. 
Figure 2.1 presents the hypothesized relationships between the key and control variables 




theoretical model illustrates these relationships along with their predicted effects. Figure 2.1 also 
shows the control variables used in the study. The theoretical model shows the expected 
direction of each hypothesized relationship and the expected effect of each relationship between 
dependent, mediating and independent variables as either positive (+) or negative (-). 
Figure 2-1. Theoretical model with hypotheses and predicted effects. 
The theoretical model used in this study will be analyzed using path analysis. This 
theoretical model hypothesizes complex and intervening relationships. By using path analysis, 
indirect and total effects of variables within the model can be examined. Additionally, the model 
contains two or more variables pointing at one variable. Such multivariate adjustments may 







The research design and methodology are explained in this section. In the first part of this 
section, an overview of the sample countries used in the study is provided. In the second part of 
this section, the variables used in the study are presented along with a focus on data collection 
and data sources. In the third part of this section, a detailed description of each variable is 
provided. In the fourth part of this section, the methods used to prepare the data for analysis such 
as completeness and multicollinearity tests are described. Finally, in the fifth and final part of 
this section, the method of data analysis is described.  
3.1 Sample Design 
As of 2012, there were 193 existing sovereign states and countries (United Nations, 
2012). This study examined 121 countries of those 193 countries. Table 3-1 provides a list of the 
countries selected for analysis in this study. Countries were selected for inclusion in the study 
based on data availability of the key variables. The countries used in this study are representative 
of a diverse range of economic and political structures. The key and control variables used in this 
study are enumerated and described in section 3.3: Variable Description. This study used multi-
year data for these key and control variables collected over a period from 2006 to 2010. 
The study excludes 72 sovereign states and countries. These sovereign states and 
countries were excluded due to lack of data availability of the key variables (Messner, 1992). 
Key variable data was collected from several multinational datasets from various sources such as 




Technology Report, World Bank Worldwide Governance Indicators, and Transparency 
International. 
Table 3-1. List of countries used in this study. 





Angola Ecuador Luxembourg Singapore 
Argentina Egypt Macedonia Slovakia 
Armenia El Salvador Madagascar Slovenia 
Australia Estonia Malawi South Africa 
Austria Ethiopia Malaysia South Korea 
Azerbaijan Finland Mali Spain 
Bahrain France Malta Sri Lanka 
Bangladesh Georgia Mauritania Suriname 
Barbados Germany Mauritius Sweden 
Belgium Greece Mexico Switzerland 
Benin Guatemala Moldova Taiwan 
Bolivia Guyana Mongolia Tanzania 
Bosnia-Herzegovina Honduras Morocco Thailand 
Botswana Hong Kong Mozambique Trinidad and Tobago 
Brazil Hungary Namibia Tunisia 
Bulgaria Iceland Nepal Turkey 
Burkina Faso India Netherlands Uganda 
Burundi Indonesia New Zealand Ukraine 
Cambodia Ireland Nicaragua United Arab Emirates 
Cameroon Israel Nigeria United Kingdom 
Canada Italy Norway USA 
Chad Jamaica Pakistan Uruguay 
Chile Japan Panama Venezuela 
China Jordan Paraguay Vietnam 
Colombia Kazakhstan Peru Zambia 
Costa Rica Kenya Philippines Zimbabwe 
Croatia Kuwait Poland 
 
Cyprus Kyrgyzstan Portugal 
 






3.2 Data Collection 
Data for the key and control variables was collected by country and year using several 
online databases for the 121 countries used in this study. Table 3-2 summarizes the key and 
control variables and their related data sources. Data for the macroeconomic variables of FDI 
and GDP per capita used in this study were collected from the World Bank World Development 
Indicators. Data for the ICT variables of Internet diffusion and Mobile diffusion used in this 
study were collected from the World Bank World Development Indicators. Data for the ICT 
variable of NRI used in this study was collected from the World Economic Forum Global 
Information Technology Report. 
Table 3-2. Data sources for variables. 
Variable Measure Source 
Transparency Voice and Accountability Indicator World Bank Worldwide 
Governance Indicators 
Corruption Corruption Perceptions Index Transparency International 
Internet diffusion Internet users (per 100 people) The World Bank World 
Development Indicators 
Mobile diffusion Mobile cellular subscriptions per 
100 people 
The World Bank World 
Development Indicators 
FDI Foreign direct investment, net 
inflows (balance of payments, 
current US$)  
The World Bank World 
Development Indicators 
NRI Networked Readiness Index World Economic Forum Global 
Information Technology Report 
GDP per capita Gross Domestic Product per capita 
(current US$) 
The World Bank World 
Development Indicators 
H-PDI Power Distance Index Hofstede Dimension Data Matrix 
H-UAI Uncertainty Avoidance Index Hofstede Dimension Data Matrix 
H-LTO Long-Term Orientation Index Hofstede Dimension Data Matrix 





 Data for the variable of Transparency used in this study was collected from the World 
Bank Worldwide Governance Indicators. Data for the variable of Corruption used in this study 
was collected from Transparency International’s Corruption Perceptions Index. Data for the 
national culture control variables of Power Distance Index, Uncertainty Avoidance Index, Long-
Term Orientation Index, and Individuality Index used in this study was collected from the 
Hofstede Cultural Dimension scores gathered through the Geert Hofstede Dimension Data 
Matrix as presented in Cultures and Organizations 3
rd
 edition (Hofstede et al., 2010). The total 
dataset consisted of 605 rows. Table 3-3 presents the key and control variables with the number 
of data items collected for each year. 
Table 3-3. Number of data items collected for each variable by year. 
Variable  2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 Total 
Transparency 121 121 121 121 121 605 
Corruption 120 120 121 121 120 602 
Internet diffusion 119 119 119 119 120 596 
Mobile diffusion 119 119 119 118 120 595 
FDI 120 120 120 120 120 600 
NRI 121 118 120 119 116 594 
GDP per capita 120 120 120 120 120 600 
H-PDI 75 75 75 75 75 375 
H-UAI 75 75 75 75 75 375 
H-LTO 86 86 86 86 86 430 




3.3 Variable Description 
This study explored the hypothesized relationships between macroeconomic, ICT, 
governance and sociocultural variables using the key and control variables as listed in Table 3-3. 




The independent and mediating variables in the theoretical model are Foreign Direct Investment, 
Gross Domestic Product per capita, Networked Readiness Index, Internet diffusion, Mobile 
diffusion, and Transparency. The intervening or mediating variables in the theoretical model are 
Networked Readiness Index, Internet diffusion, Mobile diffusion, and Transparency. Finally, the 
main dependent variable in the theoretical model is Corruption. The national culture control 
variables used in this study were Hofstede’s Cultural Dimension indices of Power Distance, 
Individuality, Long-Term Orientation, and Uncertainty Avoidance. A further enumeration and 
detailed description of the key and control variables are presented below. Representations in the 
data analysis and structural models of these key and control variables are presented in 
parentheses. 
The macroeconomic variable of Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) is the net inflow of 
investment, measured in current U.S. dollars, into a domestic economy by foreign investors. 
These investment inflows are shown in the balance of payments as financial transfers, including 
the sum of equity capital, reinvestment of earnings, short-term and long-term capital. Data for 
the variable of FDI was captured through foreign direct investment, net inflows (BoP, current 
U.S. $) indicator from the World Bank World Development Indicators which is reported in 
current U.S. dollars. The foreign direct investment, net inflows (BoP, current U.S.$) indicator as 
contained in the World Bank World Development Indicators data were supplied by the 
International Monetary Fund’s Balance of Payments database and supplemented by data from the 
United Nations Conference on Trade and Development and other official national sources. 
The FDI data values are quite large and varied -- ranging from hundreds of thousands to 
hundreds of billions of U.S. dollars. The large and varied values of the FDI data tend to increase 




2002). Logarithmic data transformation is the process of converting a data value into its 
logarithmic value using some base such as the natural base (℮). Logarithmic transformations of 
data can transform non-linear relationships into linear ones and normalize positively skewed 
distributions (Sokal & Rohlf, 1969). Such logarithmic transformation allows easier handling and 
interpretation of data values with a high degree of variance (Zar, 1999). A general logarithmic 
transformation could not be performed because a few of the FDI data values were negative. 
Therefore, the logarithmic transformation was performed on the absolute value of the FDI data 
values. Depending on the sign of the original FDI data value, a logarithmic transformed value 
was multiplied by a constant of +1 or -1 to represent its original sign. For example, negative FDI 
data values, which represent divestiture or disinvestment, were represented by multiplying the 
logarithmic transformation value by negative 1. 
The macroeconomic variable of Gross Domestic Product per capita (GDP per capita) 
measures the gross domestic product divided by the midyear population. Data for the variable of 
GDP per capita data was captured through the gross domestic product per capita (current U.S. $) 
indicator from the World Bank World Development Indicators and was measured in current U.S. 
dollars. The gross domestic product per capita (current U.S.$) indicator data as contained in the 
World Bank’s World Development Indicators was supplied by the World Bank national accounts 
data and Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD ) National Accounts 
data files. 
GDP per capita is the most widely used macroeconomic indicator of a country’s standard 
of living (Ringen, 1991). There are some scholars who suggest that the GNP, instead of GDP, is 
a more accurate measure of economy well-being and market activity (Brezina, 2012; Stiglitz, 




countries have already adopted GDP as their primary measure of production” (p. 8). Studies 
researching the relationships between macroeconomic and ICT variables generally use GDP or 
GDP per capita to measure economic activity and growth (Addison & Heshmati, 2004; Dewan et 
al., 2005; Kiiski & Pohjola, 2002). 
The ICT variable of Networked Readiness Index (NRI) measures the degree to which a 
country is positioned to use its ICT infrastructure for international competitiveness. Data for the 
variable of NRI was captured through the Networked Readiness Index index score as published 
in the Global Information Technology Report by the World Economic Forum together with 
INSEAD (French name "INStitut Européen d'ADministration des Affaires", or European 
Institute of Business Administration). The Networked Readiness Index as published in the Global 
Information Technology Report is comprised of two parts: an index score and a rank. In this 
study, only the index score was used as the measure of analysis. The index score is a composite 
of three component indexes: environment, readiness, and usage. The environment component 
index and its subcomponents examine the market, political, regulatory, and infrastructure 
conditions that facilitate or hamper ICT growth. The readiness component index and its 
subcomponents examine the readiness and preparedness of individuals, governments, and 
businesses to utilize ICT resources. The usage component index and its subcomponents examine 
the levels of usage among individuals, governments, and businesses. The composite index, 
ranging from 1.0 (worst) to 7.0 (best), provides a method for a) calculating the relative and 
overall development and use of ICT in countries and b) understanding the strengths and 
weaknesses of a country’s ICT readiness to compete in a global environment. The rank is the 




This study utilized two variables to measure ICT diffusion. These two ICT variables 
include Internet diffusion and Mobile diffusion. The ICT variable for diffusion of Internet 
(Internet diffusion) measures the distribution of Internet access within a country. Data for the 
variable of Internet diffusion data was captured through the Internet users (per 100 people) 
indicator from the World Bank World Development Indicators. The Internet users (per 100 
people) indicator measures the number of persons per 100 people of a country’s population who 
have access to the Internet. Data for the Internet users (per 100 people) indicator as contained in 
The World Bank World Development Indicators were supplied by the International 
Telecommunication Union’s World Telecommunication/ICT Development Report and World 
Bank estimates. The International Telecommunications Union (ITU) is a special agency of the 
United Nations responsible for global information and communication technologies 
coordination. 
The ICT variable of mobile cellular diffusion (Mobile diffusion) measures the dispersion 
of mobile cellular phone access within a country. Data for the variable of Mobile diffusion was 
captured through the Mobile cellular subscriptions (per 100 people) indicator of the World Bank 
World Development indicators. This indicator measures the number of persons per 100 people of 
a country’s population who have subscriptions to public mobile telephone services using cellular 
technology. These service subscriptions provide access to the public switched telephone 
network. Prepaid and post-paid subscriptions were included in the indicator. 
Data for the Mobile cellular subscriptions (per 100 people) indicator as contained in the 
World Bank World Development Indicators were supplied by the International 
Telecommunication Union’s World Telecommunication/ICT Development Report and database, 




The governance variable of Transparency (Transparency) measures the degree to which 
governmental officials and processes are visible and accountable to those who are governed. 
Data for the variable of Transparency was captured through the Voice and Accountability (VA) 
indicator of the World Bank’s Worldwide Governance Indicators. The Voice and Accountability 
(VA) indicator forms one of six World Bank governance indicators. The Worldwide Governance 
Indicators are a set of six indicators for 215 world economies. These six indicators are: Voice 
and Accountability, Political Stability and Absence of Violence, Government Effectiveness, 
Regulatory Quality, Rule of Law, and Control of Corruption. 
The Voice and Accountability (VA) indicator measures the extent to which a country’s 
citizens are able to participate in their governance by examining several aspects of a country’s 
political processes, including civil liberties, political rights, and a free media (Kaufmann, Kraay, 
& Mastruzzi, 2009). As presented in Table 3-4, the Voice and Accountability (VA) indicator is a 
composite of twenty representative and non-representative data source types such as government 
and public sector (GOV), non-governmental organizations (NGO), commercial business 
information providers (CBIP), and surveys of households and firms (SURVEY). The Voice and 
Accountability (VA) indicator, ranging from around ‐2.5 to 2.5, measures countries’ 
accountability and citizen participation in relation to the global average (equaling zero). 
This composite indicator served as a measure for transparency in this study since public 
voice and methods of accountability in a society create a perception of more transparency 
(Andrea & Antonio, 2007). The variable of Transparency served as a dependent and intervening 




Table 3-4. Voice and Accountability (VA) indicator data types and sources. 
Source Type* 
African Electoral Index (IRP) NGO 
Afro-barometer (AFR) GOV  
Bertelsmann Transformation Index (BTI) NGO  
Cingranelli Richards Human Rights Database and Political Terror Scale 
(HUM) 
GOV 
Economist Intelligence Unit Risk-wire & Democracy Index (EIU) CBIP 
Freedom House (FRH) NGO 
Freedom House Countries at the Crossroads (CCR) NGO  
Gallup World Poll (GWP) SURVEY 
Global Insight Business Conditions and Risk Indicators (WMO) CBIP  
Global Integrity Index (GII) NGO  
IFAD Rural Sector Performance Assessments (IFD) GOV 
Institute for Management and Development World Competitiveness Yearbook SURVEY 
Institutional Profiles Database (IPD) GOV 
International Budget Project Open Budget Index NGO 
Latino-barometro SURVEY 
International Research and Exchanges Board Media Sustainability Index NGO 
Political Risk Services International Country Risk Guide (PRS) CBIP  
Reporters Without Borders Press Freedom Index (RSF) NGO  
Vanderbilt University Americas Barometer SURVEY 
World Economic Forum Global Competitiveness Report (GCS) SURVEY 
Note: “type” refers to the nature of the data source. Data sources for Voice and Accountability 
are from government and public sector (GOV), non-governmental organizations (NGO), 




The governance variable for Corruption (Corruption), the main dependent variable in this 
study, measures the degree of corrupt practices in a country’s public sector. The data for the 
variable of Corruption was captured through the Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI) from 
Transparency International. This index measures the degree of corruption that exists among 
public officials and politicians (Lambsdorff, 1999a). The CPI is the most disseminated among 
policymakers and is a composite index that includes survey data from country experts, 




(Svensson, 2005). The CPI focuses on perceptions of public sector corruption – the use of public 
office for private gain. 
The CPI index ranks countries on a scale from 10 (representing a very clean/minutely 
corrupt government) to 0 (representing a highly corrupt government). On the CPI scale, countries 
with lesser perceptions of corruption score higher. Thus, the CPI scale lends itself to be 
interpreted as ‘the absence of corruption’ perception index. To make the CPI values reflect the 
presence of corruption, a data transformation was performed on the CPI data. The original CPI 
values were multiplied by the constant of negative 1 to inverse the scaling while preserving the 
rank of the values. This data transformation resulted in highly corrupt countries having a higher 
value than those with lower levels of perceived corruption. 
Given the potential important influences of sociocultural values on corruption and ICT 
diffusion, this study included four Hofstede’s Cultural Dimension indices as national culture 
control variables. Husted (1999) found that corruption was significantly correlated to the 
Hofstede cultural dimensions of power distance, masculinity, and uncertainty avoidance. 
According to Myrdal (1970a), corruption is defined, in part, by sociocultural mores and values. 
Furthermore, many scholars suggest that corruption can be defined in sociocultural terms 
(Friedrich, 1989; Johnston, 1997; Rose-Ackerman, 1978, 1996). Also, several authors such as N. 
Rosenberg (1972), Erumban and de Jong (2006), Moghadam and Assar (2008), Jakopin and 
Klein (2011), suggest that sociocultural values influence individuals in a society in a way that 
facilitates or impedes technology adaptation and diffusion. For example, Erumban and de Jong 
(2006) found that countries with high power distance and uncertainty avoidance have lower ICT 




This study used the Hofstede’s Cultural Dimension indices of Power Distance (H-PDI), 
Individuality (H-IDV), Long-Term Orientation (H-LTO), and Uncertainty Avoidance (H-UAI) 
as national culture control variables to address potential influences of sociocultural factors. Data 
for the national culture variables were imputed from the Hofstede Cultural Dimension scores for 
each country used in the study. The Hofstede Cultural Dimension scores were gathered from the 
Geert Hofstede Dimension Data Matrix as presented in Cultures and Organizations 3
rd
 edition 
(Hofstede et al., 2010). The Hofstede Cultural Dimension indices are the resulting work of Geert 
Hofstede research into cultural dimensions of a society and how these dimensions of culture 
affect behavior. In 1967, Hofstede began a large scale survey study on differences in cultural 
values of employees in different subsidiaries of IBM Europe. Hofstede compared answers of tens 
of thousands of employees in over 40 countries. The analysis of the surveys identified four 
anthropological systematic differences in national cultures: power distance, individualism, 
uncertainty avoidance, and masculinity (Hofstede, 1984). In 1991, Hofstede added the additional 
cultural dimension of long term orientation (Hofstede, 1997). 
The Hofstede Cultural Dimension indices contained power distance, individualism, 
uncertainty avoidance, masculinity and long term orientation scores for 110 countries and 
regions. However, there were some countries that had missing scores within Hofstede-defined 
regions. These missing scores were replaced with regional data scores. For example, Egypt did 
not have scores for the four Hofstede cultural dimension indices. However, Egypt is classified 
within a region of Arab countries which had regional Hofstede Cultural Dimension scores. 
Therefore, Egypt’s missing country scores were replaced by the Arab regional scores. This 
method of imputation of missing data using regional scores was the first method used to achieve 




applied, the cultural dimension data was examined for completeness and further missing data 
treatments were employed. These further missing data treatments are outlined and detailed in 
section 3.4 Data Preparation. A description of each Hofstede Cultural Dimension index used in 
this study follows. The year for the country observations was also used as a control variable. 
The national cultural control variable for power distance (H-PDI) measures the extent to 
which less powerful members of society accept and/or expect unequal distribution of power. 
Societies which score higher in this Hofstede dimension value suggest that societal inequality is 
more widely accepted by those who are governed. Data for the variable of power distance was 
captured through Hofstede Cultural Dimension Power Distance index. The national cultural 
control variable for individualism (H-IDV) measures the extent to which individuals are 
incorporated into groups. Societies which score higher in this Hofstede dimension, value 
personal rights and freedoms over collectivistic values (e.g. group loyalty). Data for the variable 
of individualism was captured through Hofstede Cultural Dimension Individualism vs. 
Collectivism Index. The national cultural control variable for long-term orientation (H-LTO) 
measures the future orientation of a society. Societies which score higher in this Hofstede 
dimension are seen as more future-oriented and foster more pragmatic views such as persistence. 
Short-term orientation societies promote past and present values such as tradition, saving face, 
etc. Data for the variable of long-term orientation was captured through Hofstede Cultural 
Dimension Long- vs. Short-Term Orientation Index. The national cultural control variable for 
uncertainty avoidance (H-UAI) measures the degree of tolerance for uncertainty and ambiguity. 
Societies with higher scores in this Hofstede dimension generally have more rules and laws and 
are less tolerant to unplanned change. Data for the variable of uncertainty avoidance was 




3.4 Data Preparation 
A primary step before data analysis can be done is data preparation. One of the first steps 
in data preparation is examining the dataset for completeness. This examination involves 
reviewing the dataset for missing data and assessing the reason for such missing data. Missing 
data can have a significant effect on research results. Missing data analysis is not generally the 
main focus of scientific inquiry but must be addressed to prevent results that are “biased, 
inefficient (lacking in power), and unreliable.” (Schafer & Graham, 2002, p. 147). A general rule 
is to have no more than 10% of data missing in any column used in the data analysis; a more 
relaxed rule for the missing data threshold is 20% (Allison, 2001; Hair, Anderson, & Tatham, 
1987; Hair, Black, Babin, & Anderson, 2010).  
This study combines data elements from several multinational datasets from various 
sources such as the World Bank World Development Indicators, World Economic Forum Global 
Information Technology Report, World Bank Worldwide Governance Indicators, and 
Transparency International. As reported by Messner (1992), there tends to be missing data in 
cross-national research because national government often does not report such critical statistics 
consistently. Given the multinational datasets used in this study and the possibly of missing data, 
an analysis for missing data was conducted on the dataset. As presented in Table 3-5, the 
independent, mediating, and dependent variables were well within the 10% allowable missing 
data threshold as suggested by Hair et al. (1987). However, several Hofstede Cultural Dimension 
index variables exceeded both the 10% and 20% missing data thresholds. Given this amount of 
missing data in the Hofstede Cultural Dimension index variables, a method of handling missing 




Table 3-5. Percentage of missing data values by variable (N=605). 
Variable Percentage of missing data 
Transparency 0.000% 
Corruption 0.496% 
Internet diffusion 1.488% 
Mobile diffusion 1.653% 
FDI 0.826% 
NRI 1.818% 





Note: ‘*’ denotes variables with missing data values over the 10% and 20% missing data 
thresholds as suggested by Hair et al. (1987) 
 
 
There are several ways to address missing data in the statistics literature (Allison, 2001, 
2003; Enders & Bandalos, 2001; Honaker & King, 2010; Little, 1988; Little & Rubin, 1987; 
Olinsky, Chen, & Harlow, 2003; Roth, 1994; Schafer & Graham, 2002). The phenomenon of 
missing data values is known as the missingness of the data (Hawthorne & Elliott, 2005; 
Lauritzen, 1995; Little, 1988). First, the reason for the missing data must be determined in order 
to select the appropriate missing data treatment. There are three categorical reasons for missing 
data: missing completely at random (MCAR), missing at random (MAR), or missing not at 
random (MNAR) (J.-O. Kim & Curry, 1977; Little, 1988; Little & Rubin, 1987). 
The first possible categorical reason for missing data is MCAR. Missing data is 
considered MCAR if the data values missing are independent of the other variables of interest or 
some unobserved variable. MCAR is also known as uniform non-response since values are 
missing independently of any other variable in the study (Wang & Fitzmaurice, 2006). As the 




MCAR, any data value has approximately the same probability of being observed or unobserved 
as any other data value. For example, a researcher distributes and collects 200 paper surveys and 
10% of those surveys are returned completely blank. If the blank surveys were randomly not 
completed, the missing data from those blank surveys could be considered MCAR. Data that is 
MCAR reduces statistical power but does not produce bias since the missing data is not related to 
other variables. 
The next possible categorical reason for missing data is MAR, which is an alternative to 
MCAR. In MAR, missing data-values are not dependent on the missing data item itself (Heitjan 
& Basu, 1996). A special case of MAR is known as uniform non-response within class (Robins, 
1997). In the special case of MAR uniform non-response within class, data values are missing 
based on a particular class or group within the dataset. According to Heitjan and Basu (1996), 
MCAR and MAR are “ignorability conditions” (p. 1) that allow particular interpretations to be 
safely made without complex missing data models. For example, in MAR, unobserved data 
values can be intuitively based on observed data values of similar data rows (Schafer & Graham, 
2002). Using the aforementioned example, a researcher distributes and collects 200 paper 
surveys and 10% of those surveys are returned partially blank (e.g. some questions were 
skipped). If the unanswered questions in the surveys were randomly not completed, this missing 
data could be considered MAR. 
The last possible categorical reason for missing data is known as MNAR. For MNAR, the 
conditions of MCAR and MAR do not hold. In MNAR, data-values are missing not at random. 
In the case of MNAR, data is missing based on the nature or value of the missing figures. Data 
that is MNAR requires more complex missing data treatments and modeling. Also, determining 




The best way to obtain estimates of the missing data without introducing additional bias is to 
create a model to mimic the missingness in the data (Dunning & Freedman, 2007). Using the 
aforementioned example, a researcher distributes and collects 200 paper surveys and 10% of 
those surveys are returned partially blank (e.g. some questions were skipped). The researcher 
reviews the surveys and discovers that a particular group (e.g. women under thirty) skipped a 
particular question (e.g. income). This commonality existing between the group and the 
unanswered question signifies that the data is MNAR. 
As shown in Figure 3.5, the Hofstede Cultural Dimension data was missing for 28% to 
38% of the counties in this study. The independent, mediating, and dependent variables in this 
study did not need a missing data treatment applied as these variables were within the 10% 
allowable missing data threshold as suggested by Hair et al. (1987). To determine the best 
method of handling the missing Hofstede Cultural Dimension data, the reason for why the data 
was missing must be categorized into one of the three causes as suggested by Little and Rubin 
(1987). In other words, were the missing cultural dimension values for countries in Hofstede’s 
study related to the actual values of those cultural dimensions, or were they associated with some 
other variable of interest? 
According to Hofstede (1984), the cultural dimensions data that was missing for several 
countries was a result of no IBM subsidiaries existing in those countries at the time of the 
original data collection. The missing Hofstede Cultural Dimension data could be MNAR if IBM 
selected countries in which to place subsidiaries based on some cultural dimension variable or 
other unobserved variable. It is quite plausible for a global country such as IBM to exercise 
diligence in placing its subsidiaries. While the explanation of selection bias by IBM is plausible, 




(Hofstede, 1984). For the purpose of this study, it must be determined if there is a selection bias 
in the Hofstede cultural dimensions data. To determine if IBM selected countries in which to 
place subsidiaries based on some cultural dimension, the observed Hofstede cultural dimension 
data was analyzed for non-normal distribution. 
A test for non-normal or asymmetrical distribution is essentially a skewness test using the 
adjusted Fisher-Pearson standardized moment coefficient (Doane & Seward, 2011). The test for 
skewness exposes whether observed data values are asymmetrically distributed around the mean. 
The test for skewness produces a skewness statistic that can be used to determine the degree of 
asymmetry in the distribution of data. A distribution of data that is relatively symmetrical 
produces a skewness statistic of near zero. A negative skewness statistic indicates more values 
lay above the mean. A positive skewness statistic indicates more data values lay below the mean. 
If IBM selected countries in which to place subsidiaries based on some cultural dimension, there 
is a high probability that such a selection bias would skew the observed data values toward the 
IBM-preferred bias. 
Doane and Seward (2011) suggest using the adjusted Fisher-Pearson standardized 
moment coefficient to test for skewness. The adjusted Fisher-Pearson standardized moment 
coefficient includes an adjustment for sample size and is readily available in software packages 
such as Minitab, Excel, SPSS, SAS and  (Doane & Seward, 2011). The skewness statistic (S) 
produced by the adjusted Fisher-Pearson standardized moment coefficient must be compared to a 
threshold of allowable skewness. Tabachnick and Fidell (1996) suggest calculating the “standard 
error of skewness – Ss” (p. 79)  by using    √    where N is the numbers of observed data 




of             as suggested in Tabachnick and Fidell (1996). A z value in excess of ±2.58 
would indicate a significant degree of skewness in the distribution of data. 
Presented in Table 3-6 are the results of the normal distribution test on the Hofstede 
cultural dimension data. These results were calculated using Microsoft Excel 2010. Other 
variables in this study were not tested for normal distribution as these variables were within the 
10% allowable missing data threshold as suggested by Hair et al. (1987). Hofstede Cultural 
Dimension data was tested for symmetric distribution to determine if IBM used some selection 
bias in choosing countries in which to place subsidiaries. If IBM had exercised some bias in the 
selection of countries, the observed data values would display this bias through an asymmetric 
distribution of the Hofstede Cultural Dimension index data values 
 As presented in the results shown in Table 3-6, the Hofstede Cultural Dimension index 
variables of power distance index (H-PDI) and long term orientation (H-LTO) did not present a 
significant degree of asymmetric distribution based on the z-distribution threshold of z =  ±2.58. 
The Hofstede Cultural Dimension index variables of uncertainty avoidance (H-UAI) and 
individualism (H-IDV), did present asymmetric distribution over the threshold of z =  ±2.58 as 
suggested by Tabachnick and Fidell (1996). 
Table 3-6. Results of normal distribution test on Hofstede data. 
Variable Mean Median St. Dev. S Ss z 
H-PDI 59.680 64 21.077 -0.151 0.126 -1.197 
H-UAI 66.307 68 22.815 -0.361 0.126 -2.857 
H-LTO 46.592 45.466 22.951 0.294 0.118 -2.485 
H-IDV 42.933 38 23.4112 0.346 0.126 2.739 
Note: The skewness statistic (S) was produced by the adjusted Fisher-Pearson standardized 
moment coefficient. The standard error of skewness Ss and z distribution calculations were 




The findings as presented in Table 3-6 suggest that IBM subsidiaries had a tendency to be 
located in countries with higher values of uncertainty avoidance and lower values of 
individuality. The asymmetric distribution found in the two Hofstede Cultural Dimensions 
suggests that the Hofstede missing data values may not be MCAR. However, these findings do 
not necessarily demonstrate that the Hofstede Cultural Dimension missing data is MNAR. The 
Hofstede Cultural Dimensions index variables of power distance (H-PDI) and long term 
orientation (H-LTO) did not present a significant degree of asymmetric distribution. 
One explanation for some of the Hofstede Cultural Dimensions indices possessing an 
asymmetric distribution is that some cultural dimensions are naturally asymmetrically 
distributed. If some cultural dimensions are naturally asymmetrically distributed, then the 
missing cultural dimension data values were unrelated to the unobserved value. This explanation 
makes the assumption that the missing Hofstede Cultural Dimensions are MAR within a class of 
countries. Specifically, the missing Hofstede Cultural Dimension data is unobserved for the class 
of countries that did not have IBM subsidiaries. As stated by Robins (1997), MAR within class 
data values are missing based on a particular group within the dataset.  
The assumption of MAR for the missing Hofstede Cultural Dimensions data allows 
particular interpretations to be safely made without utilizing complex missing data models 
(Heitjan & Basu, 1996). A more complex missing data treatment would be required if the 
Hofstede Cultural Dimensions data were MNAR. Collins, Schafer, and Kam (2001) have 
demonstrated that under most missing data cases, even an erroneous assumption of MAR has 
“only a minor impact on estimates and standard errors” (p. 6). It is important to note that 
unobserved MAR data values can be intuitively based on observed data values of similar data 




This study used two missing data treatments: removal of non-complete data rows through 
listwise deletion and data imputation through a modified version of mean substitution. The most 
common and least complex treatment of missing data is listwise deletion. Listwise deletion is 
also known as complete-case analysis (Schafer & Graham, 2002). This treatment requires the 
deletion of non-complete cases (i.e. data rows missing one or more data values) until the level of 
missing data is within an acceptable threshold. Statistical power may be affected by using 
listwise deletion as a missing data treatment due to the reduction of the sample size and 
introduction of bias if the data is not MAR or MCAR (King, Honaker, Joseph, & Scheve, 1998; 
Roth, 1994). While this treatment affects statistical power and may introduce bias, it is one of the 
preferable methods for addressing missing data (Olinsky et al., 2003). 
The listwise deletion missing data treatment was applied to the data used in the study by 
removing all data rows which did not contain values for all four Hofstede Cultural Dimension 
index variables. This application resulted in the deletion of 145 data rows or 23.967% from the 
original 606 data rows in the dataset. The data treated using listwise deletion treatment was 
denoted as LD in this study. Presented in Table 3-7 are the resulting missing data percentages by 
variable after the application of the listwise deletion treatment. As presented in Table 3-7, after 
the listwise deletion treatment, all variables were within the relaxed 20% missing data threshold 
(Allison, 2001; Hair et al., 1987; Hair et al., 2010). 
The two basic methods of handling missing data are removal of incomplete cases or 
imputation of missing data elements within incomplete cases (Little & Rubin, 2002). Although 
removal of non-complete cases through listwise deletion is the most common and least complex 
treatment for missing data, J.-O. Kim and Curry (1977), Roth (1994), and King et al. (1998) 




Table 3-7. Missing data percentages after listwise deletion (N=461). 
Variable  Missing data percentage 
Transparency 0.000% 
Corruption 0.652% 
Internet diffusion 1.087% 
Mobile diffusion 1.304% 
FDI 1.087% 
NRI 1.087% 






The alternative to removing missing data from the dataset is to substitute missing values 
to form a complete case or data row. This process of missing data substitution is known as 
imputation (Schafer & Graham, 2002). As noted by Little and Rubin (2002), there are several 
methods of imputation. Some methods of imputation such as hot/cold-deck imputation employ 
random data value substitution (Sande, 1983) or intuitively-based substitution using observed 
data values of similar data rows (Schafer & Graham, 2002). Such substitution methods select 
existing data values from within the existing dataset to replace missing data values. Random data 
value substitution is a straightforward and less complex method for handling missing data 
(Reilly, 1993). In this study, however, such random substitution has a high probability of 
assigning Hofstede Cultural Dimensions values that may be vastly different than the actual 
unobserved values for a given country. A different imputation method needed to be explored that 
would estimate data values similar to those actual unobserved values. 
Another method for handling missing data is through imputation via mean substitution 




set of values of a variable. This calculated mean is substituted for the missing values of that 
variable in the dataset. Using mean substitution creates a “group average” that is substituted for 
the missing data values. In most cases, mean substitution has proven to be more accurate than 
listwise deletion (Chan & Dunn, 1972; Chan, Gilman, & Dunn, 1976; Raymond & Roberts, 
1987). In this study, mean substitution essentially creates world averages for each Hofstede 
Cultural Dimension index. These world averages would then be applied to all countries with 
unobserved Hofstede Cultural Dimension index values. As Hofstede Cultural Dimension values 
are missing for 28% to 38% of the countries used in this study, these calculated world averages 
would be applied to a significant number of countries. It is unreasonable to assume that up to 
38% of the countries would have the same Hofstede Cultural Dimension values and those values 
would be the same as the world averages. Therefore, the mean substitution method has high 
probability of assigning world-average Hofstede Cultural Dimension values that may be vastly 
different than the actual unobserved values for a particular country.  
Fortunately, a further examination of the Hofstede Cultural Dimension studies provides 
an indication on how data imputation through a modified version of mean substitution could 
adequately handle the missing cultural dimension data values. Hofstede’s studies demonstrated 
that cultural similarities that influenced behavior of societies could be categorized by nations and  
regions (Hofstede, 1984, 1997). Some countries in the Hofstede Cultural Dimension score matrix 
do not have scores for all four of Hofstede cultural dimensions used in this study. However, in 
the Hofstede Cultural Dimension index, cultural dimension data values are provided for regional 
country groups as well. In these regional groups, each component country can be assigned the 
regional score as its individual country’s Hofstede Cultural Dimension index value. For example, 




is classified in the regional group of West African countries. The regional group of West African 
countries includes Ghana, Nigeria, and Sierra Leone. Therefore, the scores for the regional group 
of West African countries could be used in place of the missing Hofstede Cultural Dimension 
data values for these three countries. 
This study employed a modified version of mean substitution using the calculated mean 
cultural dimension scores of regional groups to address missing Hofstede Cultural Dimension 
index values. Countries used in this study were assigned to regional groups according to the 
United Nations (UN) geoscheme. This geoscheme was developed by the UN for statistical 
analysis of world regions (United Nations, 2000). Each UN geoscheme region has an associated 
area code as its identifier within the UN statistical analysis model. For the countries used in this 
study, there were sixteen UN geoscheme regions as presented in Table 3-8. 
Table 3-8. United Nations geoscheme regions (with area codes). 
Caribbean (052) Middle Africa (017) Southern Asia (034) 
Central America (013) Northern Africa (012) Southern Europe (039) 
Central Asia (143) Northern Europe (154) Western Africa (011) 
Eastern Africa (014) South America (068) Western Asia (145) 
Eastern Asia (030) South-Eastern Asia (035)  
Eastern Europe (151) Southern Africa (018)  
 
A mean score for each Hofstede Cultural Dimension was computed using available 
cultural dimension scores of regional component countries based on the UN geoscheme. A mean 
score for each UN geoscheme region was imputed for regional component countries missing data 
values. For example, Algeria is in the UN geoscheme for Northern Africa. Algeria did not have 




Africa UN geoscheme region contained two other countries, Egypt and Morocco, which had 
cultural dimension scores for the four Hofstede cultural dimensions. These available scores were 
averaged per dimension and imputed for the missing three cultural dimension scores of Algeria.  
This method of imputation using calculated regional mean scores of UN geoscheme 
regions produced scores for all but two UN geoscheme regions used in this study. Central Asia 
and Middle Africa were the only two UN geoscheme regions that did not have country-level 
Hofstede Cultural Dimension scores from which to compute regional cultural dimension scores 
through this method. The data using this modified mean substitution method was denoted as 
regional mean substitution (RMS) in this study. This RMS imputation method was preferable 
and advantageous over listwise deletion as it reduced missing data without reducing the overall 
sample size. The missing data percentages by variable after using RMS missing data treatment 
are presented in Table 3-9. As shown, all variables were well within a 10% missing data 
threshold as suggested by Hair et al. (1987). 
Table 3-9. Missing data percentages after regional mean substitution (N=605). 
Variable Missing data percentage 
Transparency 0.000% 
Corruption 0.496% 
Internet diffusion 1.488% 
Mobile diffusion 1.653% 
FDI 0.826% 
NRI 1.818% 









3.5 Data Validation 
An analysis for multicollinearity was also performed on the data. Multicollinearity exists 
when correlations among two or more independent or explanatory variables are strong. When 
two or more variables are highly correlated, it may be an indication that variables which are 
supposed to measure different constructs actually measure the same construct (Kline, 2010). 
Multicollinearity exposes variables that may measure the same construct in a statistical model 
(i.e. redundant variables). While multicollinearity may not affect the reliability of a statistical 
model, it may not give accurate results on the significance of the effects of individual variables 
within such a model (Kock, 2012). 
One possible indicator of multicollinearity is a high Pearson correlation coefficient (r) 
between two or more variables (Tabachnick & Fidell, 1996). High correlation coefficients among 
variables in the model may signify multicollinearity (Kock, 2012). Correlation coefficients (r) 
can range be from -1 to + 1. The closer the correlation coefficient is to ±1, the stronger the 
correlation. A correlation coefficient of zero suggests there is no relationship. A general “rule of 
thumb” (Farrar & Glauber, 1967, p. 82) for correlation coefficients that may indicate 
multicollinearity are those where r ≥ .8.  Using WarpPLS 3.0, a structural equation modeling 
software package discussed in greater detail in section 3.5 Data Analysis, a correlation matrix 
was generated with the data using both missing data treatments.  WarpPLS 3.0 automatically 
calculated the correlation matrix as part of its data analysis (Kock, 2012).  
Table 3-10 shows the correlation matrix with corresponding coefficients and associated 
p-values for data using regional mean substitution missing data treatment. Using the regional 




-0.888 with a significance level of p <.001. NRI and Internet diffusion had a correlation 
coefficient of r = 0.849 with a significance level of p <.001. GDP per capita and Internet 
diffusion had a correlation coefficient of r = 0.828 with a significance level of p <.001. Also, 
GDP per capita and NRI had a correlation coefficient of r = 0.829 with a significance level of p 
<.001. Table 3-11 shows the correlation matrix with corresponding coefficients and associated p-
values for data using the listwise deletion missing data treatment. Using the listwise deletion 
missing data treatment, NRI and corruption had a correlation coefficient of r = -0.907 with a 
significance level of p <.001. NRI and Internet diffusion had a correlation coefficient of r = 
0.857 with a significance level of p <.001. Analysis of the correlation matrixes using both 
missing data treatments showed correlation coefficients among variables greater than r = 0.800. 
The presence of a high correlation coefficient between two or more variables is a possible 
indicator of multicollinearity. However, such high correlation coefficients do not conclusively 
signify multicollinearity. High correlation coefficients are generally conflated with collinearity 
(Douglass, Clader, Christy, Michaels, & Belsley, 2003 & Michaels, 2003; Graham, 2003). Yet, 
strongly correlated variables can have a low degree of collinearity (Hamilton, 1987). Also, using 
correlation matrices to assess multicollinearity only exposes potential bivariate collinearity. 
Correlation matrices only compare variables in a pairwise fashion. Often, two or more variables 
in a model may have collinear relationships which are not easily detected through such pairwise 
analysis possible from correlation matrices (Tabachnick & Fidell, 1996). While analysis of 
correlations provides a valuable indicator of multicollinearity, additional tests for 
multicollinearity need to be performed. 
Another method for assessing multicollinearity is the calculation of variance inflation 




calculation of VIF value assesses the amount of multicollinearity among all variables in a model 
simultaneously. VIF values quantify the amount of inflation of variance due to a particular 
variable in the model. The VIF value for a given variable is the amount of inflation of variance 
caused by collinearity with other variables in the model (Kline, 2010; Kutner, Nachtsheim, & 
Neter, 2004).  
High VIF values may signify a high degree of multicollinearity. The threshold for high 
VIFs is based on the type of variables used in a model. For example, the recommended VIF 
threshold when using formative latent variables is VIF=3.3 (Cenfetelli & Bassellier, 2009). This 
study does not use formative latent variable measurement, so this more restrictive threshold does 
not need to be applied. For studies without latent variables, such as this study, a more relaxed 
threshold recommendation of VIF=5 or VIF=10 has also been proposed in the multivariate 
analysis literature (Hair et al., 1987; Hair et al., 2010; Kline, 2010; O'Brien, 2007). 
There are two forms of collinearity which can be tested through calculating VIF values: 
lateral and vertical collinearity. Lateral collinearity refers to predictor-criterion collinearity. 
Lateral collinearity occurs when independent variables (i.e. predictor variables) are collinear 
with the dependent variable (i.e. criterion variables) (Kock & Lynn, 2012). Vertical collinearity 
refers to predictor-predictor collinearity. 
Vertical collinearity occurs when independent variables (i.e. predictor variables) are 
collinear with other independent variables. Using WarpPLS 3.0 to calculate VIF values through a 
full collinearity test assesses vertical and lateral collinearity simultaneously (Kock, 2012). Also, 
full collinearity VIF testing is a common method for testing bias that provides more conservative 
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Notes: Correlations between variables higher than 0.800 are denoted in bold. 
 *** denotes p-value <0.001 
 **   denotes p-value <0.01 
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Notes: Correlations between variables higher than 0.800 are denoted in bold. 
 *** denotes p-value <0.001 
 **  denotes p-value <0.01 








A full collinearity test was performed that calculated the VIF values of each variable. The 
full collinearity test was performed on the data using each missing data treatment. WarpPLS 3.0 
automatically calculated the VIF values for the data as part of its data analysis (Kock, 2012).  
Table 3-12 presents the VIF values for each variable in the data using both missing data 
treatments. 
The highest VIF value was 9.478 for corruption in the data using the listwise deletion 
missing data treatment. In general, the data using the listwise deletion missing data treatment had 
higher VIF values than the data using the regional mean substitution missing data treatment. 
Data using each missing data treatment had VIF values over the recommended threshold of 
VIF=5. However, using the more relaxed threshold of a VIF=10 as suggested by Hair et al. 
(1987) and O'Brien (2007), the VIF values for the data using both missing data treatments did 
not exhibit serious bias due to multicollinearity problems. Also, the variables that contribute to 
the high VIF values in Table 3-12 are not included in the same variable block in Table 3-13 or 
Table 3-14. 
Table 3-12. Variance inflation factors by variable and missing data treatment. 
Variable Data using RMS Data using LD 
Transparency 2.784 3.672 
Corruption 8.741 9.478 
Internet diffusion 6.325 6.749 
Mobile diffusion 2.523 2.059 
FDI 1.045 1.036 
NRI 8.004 8.089 
GDP per capita 3.081 3.303 
H-PDI 2.120 1.954 
H-UAI 1.349 1.415 
H-LTO 1.336 1.310 
H-IDV 2.148 2.126 







Additionally, block VIF values for each missing data treatment were calculated by 
WarpPLS 3.0. Block VIF values measure the degree of vertical collinearity. WarpPLS 3.0 
outputs the VIF values for each latent variable block. A latent variable block is each variable 
with two or more predictors. The calculated VIFs produced by WarpPLS 3.0 represent the latent 
variables on each column (predictors), with reference to the latent variables on each row 
(criteria). This study does not utilize latent variables, so the output from WarpPLS 3.0 comprises 
the VIF values produced for each variable block. 
Table 3-13 presents the block VIF values for the data using the RMS missing data 
treatment for each variable block. Using the RMS missing data treatment, Transparency 
(predictor) to Corruption (criteria) showed a VIF value of 4.588. Also, Internet diffusion 
(predictor) to Corruption (criteria) showed a VIF value of 4.566. 
All other VIF values for the data using the RMS missing data treatment were less than 
3.3. Table 3-14 presents the block VIF values for the data using the LD missing data treatment 
for each variable block. Using the LD missing data treatment, Transparency (predictor) to 
Corruption (criteria) showed a VIF value of 4.769. Also, Internet diffusion (predictor) to 
Corruption (criteria) showed a VIF value of 4.320. All other VIF values for the data using the 
RMS missing data treatment were VIF less than 3.3. In the block VIF calculations, values of 3.3 
or lower suggest that no vertical multicollinearity exists within the data (Kock, 2012). However, 
in the multivariate analysis literature, a conservative recommended threshold for VIF values 
when analyzing models without latent variables is VIF=5 as suggested by Hair et al. (1987). 
Using this recommended threshold of VIF=5, the VIF values for the data using both missing data 
















H-PDI H-UAI H-LTO H-IDV Year 
Transparency   1.858 1.858         
Corruption 4.588  4.566 1.831    2.804 1.084 1.250 2.512 1.096 
Internet 
Diffusion 




      
Mobile 
Diffusion 
            
FDI             
NRI     1.407  1.407      
GDP per 
capita 
            
H-PDI             
H-UAI             
H-LTO             
H-IDV             
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H-PDI H-UAI H-LTO H-IDV Year 
Transparency   1.652 1.652         
Corruption 4.769  4.320 1.606    2.009 1.104 1.143 2.228 1.154 
Internet 
Diffusion 




      
Mobile 
Diffusion 
            
FDI             
NRI     1.366  1.366      
GDP per 
capita 
            
H-PDI             
H-UAI             
H-LTO             
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 Additionally, Stone-Geisser Q-squared coefficients were calculated for each of the 
endogenous variables in the study’s path model (Geisser, 1974; Stone, 1974). The resulting Q-
squared coefficients are shown for each missing data treatment in Table 3-15. The Q-squared 
coefficient is used to assess the predictive validity of each variable block in a path model. 
Endogenous variables with acceptable predictive validity have Q-squared coefficients of greater 
than zero (Kock, 2012). Each of the endogenous variables in the study’s model exhibited Q-
squared coefficients greater than zero, thereby presenting acceptable predictive validity. 
Table 3-15. Stone-Geisser Q-squared coefficients. 
 Transparency Corruption Internet Diffusion Mobile Diffusion NRI 
RMS 0.486 0.795 0.789 0.475 0.738 
LD 0.557 0.815 0.779 0.376 0.738 
 
3.6 Data Analysis 
The theoretical model for this study as shown in Figure 2.1 was constructed based on the 
hypotheses as stated in Section 2.3. This theoretical model is a path model that formalized the 
hypothesized relationships among the macroeconomic, ICT, governance, and sociocultural 
variables as listed in Table 3-3. This theoretical model was statistically analyzed using path 
analysis with WarpPLS 3.0, a structural equation modeling software package. WarpPLS 3.0 is 
specially designed to identify nonlinear relationships among variables of a theorized model by 
conducting linear and non-linear (or “warped”) regression analysis (Kock, 2012). 
Path analysis is a statistical analysis method used to explore relationships among 




by Sewall Wright, path analysis was used in his agricultural research and has now been applied 
to other complex modeling fields (Dodge & Marriott, 2003; Wright, 1934). Path analysis is an 
extension of multiple regression analysis. In multiple regression analysis, coefficients of 
association are calculated among multiple independent variables and one dependent variable. 
These coefficients are generally in the form of standardized partial regression coefficients 
(Rencher, 1998; Rosenthal & Rosnow, 1991) where the corresponding P values indicate the 
significance of the relationship (Kock, 2011a). Indeed, path analysis extends multiple regression 
analysis by forming a composite structural model of several separate multiple regression models. 
Path analysis allows the tracing of complex paths in a model to discover how one variable affects 
another. This capability of path analysis allows direct and indirect effects to be explored. Also, 
path analysis can reveal the proportional strengths of direct and indirect relationships within a 
model. 
Path analysis is a special case of structural equation modeling (SEM) (Maruyama, 1998). 
SEM is a second-generation statistical analysis technique increasing utilization in social science 
research due to its ability to assess theoretical models (Anderson & Gerbing, 1988; Kline, 2010). 
Due to its powerful predictive ability, SEM has been used in a wide variety of disciplines, 
including management (Cheng, 2001; Shook, Ketchen, Hult, & Kacmar, 2004), marketing 
(Baumgartner & Homburg, 1996; Steenkamp & Baumgartner, 2000), information systems 
(Gefen, 2000; Qureshi & Compeau, 2009), and finance and economics (Chang, Lee, & Lee, 
2009; Titman & Wessels, 1988). In typical SEM analysis, reflective or formative manifest 
variables (indicators) are constituent parts of (e.g. load upon) latent variables (constructs). The 
observable or manifest (endogenous) variables serve as underlying components of the 




associated with each construct. SEM analysis employs a measurement model and a structural 
model. In SEM analysis, the measurement model assesses the loadings and reliability estimates 
(e.g. Cronbach’s alpha) of the indictors on their associated constructs within the model. Scores 
for each construct are calculated based on the weighted averages of their component indicators. 
Once the scores for each construct are calculated, the structural model is basically a path model 
with constructs as variables and the association between variables as paths within the model. In 
path analysis, the measurement model found in SEM is excluded. The measurement model is not 
required since one indicator is associated upon one construct. 
The software selected to conduct the path analysis for this study’s theoretical model was 
WarpPLS 3.0. A structural equation modeling software package, WarpPLS 3.0 is specially 
designed to identify nonlinear relationships among variables of a theorized model by conducting 
linear and non-linear (or “warped”) regression analysis (Kock, 2012). WarpPLS 3.0 was selected 
specifically for its ability to examine non-linear relationships. The majority of social and 
economic phenomena exhibit non-linear relationships such as the law of diminishing returns (A. 
Rosenberg, 1992). In fact, these types of non-linear relationships usually take the “form of U and 
S curves” (Kock, 2011a, p. 2). WarpPLS 3.0 utilizes algorithms that attempt to identify such 
non-linear or U-curve relationships between variables within a model. This study utilized 
WarpPLS 3.0’s non-linear (denoted in the software as a Warp2) algorithm to calculate statistical 
results such as path coefficients (standardized betas) with related P values and R-squared (R
2
) 
coefficients. The calculated individual path coefficients can be interpreted as standardized beta 
coefficients of ordinary least squares regressions. By examining these path coefficients and R
2
 





Path analysis has several requirements concerning the nature of the data analyzed 
(Hatcher, 1994). First, all endogenous (dependent) variables must be measured on a continuous 
interval scale and have at least a minimum of four values. However, exogenous (independent) 
variables can be measured on a categorical scale level, if dummy-coded. This restriction does not 
apply to WarpPLS 3.0 since the software uses resampling techniques (Kock, 2012). Secondly, 
the path model variables should be free of multicollinearity. Third, path analysis generally 
requires large sample sizes (n>200) (Hatcher, 1994). Data resampling techniques, for instance 
bootstrapping and jackknifing, remove data requirements such as large sample size and 
endogenous variables having a minimum of four values. As noted in the WarpPLS 3.0 software 
manual, the non-linear (e.g. Warp2) algorithm is sensitive to outliers present in the data. 
Therefore, as recommended by the WarpPLS 3.0 software manual, P values were estimated 
using both bootstrapping and jackknifing techniques. A good model fit generally has path 
coefficients with corresponding significant P values, high R
2
 coefficients based on accepted 
thresholds, and each construct having high internal reliability above .70 (Barclay, Higgins, & 
Thompson, 1995).  
WarpPLS 3.0 has three techniques for resampling data: bootstrapping, jackknifing, and 
blindfolding. Bootstrapping creates a number of resamples containing a random arrangement of 
rows from the original data. Bootstrapping generates stable resample path coefficients with large 
sample sizes and works well with non-parametric data (Nevitt & Hancock, 2001). This study’s 
sample size falls within the acceptable limits for using the bootstrapping technique (Nevitt & 
Hancock, 2001). Jackknifing, an alternative to bootstrapping, resamples by removing one 
different row from each resample. This technique of resampling works best with small sample 




technique that creates resamples by replacing a certain number of rows in each resample with the 
means of their respective columns. Blindfolding has a tendency to perform somewhere between 
jackknifing and bootstrapping (Kock, 2012). In the results section, the results of the theoretical 
model’s path analysis using data with both missing data treatments and resampling methods 







The purpose of this study was to investigate the effects of the hypothesized relationships 
between macroeconomic, ICT, governance and sociocultural variables using the key and control 
variables as listed in Table 3-3. This chapter presents the results of the statistical analysis of 
those variables in a path model. In the first section of this chapter, the descriptive statistics of the 
key and control variables are provided and explained. The second section shows results of the 
path analysis of the theoretical model. The third section of this chapter reports the model fit 
indices. The fourth section of this chapter reports the results of hypotheses testing.  
The theoretical model used in this study is a path model that formalized the hypothesized 
relationships among the key macroeconomic, ICT, governance and sociocultural variables. The 
theoretical model used in this study is presented in Figure 2.1. This theoretical model was 
statistically analyzed using path analysis with WarpPLS 3.0, a structural equation modeling 
software package specially designed to identify nonlinear relationships among variables of a 
theorized model by conducting linear and non-linear (or “warped”) regression analysis (Kock, 
2012). 
4.1 Descriptive Statistics Analysis 
This study examined 121 countries which are listed in Table 3-1. This study used multi-
year dataset for these key and control variables collected over a period of five years (i.e. 2006, 
2007, 2008, 2009, and 2010). To address the missing Hofstede Cultural Dimensions data, two 




were applied are listwise deletion (LD) and a modified version of mean substitution called 
regional group mean substitution (RMS). 
This listwise deletion treatment resulted in the removal of 145 rows (23.967%) from the 
data. Table 4-1 presents the descriptive statistics of the data across all years for the key and 
control variables, including the Hofstede Cultural Dimension control variables, using the LD 
treatment.  
Table 4-1. Descriptive statistics of data using LD. 
Variable N Mean SD 
Transparency 460 0.332 0.873 
Corruption 457 -4.843 2.303 
Internet diffusion 455 40.681 26.793 
Mobile diffusion 454 91.600 38.418 
FDI 455 19.408 10.453 
NRI 455 4.109 0.824 
GDP per capita 455 17325.771 20683.797 
H-PDI 375 59.680 21.077 
H-UAI 375 66.307 22.815 
H-LTO 375 46.592 22.951 
H-IDV 375 42.933 23.411 
 
The other missing data treatment (the regional group mean substitution) resulted in 
reducing missing data amounts to within recommended thresholds. Table 4-2 presents the 
descriptive statistics of the data across all years for the key and control variables in the study’s 
data, including the Hofstede Cultural Dimension control variables, using the RMS treatment. The 
descriptive statistics by year and in total for the key variables are also presented in Table 4-3. 




using the RMS missing data treatment except where noted. Microsoft Excel 2010 was utilized to 
calculate the descriptive statistics. 
Table 4-2. Descriptive statistics of data using RMS. 
Variable N Mean SD 
Transparency 605 0.173 0.879 
Corruption 602 -4.525 2.221 
Internet diffusion 596 34.148 27.372 
Mobile diffusion 595 84.070 40.962 
FDI 600 18.949 10.196 
NRI 594 3.939 0.841 
GDP per capita 600 14697.774 19686.245 
H-PDI 580 61.586 18.094 
H-UAI 580 65.724 20.829 
H-LTO 580 41.812 22.486 
H-IDV 580 40.302 20.756 
 
The mean across all years for the governance variable of Transparency was 0.173 using 
the RMS missing data treatment. The data for the variable Transparency was captured through 
the World Bank’s Voice of Accountability (VA) Governance indicator. The VA indicator, 
ranging from ‐2.5 to 2.5, measures countries’ accountability and citizen participation in relation 
to a global average (equaling zero). Negative values in this indicator point toward less 
transparency through public voice and accountability. Positive values in this indicator point 
toward more transparency. This result of 0.173 indicated that the countries examined in the study 
were generally above the global average in terms of transparency. Interestingly, the mean by year 
for the governance variable Transparency decreased from 0.190 in 2006 to 0.160 in 2010. This 
signifies that the gap between the average of countries used in this study and the global average 





Table 4-3. Descriptive statistics of the data.  








2006        
 N 121 120 119 119 120 121 120 
 Mean 0.190 -4.527 27.631 64.660 18.015 3.851 13366.578 
 SD 0.876 2.278 25.736 38.593 11.548 0.910 17875.565 
2007  
       N 121 120 119 119 120 118 120 
 Mean 0.181 -4.523 30.474 75.724 20.365 3.963 15333.754 
 SD 0.878 2.232 26.474 39.547 7.873 0.855 20340.096 
2008  
       N 121 121 119 119 120 120 120 
 Mean 0.170 -4.546 33.785 86.219 19.588 4.000 16806.692 
 SD 0.882 2.194 27.077 39.445 9.380 0.869 21973.413 
2009  
       N 121 121 119 118 120 119 120 
 Mean 0.165 -4.509 37.327 93.464 19.281 3.910 14873.445 
 SD 0.885 2.211 27.687 40.142 9.145 0.810 19136.946 
2010  
       N 121 120 120 120 120 116 120 
 Mean 0.160 -4.518 41.464 100.229 17.495 3.971 13108.401 
 SD 0.889 2.230 28.053 37.663 12.277 0.757 18952.751 
Total        
 N 605 602 596 595 600 594 600 
 Mean 0.173 -4.525 34.148 84.070 18.949 3.939 14697.774 










This finding can be interpreted in a couple of different ways. The countries used in this 
study were a subset of the total countries examined by the VA indicator. Therefore, one 
interpretation is that countries used in this study became less transparent over time. 
Alternatively, another interpretation is that countries, on average, became more transparent over 
time. If countries did become more transparent, the gap between the global average and the 
country average calculated in this study would tend to contract. 
The standard deviation for the governance variable Transparency increased from 0.876 in 
2006 to 0.889 in 2010 using the RMS missing data treatment. This finding indicated that the 
difference between countries, in terms of transparency, increased. Indeed, in 2006, there were 52 
countries below the global average. In 2010, the number of countries below the global average 
increased to 58. However, the mean for countries below the global average in 2006 was -0.658. 
In 2010 this mean was -0.657, remaining relatively unchanged for countries below the global 
average. This relatively small change in standard deviation by year signified very little change 
among countries below the global average even though additional countries fell below this 
average. However, there was an increase in transparency among countries that were above the 
global average. The mean for countries above the world average in 2006 was 0.829. In 2010, this 
mean increased to 0.856. One interpretation of this finding is that countries above the global 
average study experienced significant positive changes in the apparent level of transparency. 
The mean across all years for the governance variable of Corruption was -4.525 using the 
RMS missing data treatment. The data for the variable Corruption was captured through the 
Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI) from Transparency International. The CPI ranks countries on 
a scale from 10 (representing a very clean/minimally corrupt government) to 0 (representing high 





corruption’. In order to make the higher CPI values reflect the presence of corruption, a data 
transformation was performed. This data transformation was performed on the CPI data by 
multiplying the original values by negative 1. This data transformation was done to inverse the 
scale of the values while preserving their rank.  
Therefore, the mean for the governance variable Corruption after reversing the data 
transformation across all years was 4.525 using the RMS missing data treatment. Between 2006 
and 2010, the highest value for the CPI was 9.6 for Finland, Iceland, and New Zealand in 2006. 
During this same time period, the lowest value for the CPI was 1.6 for Chad in 2006 and 2007. 
Most country values for Corruption fall below 5.0. In this study, 64.784% of data values (390 of 
602) for Corruption fell below 5.0. This signifies that several countries examined in this study 
have relatively medium to high levels of corruption between 2006 and 2010. The standard 
deviation across all years for the variable Corruption was 2.221 using the RMS missing data 
treatment. The standard deviation between years remained relatively unchanged ranging from 
2.278 in 2006 to 2.211 in 2009. The mean for the variable Corruption between years remained 
relatively unchanged as well. This mean ranged from 4.527 in 2006 to 4.509 in 2009  
The mean across all years for the ICT variable of Internet diffusion was 34.148 using the 
RMS missing data treatment. Data for the variable Internet diffusion was captured through the 
World Bank World Development Internet users (per 100 people) indicator. The mean for 
Internet diffusion was 34.148 which indicated that approximately one-third of the people in the 
countries studied had access to the Internet. Access to the Internet increased steadily during the 
period examined in this study. The mean by year increased from 27.631 in 2006 to 41.464 in 
2010. This indicated that there was a significant increase in Internet access in the countries used 





deviation by year slightly increased from 25.736 in 2006 to 28.053 in 2010 using the RMS 
missing data treatment. This finding indicated that there was a slight increase in the variance of 
Internet access among countries in this study. 
The mean across all years for the ICT variable of Mobile diffusion was 84.070 using the 
RMS missing data treatment. Data for the variable Mobile diffusion was captured through the 
World Bank World Development Mobile cellular subscriptions (per 100 people) indicator. The 
mean for Mobile diffusion was 84.070, indicating that approximately 5 in 6 persons (84 per 100 
people), on average, had mobile cellular access/subscriptions in the countries of this study for the 
time period examined. Mobile diffusion increased at a significantly faster rate than Internet 
diffusion during the period examined in this study. The mean by year increased from 64.660 in 
2006 to 100.229 in 2010. This finding indicated a large increase in the usage of mobile cellular 
technology in the countries during the time period of this study. Interestingly, the mean for 
Mobile diffusion in 2010 was over 100. Indeed, several country values for Mobile diffusion were 
above 100. In this study, 39.496% of data values (235 of 595) for Mobile diffusion were above 
100. This signifies that several countries in this study had more than 100 mobile subscriptions 
per 100 people. In fact, Estonia had 202.984 mobile subscriptions per 100 people in 2009. The 
standard deviation across all years for the variable Mobile diffusion was 40.961 using the RMS 
missing data treatment. The standard deviation between years remained relatively unchanged, 
ranging from 38.593 in 2006 to 40.142 in 2009 and decreasing to 37.663 in 2010.  
The mean across all years for the macroeconomic variable of FDI was 18.949 using the 
RMS missing data treatment. The data for the variable FDI was captured through the World 
Bank World Development foreign direct investment, net inflows (BoP, current US$) indicator. 





performed. A general logarithmic transformation could not be performed as a small percentage 
of the FDI data values were negative. Therefore, the logarithmic transformation was performed 
on the absolute value of the FDI data values. Depending on the sign of the original FDI data 
value, a logarithmic transformed value was multiplied by a constant of +1 or -1 to represent its 
original sign. 
The mean across all years for the macroeconomic variable FDI was 18.949 using the 
RMS missing data treatment (after reverse logarithmic transformation: $169,607,923.67US). 
This was interpreted as the average FDI inflow of the countries in the study across the years for 
the time period examined. The mean by year increased from 18.015 ($66,652,292.49US) in 2006 
to 20.365 ($698,887,260.25US) in 2007. This finding indicated a large surge in the FDI into 
countries during this period. Interestingly, in 2007, FDI showed a sharp decline from its highest 
level of 20.365 ($698,887,260.25US) to its lowest level of 17.495 ($39,626,157.46US) in 2010. 
This finding was indicative of the overall global financial crisis occurring in 2007 (Crotty, 2009). 
The aftereffects of the global financial crises continued to affect FDI levels into 2010. 
The standard deviation across all years for the macroeconomic variable FDI was 10.195 
using the RMS missing data treatment ($26,769.01US). The standard deviation for the variable 
FDI decreased from 11.548 ($103,569.69US) to 7.873 ($2,625.43US) in 2007. This finding 
suggests that while the amount of FDI increased dramatically in 2007, the differences between 
countries decreased. After the global financial crisis of 2007, the standard deviation of FDI 
began to increase. The standard deviation for the variable FDI increased from 7.873 
($2,625.43US) in 2007 to 12.277 ($214,700.65US) in 2010. These findings, including the 
increase in standard deviation and the decrease in mean, suggest two things. First, after the 





differences among countries, in terms of FDI inflows, increased dramatically. These differences 
in FDI inflow among countries may suggest that foreign investors shifted their investments into 
more profitable countries. 
The mean across all years for the ICT variable of NRI was 3.939 using the RMS missing 
data treatment. The data for the variable NRI was captured through the Networked Readiness 
Index from the Global Information Technology Report indices by the World Economic Forum. 
The NRI ranges from 1.0 (worst) to 7.0 (best) and provides a method for calculating the relative 
and overall development and use of ICT in countries and understanding the strengths and 
weaknesses of a country’s ICT readiness to compete in a global environment. The finding of 
3.939 for the mean across all years signifies that the average among countries in this study fell 
just below the midpoint mark of 4.0. The mean between all years increased from 3.851 in 2006 
to 3.971 in 2010. Also, the mean between all years was at its highest of 4.000 in 2008. These 
findings suggest that that networked readiness among countries gradually increased from 2006 to 
2010 with a slight spike in 2008. The standard deviation across all years for the variable NRI was 
0.841 using the RMS missing data treatment. The standard deviation for the variable NRI 
decreased from 0.910 in 2006 to 0.757 in 2010. This finding suggests that differences between 
countries in networked readiness decreased from 2006 to 2010. 
The mean across all years of the study for the macroeconomic variable of GDP per capita 
was 14,697.774 using the RMS missing data treatment. The data for the variable GDP per capita 
was captured through the gross domestic product per capita (current US$) indicator from the 
World Bank World Development Indicators. The gross domestic product per capita (current 
US$) indicator is measured in current US dollars. GDP per capita measures the gross domestic 





macroeconomic indicator of a country’s standard of living and level of economic production 
(Ringen, 1991). The mean across all years of the study for the variable of GDP per capita was 
14,697.774. This number indicated that the average GDP per capita in the countries used in this 
study was approximately $14,697.77US.  
The mean for the macroeconomic variable of GDP per capita by year increased from 
13366.578 ($13,366.58US) in 2006 to 16806.692 ($16,806.69US) in 2008. This finding 
indicated a 25.737% increase ($3,440.11US) in the GDP per capita between 2006 and 2008. 
However, GDP per capita decreased from its peak of 16806.692 ($16,806.69US) in 2008 to 
13108.401 ($13,108.40) in 2010. This finding indicated a decrease in GDP per capita of 
approximately 22.005% ($3,698.29US) between 2008 and 2010. The average GDP per capita in 
2010 was actually lower than the average GDP per capita in 2006 by $258.18. These changes in 
GDP were similar to the effect shown in the FDI data and are indicative of the aftereffects of the 
overall global financial crisis occurring in 2007 (Crotty, 2009). 
The standard deviation for the variable of GDP per capita by year increased from 
17875.565 in 2006 to 21973.413 in 2008 using the RMS missing data treatment. However, 
standard deviation decreased 21973.413 in 2008 to 18952.751. These findings indicate that the 
difference in GDP per capita from 2006 to 2008 increased, reflecting a wide difference between 
persons in different countries. These findings also indicated that differences between persons in 
terms of GDP per capita decreased from 2008 to 2010. However, differences between persons in 
different countries did not decrease at the same rate as FDI. Surprisingly, the pattern of increase 





The Hofstede Cultural Dimensions have been utilized to examine cultural similarities or 
differences in various studies examining culture and technology adoption (Erumban & de Jong, 
2006; Hofstede, 2001; Moghadam & Assar, 2008). Four of the Hofstede Cultural Dimension 
indices of Power Distance, Individualism vs. Collectivism, Long- vs. Short-Term Orientation, 
and Uncertainty Avoidance were used as national culture control variables to examine potential 
cultural factors influencing the main dependent variable in this study. The data for the cultural 
dimension variables used in this study were captured from the Geert Hofstede Dimension Data 
Matrix as presented in Cultures and Organizations 3
rd
 edition (Hofstede et al., 2010). Similar to 
the CPI, the values of the Hofstede Cultural Dimension Indexes are best used to compare relative 
characteristics of countries to one another. For example, in the power distance index, Austria has 
a score of 11 and Malaysia has a score of 104. This disparity in score suggests that there exists a 
significant difference in power distance between these two countries. However, it would not 
necessarily signify that the power distance in Malaysia is over nine times greater than in Austria. 
The national culture dimension control variables used in this study did not vary by year. 
The mean scores and standard deviations for each cultural dimension variable used in the study 
were calculated using both missing data treatments. These mean scores and standard deviations 
are present below. 
The national culture control variable of H-PDI represented the Hofstede Cultural 
Dimension of power distance. Power distance measures the extent to which less powerful 
members of society accept and/or expect unequal distribution of power (Hofstede, 1984). Higher 
scores in this variable suggest that societal inequality is more widely accepted by those who are 
governed. The minimum score in this cultural dimension was 11 (Austria) and the maximum 





PDI was 59.680. The standard deviation for the variable H-PDI using the LD missing data 
treatment was 1.088. Using the RMS missing data treatment, the mean for the variable of H-PDI 
was 61.586. The standard deviation for the variable H-PDI using the RMS missing data 
treatment was 0.751. There was a slight difference in means and standard deviations among 
missing data treatments. This slight difference suggests that the power distance cultural variable 
is consistent in both missing data treatments. 
The national culture control variable of H-IDV represented the Hofstede Cultural 
Dimension of Individualism vs. Collectivism. Individuality versus collectivism measures the 
extent to which individuals are incorporated into groups. Higher scores in this variable are 
associated with societies valuing personal rights and freedoms over collectivistic value. The 
minimum score in this cultural dimension was 6 (Guatemala) and the maximum score was 91 
(United States). Using the LD missing data treatment, the mean for the variable of H-IDV was 
42.933. The standard deviation for the variable H-IDV using the LD missing data treatment was 
1.209. Using the RMS missing data treatment, the mean for the variable of H-IDV was 40.302. 
The standard deviation for the variable H-IDV using the RMS missing data treatment was 0.862. 
There was a slight difference in means and standard deviations among missing data treatments. 
This slight difference suggests that the individuality versus collectivism cultural variable is 
consistent in both missing data treatments. 
The national culture control variable of H-LTO represented the Hofstede Cultural 
Dimension of Long- vs. Short-Term Orientation. Long- versus short-term orientation measures 
the future orientation of a society. Higher scores in this variable suggest that societies are more 
future-oriented and foster more pragmatic views such as persistence. Lower scores in this 





The minimum score in this cultural dimension was 4 (Ghana) and the maximum score was 100 
(South Korea). Using the LD missing data treatment, the mean for the variable of H-LTO was 
46.592. The standard deviation for the variable H-LTO using the LD missing data treatment was 
1.107. Using the RMS missing data treatment, the mean for the variable of H-LTO was 41.812. 
The standard deviation for the variable H-LTO using the RMS missing data treatment was 0.928. 
There was a slight difference in means and standard deviations among missing data treatments. 
This slight difference suggests that the long- versus short-term orientation cultural variable is 
consistent in both missing data treatments. 
The national culture control variable of H-UAI represented the Hofstede Cultural 
Dimension of uncertainty avoidance. Uncertainty avoidance measures the degree of tolerance for 
uncertainty and ambiguity that exists within a society. Higher scores in this variable indicate 
societies with more rules and laws; these societies are less tolerant to unplanned change. The 
minimum score in this cultural dimension was 8 (Singapore) and the maximum score was 112 
(Greece). 
Using the LD missing data treatment, the mean for the variable of H-UAI was 66.307. 
The standard deviation for the variable H-UAI using the LD missing data treatment was 1.178. 
Using the RMS missing data treatment, the mean for the variable of H-UAI was 65.724. The 
standard deviation for the variable H-UAI using the RMS missing data treatment was 0.865. 
There was a slight difference in means and standard deviations among missing data 
treatments. This slight difference suggests that the uncertainty avoidance cultural variable is 






4.2 Structural Model Analysis 
The theoretical model used in this study as presented in Figure 2.1 was statistically 
analyzed using path analysis with WarpPLS 3.0. A SEM package, WarpPLS 3.0 possesses 
multiple algorithms to analyze structural models. This software is specially designed to identify 
nonlinear relationships among variables of a theorized model by conducting linear and non-linear 
(or “warped”) regression analysis (Kock, 2012). 
WarpPLS 3.0 is a powerful SEM package that can be used to conduct path analysis. Path 
analysis is a special case of structural equation modeling (SEM) (Maruyama, 1998). In path 
analysis, the measurement model found in SEM is excluded. The measurement model is not 
required since only one indicator is associated upon one construct. The structural model found in 
SEM is basically a path model with constructs as variables and the association between variables 
as paths within the model. In order to use WarpPLS 3.0 to conduct a path analysis using the 
Warp2 regression algorithm, each variable used in this study was entered into the software as an 
indicator. Each indicator was used as a solitary indicator for each construct. 
The majority of social and economic phenomena exhibit non-linear relationships (Kock, 
2011b; A. Rosenberg, 1992). Therefore, WarpPLS 3.0 was utilized to do the path analysis. 
WarpPLS 3.0 possesses algorithms that attempt to identify such non-linear or U-curve 
relationships between variables within a model. This study utilized WarpPLS 3.0’s non-linear 
(e.g. Warp2) algorithm to calculate statistical results such as path coefficients denoted as 
standardized betas with related P values and R-squared (R
2
) coefficients for the path model. The 
overall strength and predictive power of the model can be determined by examining these path 
and R
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bootstrapping, jackknifing, and blindfolding. Bootstrapping – with WarpPLS 3.0’s default setting 
of 100 resamples – and jackknifing resampling techniques were applied to the data using 
WarpPLS 3.0 before analysis. In addition, both missing data treatments were used in preparing 
the data for analysis. 
As noted in the WarpPLS 3.0 software manual, the non-linear (e.g. Warp2) algorithm is 
sensitive to outliers present in the data. As recommended by the WarpPLS 3.0 software manual, 
P values were estimated using both the bootstrapping and jackknifing resampling techniques. 
Therefore, the data using two missing data treatments and two different resampling techniques 
was analyzed using path analysis which yielded four sets of results. Figure 4-1 presents the 
study’s structural model with results of the Warp2 algorithm with the RMS missing data 
treatment and bootstrapping resampling technique applied. Figure 4-2 presents the study’s 
structural model with results of the Warp2 algorithm with the RMS missing data treatment and 
the jackknifing resampling technique applied. Figure 4-3 presents the study’s structural model 
with results of the Warp2 algorithm with the LD missing data treatment and the bootstrapping 
resampling technique applied. Figure 4-4 presents the study’s structural model with results of the 
Warp2 algorithm with the LD missing data treatment and the jackknifing resampling technique 
applied. 
Each set of results shows path coefficients as standardized betas (β) and R-squared (R
2
) 
coefficients of explained variance. Beta values followed by three asterisks (***) are significant at 
P < 0.001. Beta values followed by two asterisks (**) are significant at P < 0.01. Beta values 
followed by one asterisk (*) are significant at P < 0.05. Beta values followed by no asterisk are 
not statistically significant. The P=0.05 level can be seen as the upper threshold of acceptability 



































































Figure 4-1. Structural model with RMS and bootstrapping.  
*** indicates p-value of <0.001 
**  indicates p-value of <0.01 
*  indicates p-value of <0.05 


































































Figure 4-2. Structural model with RMS and jackknifing.  
*** indicates p-value of <0.001 
**  indicates p-value of <0.01 
*  indicates p-value of <0.05 

































































Figure 4-3. Structural model with LD and bootstrapping.   
*** indicates p-value of <0.001 
**  indicates p-value of <0.01 
*  indicates p-value of <0.05 


































































Figure 4-4. Structural model with LD and jackknifing.  
*** indicates p-value of <0.001 
**  indicates p-value of <0.01 
*  indicates p-value of <0.05 





The WarpPLS 3.0 software manual recommends using “the P values associated with the 
most stable [path] coefficients” (Kock, 2012, p. 13). The significant path coefficients along with the 
related P values were estimated for each missing data treatment and bootstrapping and jackknifing 
resampling techniques as shown in Table 4-4.  
Table 4-4. Number of significant paths by P-value level.  
Significance level 
Number of significant paths 
RMS LD 
bootstrapping jackknifing bootstrapping jackknifing 
P<0.05 11 9 10 10 
P<0.01 10 6 10 7 
P<0.001 9 6 7 5 
 
 
 As predicted by the WarpPLS 3.0 manual, results with large samples and those that used 
bootstrapping resampling gave more stable path coefficients. (Kock, 2012). Consequently, the data 
with the RMS missing data treatment and bootstrapping resampling technique demonstrated the 
higher number of significant paths with stronger associated P values, indicating a higher overall 
predictive and explanatory quality of this particular model. 
4.3 Model Fit Indices 
WarpPLS 3.0 conducts a model fitness test as part of its structural model analysis. The 
results of these model fitness tests are outlined in this section. The following model fitness tests 
indices were calculated: average path coefficient (APC), average R-squared value (ARS), and 
average variance inflation factor (AVIF). The APC index is the average of the absolute values of 
the model’s path coefficients. ARS index is the absolute value of the R
2





The AVIF index is the overall measure of multicollinearity of the model. Model fit indices are 
useful when comparing the quality of a model with different data. In this study, the quality of the 
model was assessed by comparing the APC, ARS, and AVIF values of the data using different 
missing data treatments. The ARS and AVIF indices are more important when comparing models 
(Kock, 2011b, 2012).  
The results of the model fitness tests along with associated P-values are shown in Table 4.3. 
It is recommended that APC and ARS are significant at the P<0.05 level and AVIF is less than 5 
(Hair et al., 2010; Kline, 2010; Kock, 2012). The APC and ARS indices’ P-values for the data with 
both missing data treatments were significant at the P<.001 level. The AVIF index for the data with 
both missing data treatments was less than 5. The model using data with the RMS missing data 
treatment demonstrated a higher ARS. This indicated that the study’s model had more explanatory 
power using data with the RMS treatment. The data with the LD missing data treatment had a 
slightly lower AVIF index (1.953) than the data with the RMS missing data treatment (2.145). 
However, these AVIF indices had values below the recommended threshold. 
Table 4-5. Model fit indices with associated P-values. 
Fit Index Data with LD Data with RMS 
APC 0.309* 0.300* 
ARS 0.657* 0.664* 
AVIF 1.953 2.145 








4.4 Hypotheses Testing 
The ARS values for data using the RMS missing data treatment were higher than the LD 
missing data treatment as shown in Table 4-5. Also, the data using the RMS missing data treatment 
and bootstrapping resampling demonstrated the higher number of significant paths with stronger 
associated P values. Given these results of the model fit and significant path tests, data with the 
RMS missing data treatment and bootstrapping resampling were used in the hypotheses testing. The 
results of the hypotheses testing are presented in Table 4-6. A detailed review of these results for 
each hypothesis follows. 
Table 4-6: Summary results of hypotheses testing 
Hypotheses Supported 
H1a: FDI has a positive effect on networked readiness. Accept
(a)
 
H1b: GDP per capita has a positive effect on networked readiness. Accept
(a)
 
H2a: Networked readiness has a positive effect on Internet diffusion. Accept
(a)
 
H2b: Networked readiness has a positive effect on mobile phone diffusion. Accept
(a)
 
H2c: Mobile phone diffusion has a positive effect on Internet diffusion. Accept
(a)
 
H3a: Internet diffusion has a positive effect on transparency. Accept
(a)
 
H3b: Mobile phone diffusion has a positive effect on transparency. Reject 
H4a: Internet diffusion has a negative effect on corruption. Accept 
H4b: Transparency has a negative effect on corruption. Accept 
H4c: Mobile phone diffusion has a negative effect on corruption. Accept 
Note: (a) Results significant at P<0.01 across all missing data treatments and resampling analyses. 
 
Hypothesis 1a stated that foreign direct investment (FDI) has a positive effect on networked 
readiness (NRI). The results showed that FDI has a significant (P<0.001) and positive (β=0.179) 
effect on NRI. Thus, Hypothesis 1a was supported. Figure 4-5 shows the relationship between FDI 
and NRI in the data. As shown, the relationship between FDI and NRI was non-linear. WarpPLS 





, J- or Kuznet-curves depending on the direction of the curve and the amount of non-linearity 
(Selden & Song, 1995). These non-linear relationships have been found in other studies related to 
FDI and international trade (D. K. Backus, Kehoe, & Kydland, 1994; Rose & Yellen, 1989). 
 
Figure 4-5. Relationship between FDI and NRI. 
Hypothesis 1b stated that GDP per capita, as measured in current US dollars from gross 
domestic product per capita (current US$) indicator through the World Bank World Development 
Indicators, has a positive effect on networked readiness. GDP per capita had a significant (P<0.001) 





(CPI) from Transparency International. Thus, Hypothesis 1b was supported. Figure 4-6 shows the 




Figure 4-6. Relationship between GDP per capita and NRI 
Hypothesis 2a stated that networked readiness (NRI) has a positive effect on Internet 
diffusion as measured through World Bank World Development Internet users (per 100 people) 





Internet diffusion. Thus, Hypothesis 2 was supported. Figure 4-7 shows the relationship between 
NRI and Internet diffusion in the data. As shown, this relationship was relatively linear. 
 
 
Figure 4-7. Relationship between NRI and Internet diffusion. 
Hypothesis 2b stated that networked readiness (NRI) has a positive effect on mobile phone 
diffusion (Mobile diffusion). The results showed that NRI had significant (P<0.001) and positive 
(β=0.687) effects on mobile diffusion as measured through World Bank World Development 




Figure 4-8 shows the relationship between NRI and mobile diffusion. As shown, this relationship 
was non-linear. 
 
Figure 4-8. Relationship between NRI and Mobile diffusion. 
Hypothesis 2c stated that mobile phone diffusion (Mobile diffusion) has a positive effect on 
Internet diffusion. Mobile diffusion, as measured through the World Bank World Development 
indicator of Mobile cellular subscriptions (per 100 people), had a significant (P<0.001) and positive 
(β=0.396) effect on Internet diffusion, as measured through the World Bank World Development 




the relationship between mobile diffusion and Internet diffusion in the data. As shown, this 
relationship was non-linear. 
 
Figure 4-9. Relationship between Mobile and Internet diffusion. 
 
Hypothesis 3a stated that Internet diffusion has a positive effect on transparency. Internet 
diffusion, as measured through the World Bank World Development indicator of Internet users (per 
100 people), had a significant (P<0.001) and positive (β=0.675) effect on transparency, as measured 




supported. Figure 4-10 shows the relationship between Internet diffusion and transparency in the 
data. As shown, this relationship was non-linear. 
 
Figure 4-10. Relationship between Internet diffusion and transparency. 
Hypothesis 3b stated that mobile phone diffusion (Mobile diffusion) had a positive effect on 
transparency. Mobile diffusion, as measured through the World Bank World Development indicator 
of Mobile cellular subscriptions (per 100 people), did not have a significant (P=0.182) or positive 
(β=-0.055) effect on transparency, as measured through the World Bank Governance index of 




relationship between mobile diffusion and transparency in the data using group-mean substitution 
with bootstrapping resampling. As shown, this relationship was non-linear. 
 
Figure 4-11. Relationship between mobile diffusion and transparency. 
Hypothesis 4a stated that Internet diffusion has a negative effect on corruption. Internet 
diffusion, as measured through the World Bank World Development indicator of Internet users (per 
100 people), had a significant (P<0.001) and negative (β=-0.410) effect on corruption as measured 




4a was supported. Figure 4-12 shows the relationship between Internet diffusion and corruption in 
the data. As shown, this relationship was non-linear. 
Figure 4-12. Relationship between Internet diffusion and corruption. 
Hypothesis 4b stated that transparency has a negative effect on corruption. Transparency, as 
measured through the World Bank Governance index of Voice of Accountability, had a significant 
(P<0.001) and negative (β=-0.408) effect on corruption, as measured through the Corruption 




Figure 4-13 shows the relationship between transparency and corruption in the data. As shown, this 
relationship was a non-linear or J-curve. 
 
Figure 4-13. Relationship between transparency and corruption. 
Hypothesis 4c stated that mobile phone diffusion (Mobile diffusion) has a negative effect on 
corruption. Mobile diffusion, as measured through the World Bank World Development indicator 
of Mobile cellular subscriptions (per 100 people), did have a significant (P<0.05) and negative (β=-
0.092) effect on corruption, as measured through the Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI) from 




between mobile phone diffusion and corruption in the data. As shown, this relationship was non-
linear. 
 
Figure 4-14. Relationship between mobile diffusion and corruption. 
In this study, four control variables were used as national culture control variables to 
examine potential cultural factors influencing the main dependent variable. These four national 
culture control variables included the Hofstede Cultural Dimension indices of Power Distance, 




year was also used as a control variable in order to control for potential multiple year effects. The 
year variable did not prove statistically significant (β=0.081, P=0.190) in the data analysis. 
The national culture control variable of H-PDI represented the Hofstede Cultural Dimension 
of power distance. H-PDI had a significant (P<0.01) and positive (β=0.065) effect on corruption as 
measured through the Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI) from Transparency International. The 
national culture control variable of H-UAI represented the Hofstede Cultural Dimension of 
uncertainty avoidance. H-UAI had a significant (P<0.01) and positive (β=0.085) effect on 
corruption as measured through the Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI) from Transparency 
International. 
The national culture control variable of H-IDV represented the Hofstede Cultural 
Dimension of Individualism vs. Collectivism. H-IDV did not have a significant (P=0.447, β=-
0.003) effect on corruption as measured through the Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI) from 
Transparency International. The national culture control variable of H-LTO represented the 
Hofstede Cultural Dimension of Long- vs. Short-Term Orientation. H-LTO did not have a 
significant (P=0.072, β=-0.031) effect on corruption as measured through the Corruption 
Perceptions Index (CPI) from Transparency International. 
4.4 Direct, Indirect and Total Effects 
The J. Cohen (1988) f-squared effect size coefficients were calculated for the paths in this 
study’s model. Direct, indirect and total effect coefficients were calculated using WarpPLS 3.0. 
Calculation of such indirect, direct and total effect coefficients can prove crucial to evaluating and 
explaining mediating effects of variables in the model. Effect size is the contribution by a predictor 
variable on the R
2




WarpPLS 3.0 calculates these effects for variables linked by one or more paths in the 
following manner: “the path coefficients associated with the effects, the number of paths that make 
up the effects, the P values associated with effects (calculated via resampling, using the selected 
resampling method), the standard errors associated with the effects, and effect sizes associated with 
the effects” (Kock, 2012, p. 50). According to J. Cohen (1988), effect sizes can be small (0.02), 
medium (0.15), or large (0.35). Effect size coefficients (ƒ
2
) below 0.02 are considered too small for 
relevancy. 
Direct effects for each variable relationship in the model along with the effect size with 
respective P values and standard error are shown in Table 4-7. Direct effects are analogous to the 
path coefficients for each variable-to-variable relationship. It is important to note effect size when 
examining direct effects. While a direct effect may be significant (P<0.001), magnitude of that 
effect (i.e. effect size) may be small. FDI showed a positive and significant direct effect on NRI 
(direct effect=0.179, P<0.001). The magnitude of the direct effect of FDI on NRI was small (effect 
size=0.104). GDP per capita showed a positive and significant direct effect on NRI (direct 
effect=0.750, P<0.001). The magnitude of the direct effect of GDP per capita on NRI was large 
(effect size=0.634). 
NRI showed a positive and significant direct effect on Internet diffusion (direct 
effect=0.578, P<0.001). The magnitude of the direct effect of NRI on Internet diffusion was large 
(effect size=0.491). NRI showed a positive and significant direct effect on Mobile diffusion (direct 
effect=0.678, P<0.001). The magnitude of the direct effect of NRI on Mobile diffusion was large 
(effect size=0.472). Mobile diffusion showed a positive and significant direct effect on Internet 
diffusion (direct effect=0.396, P<0.001). The magnitude of the direct effect of Mobile diffusion on 




significant direct effect on Transparency (direct effect=-0.055, p=0.182). The magnitude of the 
direct effect of Mobile diffusion on Transparency was small (effect size=0.028). Mobile diffusion 
showed a negative and significant direct effect on Corruption (direct effect=-0.092, P<0.05, 
p=0.015). The magnitude of the direct effect of Mobile diffusion on Corruption was small (effect 
size=0.053). 
Internet diffusion showed a positive and significant direct effect on Transparency (direct 
effect=0.675, P<0.001). The magnitude of the direct effect of Internet diffusion on Transparency 
was large (effect size=0.481). Internet diffusion showed a positive and significant direct effect on 
Corruption (direct effect=-0.410, P<0.001). The magnitude of the direct effect of Internet diffusion 
on Corruption was medium (effect size=0.348). Transparency showed a negative and significant 
direct effect on Corruption (direct effect=-0.408, P<0.001). The magnitude of the direct effect of 
Transparency on Corruption was medium (effect size=0.348). 
The control variables were also analyzed for their direct effect on Corruption. Hofstede’s 
power distance index (H-PDI) showed a positive and significant direct effect on Corruption (direct 
effect=0.065, P<0.01, p=0.008). The magnitude of the direct effect of H-PDI on Corruption was 
small (effect size=0.045). Hofstede’s uncertainty avoidance index (H-UAI) showed a positive and 
significant direct effect on Corruption (direct effect=0.085, P<0.01, p=0.002). The magnitude of the 
direct effect of H-UAI on Corruption was small (effect size=0.045). Hofstede’s long-term 
orientation (H-LTO) showed a negative but not significant direct effect on Corruption (direct 
effect=-0.031, p=0.072). The magnitude of the direct effect of H-LTO on Corruption was below 
Cohen’s recommended effect size threshold for relevancy (effect size=0.008). Hofstede’s 




(direct effect=-0.003, p=0.447). The magnitude of the direct effect of H-IDV on Corruption was 
below Cohen’s recommended effect size threshold for relevancy (effect size=0.002). 










FDI → NRI 0.179 <0.001 0.104 small 0.030 
GDP per capita → NRI 0.750 <0.001 0.634 large 0.025 
NRI → Internet diffusion 0.578 <0.001 0.491 large 0.023 
NRI → Mobile diffusion 0.687 <0.001 0.472 large 0.018 
Mobile diffusion → Internet 
diffusion 
0.396 <0.001 0.314 medium 0.026 
Mobile diffusion → Transparency -0.055 0.182 0.028 small 0.061 
Mobile diffusion → Corruption -0.092 0.015 0.053 small 0.042 
Internet diffusion → Transparency 0.675 <0.001 0.481 large 0.028 
Internet diffusion → Corruption -0.410 <0.001 0.347 medium 0.061 
Transparency → Corruption -0.408 <0.001 0.348 medium 0.061 
H-PDI → Corruption 0.065 0.008 0.045 small 0.027 
H-UAI → Corruption 0.085 0.002 0.024 small 0.030 
H-LTO → Corruption -0.031 0.072 0.008 no rel. 0.021 
H-IDV → Corruption -0.003 0.447 0.002 no rel. 0.025 
Note: * Effect size coefficients and effect size are reported. According to J. Cohen (1988), effect 
sizes can be small (0.02), medium (0.15), or large (0.35). Effect size coefficients below 0.02 are 
considered too small for relevancy (no rel.). 
 
Indirect effects are introduced when the path from an initial variable to an outcome variable 
has other intervening variables. The intervening variables in a model can have a mediation effect on 
the relationship between the initial and outcome variables. The indirect effects by number of 
aggregated segments and summation of indirect effects for each variable relationship in the model 
along with the effect size with respective P values and standard error were also calculated.  
The indirect effects of initial variables on outcome variables with two aggregated segments, 




diffusion, which had one two-segment path to Corruption (Internet diffusion → Transparency → 
Corruption), showed a negative and significant indirect effect on Corruption (indirect effect=-0.275, 
P<0.001). The magnitude of the indirect effect of Internet diffusion on Corruption was medium 
(effect size=0.233). 
Table 4-8. Indirect effects for relationships with two aggregated segments. 










Internet diffusion → 
Transparency → Corruption 
1 -0.275 <0.001 0.233 medium 0.045 
Mobile diffusion → Internet 
diffusion → Transparency 
1 0.268 <0.001 0.138 small 0.019 
Mobile diffusion → 
Transparency → 
Corruption; Mobile 
diffusion → Internet 
diffusion → Corruption 
2 -0.140 <0.001 0.081 small 0.031 
FDI → NRI → Internet 
diffusion 
1 0.103 <0.001 0.051 small 0.017 
FDI → NRI → Mobile 
diffusion 
1 0.123 <0.001 0.048 small 0.021 
NRI → Internet diffusion → 
Transparency; NRI → 
Mobile diffusion → 
Transparency 
2 0.352 <0.001 0.237 medium 0.047 
NRI → Internet diffusion → 
Corruption; NRI → Mobile 
diffusion → Corruption 
2 -0.300 <0.001 0.274 medium 0.045 
NRI → Mobile diffusion → 
Internet diffusion 
1 0.272 <0.001 0.231 medium 0.018 
GDP per capita → NRI → 
Internet diffusion 
1 0.434 <0.001 0.361 large 0.025 
GDP per capita → NRI → 
mobile diffusion 
1 0.515 <0.001 0.375 large 0.023 
Note: * Effect size coefficients and effect size are reported. According to J. Cohen (1988), effect 
sizes can be small (0.02), medium (0.15), or large (0.35). Effect size coefficients below 0.02 are 
considered too small for relevancy (no rel.). 
Mobile diffusion, which had one two-segment path to Transparency (Mobile diffusion → 




Transparency (indirect effect=0.268, P<0.001). The magnitude of the indirect effect of Mobile 
diffusion on Transparency was small (effect size=0.138). Mobile diffusion, which had two two-
segment path to Corruption (Mobile diffusion → Transparency → Corruption; Mobile diffusion → 
Internet diffusion → Corruption), showed a negative and significant indirect effect on Corruption 
(indirect effect=-0.140, P<0.001). The magnitude of the indirect effect of Mobile diffusion on 
Corruption was small (effect size=0.081). FDI, which had one two-segment path to Internet 
diffusion (FDI → NRI → Internet diffusion), showed a positive and significant indirect effect on 
Internet diffusion (indirect effect=0.103, P<0.001). The magnitude of the indirect effect of FDI on 
Internet diffusion was small (effect size=0.051). 
FDI, which had one two-segment path to Mobile diffusion (FDI → NRI → Mobile 
diffusion), showed a positive and significant indirect effect on mobile diffusion (indirect 
effect=0.123, P<0.001). The magnitude of the indirect effect of FDI on Mobile diffusion was small 
(effect size=0.048). NRI, which had two two-segment path to Transparency (NRI → Internet 
diffusion → Transparency; NRI → Mobile diffusion → Transparency), showed a positive and 
significant indirect effect on Transparency (indirect effect=0.352, P<0.001). The magnitude of the 
indirect effect of NRI on Transparency was medium (effect size=0.237). NRI, which had two two-
segment path to Corruption (NRI → Internet diffusion → Corruption; NRI → Mobile diffusion → 
Corruption), showed a negative and significant indirect effect on Corruption (indirect effect=-0.300, 
P<0.001). The magnitude of the indirect effect of NRI on Corruption was medium (effect 
size=0.274). NRI, which had one two-segment path to Internet diffusion (NRI → Mobile diffusion 
→ Internet diffusion), showed a positive and significant indirect effect on Internet diffusion 
(indirect effect=0.272, P<0.001). The magnitude of the indirect effect of NRI on Internet diffusion 




diffusion (GDP per capita → NRI → Internet diffusion), showed a positive and significant indirect 
effect on Internet diffusion (indirect effect=0.434, P<0.001). The magnitude of the indirect effect of 
GDP per capita on Internet diffusion was large (effect size=0.361). GDP per capita, which had one 
two-segment path to Mobile diffusion (GDP per capita → NRI → Mobile diffusion), showed a 
positive and significant indirect effect on Mobile diffusion (indirect effect=0.515, P<0.001). The 
magnitude of the indirect effect of GDP per capita on Mobile diffusion was large (effect 
size=0.375). 
The indirect effects of initial variables on outcome variables with three aggregated 
segments, along with associate P values, effect size, and standard errors are shown in Table 4-9. 
Mobile diffusion, which had one three-segment path to Corruption (Mobile diffusion → Internet 
diffusion → Transparency → Corruption), showed a negative and significant indirect effect on 
Corruption (indirect effect=-0.109, P<0.001). The magnitude of the indirect effect of Mobile 
diffusion on Corruption was small (effect size=0.063). 
FDI, which had two three-segment path to Transparency (FDI → NRI → Internet diffusion 
→ Transparency; FDI → NRI → Mobile diffusion → Transparency), showed a positive and 
significant indirect effect on Transparency (indirect effect=0.063, P<0.001). The magnitude of the 
indirect effect of FDI on Transparency was small (effect size=0.021). FDI, which had two three-
segment path to Corruption (FDI → NRI → Internet diffusion → Corruption; FDI → NRI → 
Mobile diffusion → Corruption), showed a negative and significant indirect effect on Corruption 
(indirect effect=-0.054, P<0.001). The magnitude of the indirect effect of FDI on Corruption was 


















Mobile diffusion → 
Internet diffusion → 
Transparency → 
Corruption 
1 -0.109 <0.001 0.063 small 0.020 
FDI → NRI → Internet 
diffusion → Transparency; 
FDI → NRI → Mobile 
diffusion → Transparency 
2 0.063 <0.001 0.021 small 0.013 
FDI → NRI → Internet 
diffusion → corruption; 
FDI → NRI → mobile 
diffusion → corruption 
2 -0.054 <0.001 0.026 small 0.012 
FDI → NRI → Mobile 
diffusion → Internet 
diffusion 
1 0.049 <0.001 0.024 small 0.010 
NRI → Mobile diffusion 
→ Internet diffusion → 
Transparency 
1 0.184 <0.001 0.124 small 0.014 
NRI → Mobile diffusion 
→ Transparency → 
Corruption; NRI → 
Internet diffusion → 
Transparency → 
Corruption; NRI → Mobile 
diffusion → Internet 
diffusion → Corruption 
3 -0.256 <0.001 0.233 medium 0.025 
GDP per capita → NRI → 
Mobile diffusion → 
Transparency; GDP per 
capita → NRI → Internet 
diffusion→ Transparency 
2 0.264 <0.001 0.186 medium 0.038 
GDP per capita → NRI → 
Mobile diffusion → 
Corruption; GDP per capita 
→ NRI → Internet 
diffusion → Corruption 
2 -0.225 <0.001 0.193 medium 0.033 
GDP per capita → NRI → 
Mobile diffusion → 
Internet diffusion 
1 0.204 <0.001 0.170 medium 0.014 
Note: * Effect size coefficients and effect size are reported. According to J. Cohen (1988), 
effect sizes can be small (0.02), medium (0.15), or large (0.35). Effect size coefficients below 





FDI, which had one three-segment path to Internet diffusion (FDI → NRI → Mobile 
diffusion → Internet diffusion), showed a negative and significant indirect effect on Internet 
diffusion (indirect effect=-0.049, P<0.001). The magnitude of the indirect effect of FDI on Internet 
diffusion was small (effect size=0.024). NRI, which had one three-segment path to Transparency 
(NRI → mobile diffusion → Internet diffusion → Transparency), showed a positive and significant 
indirect effect on Transparency (indirect effect=0.184, P<0.001). The magnitude of the indirect 
effect of NRI on Transparency was small (effect size=0.124). NRI, which had three three-segment 
path to Corruption (NRI → Mobile diffusion → Transparency → Corruption; NRI → Internet 
diffusion → Transparency → Corruption; NRI → Mobile diffusion → Internet diffusion → 
Corruption), showed a negative and significant indirect effect on Corruption (indirect effect=-0.256, 
P<0.001). The magnitude of the indirect effect of NRI on corruption was medium (effect 
size=0.233). GDP per capita, which had two three-segment path to Transparency (GDP per capita 
→ NRI → Mobile diffusion → Transparency; GDP per capita → NRI → Internet diffusion→ 
Transparency), showed a positive and significant indirect effect on Transparency (indirect 
effect=0.264, P<0.001). The magnitude of the indirect effect of GDP per capita on Transparency 
was medium (effect size=0.186). GDP per capita, which had two three-segment path to Corruption 
(GDP per capita → NRI → Mobile diffusion → Corruption; GDP per capita → NRI → Internet 
diffusion → Corruption), showed a negative and significant indirect effect on Corruption (indirect 
effect=-0.225, P<0.001). The magnitude of the indirect effect of GDP per capita on Corruption was 
medium (effect size=0.193). GDP per capita, which had one three-segment path to Internet 
diffusion (GDP per capita → NRI → Mobile diffusion → Internet diffusion), showed a negative 
and significant indirect effect on Internet diffusion (indirect effect=0.204, P<0.001). The magnitude 




The indirect effects of initial variables on outcome variables with four aggregated segments, 
along with associate P values, effect size, and standard errors are shown in Table 4-10.  














FDI → NRI → Mobile 
diffusion → Internet 
diffusion → Transparency 
1 0.033 <0.001 0.011 no rel. 0.006 
FDI → NRI → Mobile 
diffusion → Internet 
diffusion → Corruption; FDI 
→ NRI → Mobile diffusion 
→ Transparency → 
Corruption; FDI → NRI → 
Mobile diffusion → 
Transparency → Corruption 
3 -0.046 <0.001 0.022 small 0.008 
NRI → Mobile diffusion → 
Internet diffusion → 
Transparency→ Corruption 
1 -0.075 <0.001 0.069 small 0.013 
GDP per capita → NRI → 
Mobile diffusion → Internet 
diffusion → Transparency 
1 0.138 <0.001 0.097 small 0.011 
GDP per capita → NRI → 
Mobile diffusion → Internet 
diffusion → Corruption; 
GDP per capita → NRI → 
Mobile diffusion → 
Transparency → Corruption; 
GDP per capita → NRI → 
Internet diffusion → 
Transparency →Corruption 
3 -0.192 <0.001 0.164 medium 0.021 
Note: * Effect size coefficients and effect size are reported. According to J. Cohen (1988), effect 
sizes can be small (0.02), medium (0.15), or large (0.35). Effect size coefficients below 0.02 are 
considered too small for relevancy (no rel.). 
 
FDI, which had one four-segment path to Transparency (FDI → NRI → Mobile diffusion 




Transparency (indirect effect=0.033, P<0.001). The magnitude of the indirect effect of FDI on 
Transparency was below Cohen’s recommended effect size threshold for relevancy (effect 
size=0.011). FDI, which had three four-segment path to Corruption (FDI → NRI → Mobile 
diffusion → Internet diffusion → Corruption; FDI → NRI → Mobile diffusion → transparency → 
Corruption; FDI → NRI → Mobile diffusion → Transparency → Corruption), showed a negative 
and significant indirect effect on Corruption (indirect effect=-0.046, P<0.001). The magnitude of 
the indirect effect of FDI on Corruption was small (effect size=0.022). 
 NRI, which had one four-segment path to Corruption (NRI → Mobile diffusion → Internet 
diffusion → Transparency→ Corruption), showed a negative and significant indirect effect on 
Corruption (indirect effect=0.033, P<0.001). The magnitude of the indirect effect of NRI on 
Corruption was small (effect size=0.069). GDP per capita, which had one four-segment path to 
Transparency (GDP per capita → NRI → Mobile diffusion → Internet diffusion → Transparency), 
showed a positive and significant indirect effect on Transparency (indirect effect=0.138, P<0.001). 
The magnitude of the indirect effect of GDP per capita on Transparency was small (effect 
size=0.097). GDP per capita, which had three four-segment path to Corruption (GDP per capita → 
NRI → Mobile diffusion → Internet diffusion → Corruption; GDP per capita → NRI → Mobile 
diffusion → Transparency → Corruption; GDP per capita → NRI → Internet diffusion → 
Transparency →Corruption), showed a negative and significant indirect effect on Corruption 
(indirect effect=-0.192, P<0.001). The magnitude of the indirect effect of GDP per capita on 
Corruption was medium (effect size=0.164). 
The indirect effects of initial variables on outcome variables with five aggregated segments, 
along with associate P values, effect size, and standard errors are shown in Table 4-11.  FDI, which 




Transparency → Corruption), showed a negative and significant indirect effect on Corruption 
(indirect effect=-0.013, P<0.001). The magnitude of the indirect effect of FDI on corruption was 
below Cohen’s recommended effect size threshold for relevancy (effect size=0.007). GDP per 
capita, which had one five-segment path (GDP per capita → NRI → Mobile diffusion → Internet 
diffusion → Transparency → Corruption), showed a negative and significant indirect effect on 
Corruption (indirect effect=-0.013, P<0.001). The magnitude of the indirect effect of GDP per 
capita on Corruption was below Cohen’s recommended effect size threshold for relevancy (effect 
size=0.007). 













FDI → NRI → Mobile 
diffusion → Internet 
diffusion → Transparency 
→ Corruption 
1 -0.013 <0.001 0.007 no rel. 0.003 
GDP per capita → NRI → 
Mobile diffusion → 
Internet diffusion → 
Transparency → 
Corruption 
1 -0.056 <0.001 0.048 small 0.011 
Note: * Effect size coefficients and effect size are reported. According to J. Cohen (1988), 
effect sizes can be small (0.02), medium (0.15), or large (0.35). Effect size coefficients below 
0.02 are considered too small for relevancy (no rel.). 
 
The sum of indirect effects of initial variables on outcome variables in the model, along with 
the number of paths, the effect size with respective P values and standard error are shown in Table 
4-12. Internet diffusion, which had one path to Corruption (Internet diffusion → Corruption), 




P<0.001). The summative magnitude of the indirect effect of Internet diffusion on Corruption was 
medium (effect size=0.233).  
Table 4-12. Sum of indirect effects. 










Internet diffusion → 
Corruption 
1 -0.275 <0.001 0.233 medium 0.045 
Mobile diffusion → 
Transparency 
1 0.268 <0.001 0.138 small 0.019 
Mobile diffusion →…→ 
Corruption 
3 -0.249 <0.001 0.144 small 0.033 
FDI → …→ 
Transparency 
3 0.096 <0.001 0.032 small 0.019 
FDI → …→ Corruption 6 -0.113 <0.001 0.055 small 0.033 
FDI →… → Internet 
diffusion 
2 0.152 <0.001 0.075 small 0.019 
FDI → Mobile diffusion 1 0.123 <0.001 0.048 small 0.033 
NRI → …→ 
Transparency 
3 0.536 <0.001 0.361 large 0.048 
NRI → …→ Corruption 6 -0.631 <0.001 0.576 large 0.033 
NRI → Internet diffusion 1 0.272 <0.001 0.231 medium 0.018 
GDP per capita →… → 
Transparency 
3 0.402 <0.001 0.283 medium 0.040 
GDP per capita → …→ 
Corruption 
6 -0.473 <0.001 0.406 large 0.029 
GDP per capita →…→ 
Internet diffusion 
2 0.638 <0.001 0.530 large 0.024 
GDP per capita → 
Mobile diffusion 
1 0.515 <0.001 0.375 large 0.023 
Note: * Effect size coefficients and effect size are reported. According to J. Cohen (1988), effect 
sizes can be small (0.02), medium (0.15), or large (0.35). Effect size coefficients below 0.02 are 
considered too small for relevancy (no rel.). 
 
Mobile diffusion, which had one path to Transparency (Mobile diffusion → Transparency), 
showed a positive and significant indirect effect on Transparency (sum of indirect effect=0.268, 




small (effect size=0.138). Mobile diffusion, which had three paths to Corruption (Mobile diffusion 
→ Transparency → Corruption; Mobile diffusion → Internet diffusion → Corruption; Mobile 
diffusion → Internet diffusion → Transparency → Corruption), showed a negative and significant 
indirect effect on Corruption (sum of indirect effect=-0.249, P<0.001). The summative magnitude 
of the indirect effect of Mobile diffusion on Corruption was small (effect size=0.144). 
FDI, which had three paths to Transparency (FDI → NRI → Internet diffusion → 
Transparency; FDI → NRI → Mobile diffusion → Transparency; FDI → NRI → Mobile diffusion 
→ Internet diffusion → Transparency), showed a positive and significant indirect effect on 
Transparency (sum of indirect effect=0.096, P<0.001). The summative magnitude of the indirect 
effect of FDI on Transparency was small (effect size=0.032). FDI, which had six paths to 
Corruption (FDI → NRI → Internet diffusion → Corruption; FDI → NRI → Mobile diffusion → 
Corruption; FDI → NRI → Mobile diffusion → Internet diffusion → Corruption; FDI → NRI → 
Mobile diffusion → Transparency → Corruption; FDI → NRI → Mobile diffusion → 
Transparency → Corruption; FDI → NRI → Mobile diffusion → Internet diffusion → 
Transparency → Corruption), showed a negative and significant indirect effect on Corruption (sum 
of indirect effect=-0.113, P<0.001). The summative magnitude of the indirect effect of FDI on 
Corruption was small (effect size=0.055). 
FDI, which had two paths to Internet diffusion (FDI → NRI → Internet diffusion; FDI → 
NRI → Mobile diffusion → Internet diffusion), showed a positive and significant indirect effect on 
Internet diffusion (sum of indirect effect=0.152, P<0.001). The summative magnitude of the 
indirect effect of FDI on Internet diffusion was small (effect size=0.075). FDI, which had one path 
to Mobile diffusion (FDI → NRI → Mobile diffusion), showed a positive and significant indirect 




the indirect effect of FDI on Mobile diffusion was small (effect size=0.048). NRI, which had three 
paths to Transparency (NRI → Internet diffusion → Transparency; NRI → Mobile diffusion → 
Transparency; NRI → Mobile diffusion → Internet diffusion → Transparency), showed a positive 
and significant indirect effect on Transparency (sum of indirect effect=0.536, P<0.001). The 
summative magnitude of the indirect effect of NRI on Transparency was large (effect size=0.361). 
NRI, which had six paths to Corruption (NRI → Internet diffusion → Corruption; NRI → 
Mobile diffusion → Corruption; NRI → Mobile diffusion → Transparency → Corruption; NRI → 
Internet diffusion → Transparency → Corruption; NRI → Mobile diffusion → Internet diffusion → 
Corruption; NRI → Mobile diffusion → Internet diffusion → Transparency→ Corruption), showed 
a negative and significant indirect effect on Corruption (sum of indirect effect=-0.631, P<0.001). 
The summative magnitude of the indirect effect of NRI on Corruption was large (effect size=0.576). 
NRI, which had one path to Internet diffusion (NRI → Mobile diffusion → Internet diffusion), 
showed a positive and significant indirect effect on Internet diffusion (sum of indirect effect=0.272, 
P<0.001). The summative magnitude of the indirect effect of NRI on Internet diffusion was medium 
(effect size=0.231). 
GDP per capita, which had three paths to Transparency (GDP per capita → NRI → Mobile 
diffusion → Transparency;  GDP per capita → NRI → Internet diffusion→ Transparency; GDP per 
capita → NRI → Mobile diffusion → Internet diffusion → Transparency), showed a positive and 
significant indirect effect on Transparency (sum of indirect effect=0.402, P<0.001). The summative 
magnitude of the indirect effect of GDP per capita on Transparency was medium (effect 
size=0.283). GDP per capita, which had six paths to Corruption (GDP per capita → NRI → Mobile 
diffusion → Corruption;  GDP per capita → NRI → Internet diffusion → Corruption; GDP per 




Mobile diffusion → Transparency → Corruption;  GDP per capita → NRI → Internet diffusion → 
Transparency →Corruption; GDP per capita → NRI → Mobile diffusion → Internet diffusion → 
Transparency → Corruption), showed a negative and significant indirect effect on Corruption (sum 
of indirect effect=-0.473, P<0.001). The summative magnitude of the indirect effect of GDP per 
capita on Corruption was large (effect size=0.406). GDP per capita, which had two paths to Internet 
diffusion (GDP per capita → NRI → Internet diffusion; GDP per capita → NRI → Mobile 
diffusion → Internet diffusion), showed a positive and significant indirect effect on Internet 
diffusion (sum of indirect effect=0.638, P<0.001). The summative magnitude of the indirect effect 
of GDP per capita on Internet diffusion was large (effect size=0.530). GDP per capita, which had 
one path to Mobile diffusion (GDP per capita → NRI → Mobile diffusion), showed a positive and 
significant indirect effect on Mobile diffusion (sum of indirect effect=0.515, P<0.001). The 
summative magnitude of the indirect effect of GDP per capita on Mobile diffusion was large (effect 
size=0.375). 
The total effect of FDI, along with the number of paths, the effect size with respective P 
values and standard error are shown in Table 4-13. FDI showed a positive and significant total 
effect on Transparency (total effect=0.096, P<0.001). The magnitude of the total effect of FDI on 
Transparency was small (effect size=0.032). FDI showed a negative and significant total effect on 
Corruption (total effect=-0.113, P<0.001). The magnitude of the total effect of FDI on Corruption 
was small (effect size=0.055). FDI showed a positive and significant total effect on Internet 
diffusion (total effect=0.152, P<0.001). The magnitude of the total effect of FDI on Internet 
diffusion was small (effect size=0.075). FDI showed a positive and significant total effect on 
Mobile diffusion (total effect=0.123, P<0.001). The magnitude of the total effect of FDI on Mobile 




(total effect=0.179, P<0.001). The magnitude of the total effect of FDI on NRI was small (effect 
size=0.104). 











Transparency 3 0.096 <0.001 0.032 small 0.017 
Corruption 6 -0.113 <0.001 0.055 small 0.019 
Internet 
Diffusion 
2 0.152 <0.001 0.075 small 0.026 
Mobile 
Diffusion 
1 0.123 <0.001 0.048 small 0.021 
NRI 1 0.179 <0.001 0.104 small 0.030 
Note: * Effect size coefficients and effect size are reported. According to J. Cohen (1988), effect 
sizes can be small (0.02), medium (0.15), or large (0.35). Effect size coefficients below 0.02 are 
considered too small for relevancy (no rel.). 
 
The total effect of GDP per capita, along with the number of paths, the effect size with 
respective P values, and standard error are shown in Table 4-14. GDP per capita showed a positive 
and significant total effect on Transparency (total effect=0.402, P<0.001). The magnitude of the 
total effect of GDP per capita on Transparency was medium (effect size=0.283). GDP per capita 
showed a negative and significant total effect on Corruption (total effect=-0.473, P<0.001). The 
magnitude of the total effect of GDP per capita on Corruption was large (effect size=0.406). GDP 
per capita showed a positive and significant total effect on Internet diffusion (total effect=0.638, 
P<0.001). The magnitude of the total effect of GDP per capita on Internet diffusion was large 
(effect size=0.530). GDP per capita showed a positive and significant total effect on Mobile 
diffusion (total effect=0.515, P<0.001). The magnitude of the total effect of GDP per capita on 




total effect on NRI (total effect=0.750, P<0.001). The magnitude of the total effect of GDP per 
capita on NRI was large (effect size=0.634).  
Table 4-14. Total effect of GDP per capita. 
 






Transparency 3 0.402 <0.001 0.283 medium 0.040 
Corruption 6 -0.473 <0.001 0.406 large 0.029 
Internet 
Diffusion 
2 0.638 <0.001 0.530 large 0.024 
Mobile 
Diffusion 
1 0.515 <0.001 0.375 large 0.023 
NRI 1 0.750 <0.001 0.634 large 0.025 
Note: * Effect size coefficients and effect size are reported. According to J. Cohen (1988), effect 
sizes can be small (0.02), medium (0.15), or large (0.35). Effect size coefficients below 0.02 are 
considered too small for relevancy (no rel.). 
 
The total effect of NRI, along with the number of paths, the effect size with respective P 
values and standard error are shown in Table 4-15. NRI showed a positive and significant total 
effect on Transparency (total effect=0.536, P<0.001). The magnitude of the total effect of NRI on 
Transparency was large (effect size=0.361). NRI showed a negative and significant total effect on 
Corruption (total effect=-0.631, P<0.001). 
The magnitude of the total effect of NRI on Corruption was large (effect size=0.576). NRI 
showed a positive and significant total effect on Internet diffusion (total effect=0.851, P<0.001). 
The magnitude of the total effect of NRI on Internet diffusion was large (effect size=0.723). NRI 
showed a positive and significant total effect on Mobile diffusion (total effect=0.687, P<0.001). The 















Transparency 3 0.536 <0.001 0.361 large 0.048 
Corruption 6 -0.631 <0.001 0.576 large 0.033 
Internet 
Diffusion 
2 0.851 <0.001 0.723 large 0.010 
Mobile 
Diffusion 
1 0.687 <0.001 0.472 large 0.018 
Note: * Effect size coefficients and effect size are reported. According to J. Cohen (1988), effect 
sizes can be small (0.02), medium (0.15), or large (0.35). Effect size coefficients below 0.02 are 
considered too small for relevancy (no rel.). 
 
The total effect of Internet diffusion, along with the number of paths, the effect size with 
respective P values, and standard error are shown in Table 4-16. Internet diffusion showed a 
positive and significant total effect on Transparency (total effect=0.675, P<0.001). The magnitude 
of the total effect of Internet diffusion on transparency was large (effect size=0.481). Internet 
diffusion showed a negative and significant total effect on Corruption (total effect=-0.686, 
P<0.001). The magnitude of the total effect of Internet diffusion on Corruption was large (effect 
size=0.579). 











Transparency 1 0.675 <0.001 0.481 large 0.028 
Corruption 2 -0.686 <0.001 0.579 large 0.042 
Note: * Effect size coefficients and effect size are reported. According to J. Cohen (1988), effect 
sizes can be small (0.02), medium (0.15), or large (0.35). Effect size coefficients below 0.02 are 
considered too small for relevancy (no rel.). 
 
The total effect of Mobile diffusion, along with the number of paths, the effect size with 




and significant total effect on Transparency (total effect=0.212, P<0.001). The magnitude of the 
total effect of Mobile diffusion on Transparency was small (effect size=0.109). Mobile diffusion 
showed a negative and significant total effect on Corruption (total effect=-0.341, P<0.001). The 
magnitude of the total effect of Mobile diffusion on Corruption was medium (effect size=0.197). 
Mobile diffusion showed a positive and significant total effect on Internet diffusion (total 
effect=0.396, P<0.001). The magnitude of the total effect of Mobile diffusion on Internet diffusion 
was medium (effect size=0.314). 











Transparency 2 0.212 <0.001 0.109 small 0.064 
Corruption 4 -0.341 <0.001 0.197 medium 0.044 
Internet 
Diffusion 
1 0.396 <0.001 0.314 medium 0.026 
Note: * Effect size coefficients and effect size are reported. According to J. Cohen (1988), effect 
sizes can be small (0.02), medium (0.15), or large (0.35). Effect size coefficients below 0.02 are 
considered too small for relevancy (no rel.). 
 
The total effect of transparency, along with the number of paths, the effect size with 
respective P values and standard error are shown in Table 4-18. Transparency showed a negative 
and significant total effect on corruption (total effect=-0.408, P<0.001). The magnitude of the total 
effect of transparency on corruption was medium (effect size=0.348). 
Table 4-18. Total effect size of Transparency. 
 
Paths N Total Effect P-value 
Effect Size 
Coefficient* 
Effect Size* Std. Err. 
Corruption 1 -0.408 <0.001 0.348 medium 0.061 




sizes can be small (0.02), medium (0.15), or large (0.35). Effect size coefficients below 0.02 are 






The purpose of this study was to investigate the effects of the hypothesized relationships of 
key macroeconomic, ICT and sociocultural variables on corruption and transparency. Specifically, 
this study explored the relationship between the ICT environment, diffusion of specific ICTs (e.g. 
Internet diffusion and mobile cellular diffusion), and the two macroeconomic variables of FDI and 
Gross Domestic Product (GDP) per capita and its potential effects on increasing transparency and 
reducing corruption. This chapter presents a discussion and interpretation of the statistical results 
and path analysis of these relationships. In the first section of this chapter, a brief overview of the 
study is provided. The second section provides a detailed discussion of each set of variables with 
their related effects. 
5.1 Overview of the Study 
This study tested the hypothesized relationships among the key macroeconomic, ICT, 
governance and sociocultural variables. These variables are listed in Table 3-3. The testing of these 
hypothesized relationships was statistically analyzed using path analysis with WarpPLS 3.0, a 
structural equation modeling software package. The path model representing these relationships is 
formalized as demonstrated in Figure 2.1. WarpPLS 3.0 was used to statistically analyze this path 
model because the software was specially designed to identify nonlinear relationships among 
variables. WarpPLS identifies such nonlinear relationships by conducting linear and non-linear (or 
“warped”) regression analysis (Kock, 2012). 
The data for the key variables in this study was drawn from several data sources such as the 




Dimension Data Matrix. The independent and mediating variables in the theoretical model are 
Foreign Direct Investment, Gross Domestic Product per capita, Networked Readiness Index, 
Internet diffusion, Mobile diffusion, and Transparency. The intervening or mediating variables in 
the theoretical model are Networked Readiness Index, Internet diffusion, Mobile diffusion, and 
Transparency. Finally, the main dependent variable in the theoretical model is Corruption. The 
national culture control variables used in this study were Hofstede Cultural Dimension indices of 
Power Distance, Individuality, Long-Term Orientation, and Uncertainty Avoidance. 
A missing data analysis was performed prior to the statistical analysis. The independent, 
mediating, and dependent variables were within the 10% missing data threshold as suggested by 
Hair et al. (1987). However, several Hofstede Cultural Dimension indices exceed the missing data 
threshold. To address the missing data, this study utilized two missing data treatments: listwise 
deletion (LD) and a modified version of mean substitution called regional mean substitution (RMS) 
imputation which uses the calculated mean Hofstede Cultural Dimension scores of UN geoscheme 
regional groups. The LD treatment removed all data rows which contained missing data elements 
for all four Hofstede Cultural Dimension indices. This resulted in the removal of 145 rows 
(23.967% of the dataset) using the LD treatment. Using the RMS imputation treatment, all 
independent and dependent variables were within a 10% missing data threshold. 
The data with each missing data treatment was analyzed for multicollinearity. One possible 
indicator of multicollinearity is a high Pearson correlation coefficient (r) between two or more 
variables (Tabachnick & Fidell, 1996). High correlation coefficients among variables in the model 
may signify multicollinearity (Kock, 2012). A general “rule of thumb” (Farrar & Glauber, 1967, p. 




3.0, a correlation matrix was generated with the data using both missing data treatments as part of 
its analysis (Kock, 2012). 
The correlation matrices with corresponding coefficients and associated p-values for data 
using each missing data treatment are presented in Table 3-10 and Table 3-11. Analysis of the 
correlation matrixes using both missing data treatments showed correlation coefficients among 
variables greater than r = 0.800. Based on the RMS missing data treatment, NRI and corruption had 
a correlation coefficient of r = -0.888 with a significance level of p <.001. NRI and Internet 
diffusion had a correlation coefficient of r = 0.849 with a significance level of p <.001. GDP per 
capita and Internet diffusion had a correlation coefficient of r = 0.828 with a significance level of p 
<.001. Also, GDP per capita and NRI had a correlation coefficient of r = 0.829 with a significance 
level of p <.001. Using the LD missing data treatment, NRI and corruption had a correlation 
coefficient of r = -0.907 with a significance level of p <.001. NRI and Internet diffusion had a 
correlation coefficient of r = 0.857 with a significance level of p <.001. 
The presence of a high correlation coefficient between two or more variables is a possible 
indicator of multicollinearity. While high correlation coefficients do not conclusively signify 
multicollinearity, such high correlation coefficients are generally conflated with collinearity 
(Douglass et al., 2003 & Michaels, 2003; Graham, 2003). Therefore, additional tests for 
multicollinearity were performed. 
A full collinearity test was performed on the data using each missing data treatment that 
calculated the VIF values of each variable. Table 3-12 presents the VIF values for each variable in 
the data using both missing data treatments. Using the more relaxed threshold of a VIF=10 as 




treatments did not exhibit serious bias due to multicollinearity problems. Additionally, block VIF 
values which measure the degree of vertical collinearity were calculated for each variable using 
each missing data treatment. Table 3-13 presents the block VIF values for each variable block with 
data using the RMS missing data treatment. Table 3-14 presents the block VIF values for each 
variable block with data using the LD missing data treatment. In the multivariate analysis literature, 
a conservative recommended threshold for VIF values when analyzing models without latent 
variables is VIF=5 as suggested by Hair et al. (1987). Using this recommended threshold of VIF=5, 
the VIF values for the data using both missing data treatments suggest that no vertical 
multicollinearity exist. 
The descriptive statistics for the data using each missing data treatment were calculated 
using Microsoft Excel 2010. The study’s theoretical model was analyzed using path model analysis 
with WarpPLS 3.0. The study’s theoretical model was analyzed using WarpPLS’s Warp2 algorithm 
which looks for non-linear relationships among variables. The data using both missing data 
treatments and two different resampling techniques (e.g. bootstrapping and jackknifing) was 
analyzed yielding four sets of results of the path model. The data with the RMS missing data 
treatment and bootstrapping resampling technique demonstrated the higher number of significant 
paths with stronger associated P values, indicating a higher overall predictive and explanatory 
quality of this particular model. The results of this model and data were used to test the hypotheses 
of the study. The results of the hypotheses testing are outlined in Table 4.6. 
The results of the data analysis were presented in Chapter IV. In this chapter, the 





5.2 Overview of Findings 
The goal of this study was to investigate the relationships between the ICT environment, 
diffusion of two specific ICTs, and the two macroeconomic variables of FDI and Gross Domestic 
Product (GDP) per capita and their potential effects on increasing transparency and reducing 
corruption. The five main independent variables, namely Foreign Direct Investment, Gross 
Domestic Product per capita, Networked Readiness Index, Internet diffusion, Mobile diffusion, as 
well as the intervening variable of Transparency explained 80.8% (R
2
= 0.808) the variance in the 
governance variable of Corruption. Furthermore, the five main independent variables explained 
49.7% (R
2
= 0.497) of the variance in the governance variable of Transparency. 
5.2.1 Macroeconomic Variable Findings 
One of the primary focuses of this study was to explore how the macroeconomic 
independent variables affected transparency and corruption. Indeed, this study did find that FDI had 
a significant effect on corruption and transparency. The macroeconomic variable of FDI did 
increase transparency and reduce corruption. For each increase of $26,795.79 (1 SD) in FDI, there 
was an evident increase in transparency by 1.688% (0.096 SD) and a decrease in corruption by 
2.510% (-0.113 SD). This finding is congruent with similar findings from other studies. Larraín and 
Tavares (2004) found that FDI, as a share of GDP, is significantly associated with lower corruption 
levels. However, in this study, the effect sizes of FDI on these variables were relatively small. FDI 
accounted for the variance in transparency of only 3.2% (ƒ
2
 = 0.032) and 5.5% (ƒ
2
 = 0.055) in 
corruption. 
The small effect of FDI on corruption and transparency may be attributed to the unique 




affect inward FDI flows (Addison & Heshmati, 2004; Cuervo-Cazurra, 2008; Habib & Zurawicki, 
2002; Wei, 2000). Generally, these studies have demonstrated that the higher levels of corruption 
reduce FDI inflows. Also, these studies have given this corruption-to-FDI relationship some degree 
of specificity. In these studies, the effect of FDI on corruption has been found to be moderated or 
mediated by such country factors such as resource richness (Kolstad & Wiig, 2009), concentration 
of bureaucratic power (Gyimah-Brempong, 2002), democratization and ICT (Addison & Heshmati, 
2004), and the difference between host and source countries (Habib & Zurawicki, 2002). 
On the contrary, the effect of FDI on corruption is often less studied. However, Larraín and 
Tavares (2004) and Pinto and Zhu (2008) studied this particular relationship. Larraín and Tavares 
(2004) found that FDI is associated with lower corruption levels. Their findings are harmonious 
with the results of this study: increases in FDI leads to decreases in corruption. However, Pinto and 
Zhu (2008) found that this relationship is not so straightforward. Pinto and Zhu (2008) found that 
FDI actually contributed to corruption in authoritarian and poor countries. However, FDI reduces 
corruption as countries become more democratic. Furthermore, FDI inflows had a negligible effect 
on more developed economies. The small effect on corruption by FDI may be attributed to the 
differentiated effects found by Pinto and Zhu (2008). 
GDP per capita had a large effect on levels of transparency and corruption. This study found 
that the macroeconomic variable of GDP per capita increased transparency and reduced corruption. 
For each increase of $19,686.27 (1 SD) of GDP per capita, there was an elevation in transparency 
by 7.068% (0.402 SD) and a decrease in corruption by 10.507% (-0.473 SD). The effect sizes of 
GDP per capita on corruption and transparency variables were relatively large. GDP per capita 
accounted for the variance in transparency of 28.3% (ƒ
2
 = 0.283) and 40.6% (ƒ
2
 = 0.406) in 




GDP per capita and corruption. Arvas and Ata (2011) found that increases in GDP per capita are 
significantly associated with lower levels of corruption. Paldam (2004) also found that as countries 
transfer from poor to rich economies, in terms of increase in GDP per capita, significant reductions 
in corruption are produced. These findings add confirming evidence to the suggestions by Vinod 
(1999) that corruption can be reduced by increasing per capita income. 
This study also found that FDI and GDP per capita had a significant and positive effect on 
NRI. This finding is consistent with previous research which demonstrates that macroeconomic 
variables such as FDI and GDP per capita have a significant impact on ICT investment and capacity 
(Gholami et al., 2006; Kshetri & Cheung, 2002; OECD, 1991; Suh & Khan, 2003). FDI has been 
shown to present host countries with access to newer technology (OECD, 1991) and has increased 
domestic investment in ICT (Agrawal, 2003). Additionally, Gholami et al. (2006) found that 
increases in FDI lead to growth in ICT investment and capacity.  
In this study, it is demonstrated that each FDI increase of $26,795.79 (1 SD) accounts for an 
increase in the NRI by 2.510% (0.151 SD). However, FDI has a small yet significant effect (ƒ
2
 = 
.104 or 10.4%) on explaining the variance of NRI. Similarly, FDI had small but statistically 
significant effects on Internet diffusion and mobile diffusion. This study found that each FDI 
increase of $26,795.79 (1 SD) accounts for an increase in Internet diffusion of 4.160 people per 100 
persons (0.152 SD) and an increase in mobile diffusion of 5.038 people per 100 persons (0.123 SD). 
The effect of FDI on the explained variance of Internet diffusion was 7.5% (ƒ
2
 = 0.075). Also, FDI 
has explained a small amount of the variance (ƒ
2
= 0.048 or 4.8%) of Mobile diffusion. This finding 
is somewhat at odds with Kshetri and Cheung (2002) who showed that rapid mobile cellular phone 




FDI has been considered as an influential factor in corruption and ICT infrastructure. 
However, income inequality, usually measured in GDP per capita, has been put forth as important 
factor as well (Dasgupta et al., 2001; Erumban & de Jong, 2006). Interestingly, this study showed 
that GDP per capita, rather than FDI, has larger effects. In this study, it is demonstrated that each 
GDP per capita increase of $19,686.25 (1 SD) accounts for an increase in the NRI by 10.518% 
(0.750 SD). Also, GDP per capita has a large and significant effect (ƒ
2
 = 0.634 or 63.4%) on 
explaining the variance of NRI. Similarly, GDP per capita had a large and statistically significant 
effect on Internet diffusion and mobile diffusion. This study found that each GDP per capita 
increase of $19,686.25 (1 SD) accounts for an increase in Internet diffusion of 17.463 people per 
100 persons (0.638 SD) and an increase in mobile diffusion of 21.095 people per 100 persons 
(0.515 SD). Furthermore, the effect of GDP per capita on the explained variance of Internet 
diffusion was 53.0% (ƒ
2
 = 0.530). Likewise, GDP per capita had a large effect on the explained 
variance (ƒ
2
 = 0.375 or 37.5%) of mobile diffusion. These findings add confirming evidence to the 
research by Dewan et al. (2005) and Gholami et al. (2006) which demonstrated that GDP per capita 
and FDI have a positive effect on NRI. 
The findings in this study are consistent with existing research on the effects of GDP on ICT 
variables. Rasiah (2006) found that growth in GDP precedes growth in ICT. GDP per capita, 
considered a surrogate for the standard of living in a country (Easterlin, 2000; Ringen, 1991), 
increases as overall GDP rises. Dewan et al. (2005) found that GDP per capita had a positive effect 
on ICT diffusion. As the standard of living rises via increases in income, a large portion of 
disposable income becomes available. This disposable income can be used to acquire access to 
ICTs. Moreover, Billon, Marco, and Lera-Lopez (2009) found that, in developing countries, 




broadband Internet access dropped, on average, by 18% from 2008 to 2010. Also, prices for mobile 
cellular services decreased by 22% during the same time period. The most significant price 
decreases occurred in African nations where prices for broadband access fell by over 55% and 
mobile cellular prices decreased by over 25%. It is quite likely that increases in per capita income 
also provide governments with more tax revenues to invest in ICT infrastructure. Singh, Das, and 
Joseph (2007), using a model where GDP and e-governance maturity was mediated by ICT 
infrastructure and other factors, found that GDP strongly influenced e-governance maturity and 
readiness through ICT infrastructure. Also, Billon et al. (2009) found that GDP was one of the 
major explanatory factors in countries with higher levels of ICT adoption.  
5.2.2 ICT Variable Findings 
This study investigated how three ICT variables affected transparency and corruption. The 
three variables included NRI, Internet diffusion, and mobile cellular diffusion. Indeed, this study 
did find that NRI had a significant effect on corruption and transparency. The ICT variable of NRI 
did increase transparency and reduce corruption. For each increase of 0.841 (1 SD) in NRI, there 
was a demonstrated increase in transparency by 9.423% (0.536 SD) and a decrease in corruption by 
14.017% (-0.631 SD). Furthermore, the effect of NRI on the explained variance of transparency 
was 36.1% (ƒ
2
 = 0.361). Likewise, NRI had a large effect on the explained variance (ƒ
2
 = 0.576 or 
57.6%) of corruption. This finding is congruent with similar findings from other studies. Opoku-
Mensah (2000) found that ICTs such as Internet access improved access to information, thereby 
increasing transparency. Soper (2007) also found that ICT investments facilitate future levels of 
increased democracy and reduce corruption. Similarly, Charoensukmongkol and Moqbel (2012) 
found that increased ICT investment reduces corruption, and Sturges (2004) revealed that access to 




NRI also had large positive effects on Internet and mobile diffusion. For each increase of 
0.841 (1 SD) in NRI, there was an increase on Internet diffusion of 23.296 people per 100 persons 
(0.851 SD). This effect of NRI on Internet diffusion was large (ƒ
2
 = 0.723 or 72.3%). For each 
increase of 0.841 (1 SD) in NRI, there was an increase in mobile cellular diffusion of 24.141 people 
per 100 persons (0.687 SD). The effect of NRI on mobile cellular diffusion was large (ƒ
2
 = 0.472 or 
47.2%). These findings are similar to other studies investigating ICT environment and ICT 
diffusion. Jakopin and Klein (2011) established that two components of the NRI, regulatory quality 
and market environment, significantly benefit Internet diffusion. 
The ICT variable of Internet diffusion had a large and significant effect on transparency and 
corruption. For each increase of 27.372 per 100 persons on Internet diffusion (1 SD), there was a 
demonstrated increase in transparency by 11.867% (0.675 SD). Furthermore, the effect of Internet 
diffusion on the explained variance of transparency was 48.1% (ƒ
2
 = 0.481). Also, for each increase 
of 27.372 people per 100 person on Internet diffusion (1 SD), there was a marked reduction in 
corruption by 15.239% (-0.686 SD). Likewise, Internet diffusion had a large effect on the explained 
variance (ƒ
2
 = 0.579 or 57.9%) of corruption. The results of this study mirror the findings of similar 
studies on Internet access and transparency. García-Murillo (2010) found that several developed 
countries have moved toward greater transparency by publishing information on the Internet 
concerning governmental issues. Similarly, S. M. Johnson (1998) and Cuillier and Piotrowski 
(2009) showed that the Internet expands public access to government information. 
Interestingly, mobile cellular diffusion had a weaker effect on transparency and corruption. 
For each increase of 40.961 people per 100 persons in mobile cellular diffusion (1 SD), there was a 
marginal increase in transparency by 3.727 % (0.212 SD). Furthermore, the effect of mobile cellular 
diffusion on the explained variance of transparency diffusion was 10.9% (ƒ
2




each increase of 40.961 people per 100 person in mobile cellular diffusion (1 SD), there was a 
notable reduction in corruption by 7.575% (-0.341 SD). Likewise, mobile cellular diffusion had a 
medium effect on the explained variance (ƒ
2
 = 0.197 or 19.7%) of corruption. Additionally, for each 
increase of 40.961 people per 100 persons in mobile cellular diffusion (1 SD), there was a marginal 
increase on Internet diffusion by 10.839 people per 100 persons (0.396 SD). Furthermore, the effect 
of mobile cellular diffusion on the explained variance of Internet diffusion was 31.4% (ƒ
2
 = 0.314). 
These results seem to point to the fact that mobile cellular access has a greater impact on the 
diffusion of Internet access. Indeed, according to Kenichi (2004), mobile cellular phone diffusion 
leads to increased diffusion of Internet access. 
However, it is important to note that for each increase of 40 people having mobile cellular 
subscriptions, there are only 10 additional people acquiring Internet access. Baliamoune-Lutz 
(2003) suggested that differences between communication technology (e.g. mobile phones) and 
information technology (e.g. the Internet) have become blurred. Many mobile cellular consumers 
can now access data and information via mobile phones (H.-W. Kim et al., 2007). For instance, in 
Japan, approximately 40% of the population accesses the Internet via mobile phones (Kenichi, 
2004). However, this dissertation did not find strong evidence to support the convergence of these 
two ICTs. In fact, this dissertation shows that the two ICTs are distinctly different in their effects on 
transparency and corruption. 
5.2.3 Control Variable Findings 
Given the potential influences of national cultural differences, four dimensions of the 
Hofstede Cultural Dimensions framework were used as national culture control variables. Only 




effect on corruption. For each 18.094 point increase in power distance (1 SD), there was a small 
increase in corruption by 1.444% (0.065 SD). Furthermore, the effect of power distance on the 
explained variance of corruption was 4.5% (ƒ
2
 = 0.045). Additionally, for each 20.829 point 
increase in uncertainty avoidance (1 SD), there was a small increase in corruption by 1.888% (0.085 
SD). Similarly, the effect of uncertainty avoidance on the explained variance of corruption was 
2.4% (ƒ
2
 = 0.024). 
The effects of these two Hofstede Cultural Dimension indices are very small compared to 
the effects of other variables within the study’s theoretical model. These effects may be explained 
through their relationships with corruption and other ICT variables within the model. Some studies 
have found that Hofstede Cultural Dimensions of uncertainty avoidance and masculinity are 
associated with higher levels of corruption (Husted, 1999; Kimbro, 2002; Robertson & Watson, 
2004). Similarly, Getz and Volkema (2001) showed that power distance and uncertainty avoidance 
were positively associated with corruption. Also, other studies have demonstrated how these two 
Hofstede Cultural Dimension indices affect ICT usage and adoption. For example, Erumban and de 
Jong (2006) showed that power distance and uncertainty avoidance influence ICT adoption. 
Likewise, Straub et al. (1997) suggested that power distance and uncertainty avoidance accounts for 
differences in e-mail usage. Lastly, de Mooij and Hofstede (2002) stated that uncertainty avoidance 
affects such ICT variables as embracement of the Internet and the ownership of computers and 
mobile cellular phones. The effect of these two Hofstede Cultural Dimension indices on corruption 
may be a result of their effect on the ICT variables within the model. The year was also used as a 
control variable in order to control for potential multiple year effects. However, the year variable 
did not prove statistically significant (β=0.081, P=0.190) in the data analysis, indicating that no 




5.2.4 Transparency’s effect on Corruption 
One focus of this study was to augment the existing body of research on how transparency 
affects levels of corruption. Indeed, this study did find that transparency had a significant negative 
effect on corruption. For each increase of 0.879 (1 SD) in transparency, there was a demonstrated 
decrease in corruption by 9.063% (-0.408 SD). Furthermore, the effect of transparency on the 
explained variance of corruption was 34.8% (ƒ
2
 = 0.348). This finding was expected and consistent 
with similar findings from other studies. Initiatives that increase transparency have been shown to 
be an effective anti-corruption tool (Bertot et al., 2010). Similarly, Brunetti and Weder (2003) 
found a strong association between transparency through greater press freedom and reduced 
corruption. Conversely, a lack of transparency tends to  exacerbate corruption-related problems 







The focus of this study was to investigate how ICTs affect levels of transparency and 
corruption. This study significantly adds to the existing body of research by confirming the effects 
of ICTs on improving transparency and governance (Avgerou, 1998; Krueger, 2002; Opoku-
Mensah, 2000; Soper, 2007). Additionally, this study explores the interrelated effects of ICT, 
macroeconomic, and national sociocultural variables on transparency and corruption. Specifically, 
this study increases the existing body of research on corruption by providing confirmatory evidence 
of how corruption and transparency are affected by three ICT variables: NRI, Internet diffusion, and 
mobile cellular diffusion. In the first section of this chapter, a summary of the study’s key findings 
is provided. The second section provides a brief discussion of the study’s limitations. The third 
section of this chapter outlines theoretical and practical implications with directions for further 
research. The fourth section provides a summary of this chapter. 
6.1 Summary 
Indeed, this study found that the degree to which a country is positioned to use its ICT 
infrastructure for international competitiveness, as measured through the Networked Readiness 
Index (NRI) published in the Global Information Technology Report by the World Economic 
Forum, has a strong effect on the levels of corruption and transparency. A 0.841 increase in the NRI 
resulted in a decrease in corruption by 14.017%. Also, an increase in NRI by 0.841 resulted in an 
increase in transparency by 9.423%. These findings reinforce what other scholars have found 
concerning the positive effect of ICT infrastructure in reducing corruption and increasing 
transparency (Charoensukmongkol & Moqbel, 2012; Soper, 2007; Soper & Demirkan, 2012). ICTs 




that facilities and improves political involvement (Krueger, 2002, 2006; Norris, 2001), thereby 
increasing transparency. 
Not surprisingly, the NRI also had a large positive effect on Internet and mobile diffusion. 
Each increase in the NRI by 0.841 resulted in an increase of Internet diffusion of 23.296 people per 
100 persons. Similarly, each increase in the NRI by 0.841 resulted in an increase of mobile cellular 
diffusion by 24.141 people per 100 persons. Kshetri and Cheung (2002) found that two components 
of the NRI, market openness and government initiatives, stimulated the diffusion of mobile 
communications in China. In this study, the NRI had large exploratory power on levels of Internet 
diffusion (ƒ
2
 = 0.723 or 72.3%) and mobile diffusion (ƒ
2
 = 0.472 or 47.2%). Jakopin and Klein 
(2011) found that two components of the NRI, regulatory quality and market environment, 
significantly benefit Internet diffusion. Improvements in infrastructure intensify market competition 
and reduce costs of goods and services (Aghion & Schankerman, 1999) such as Internet access and 
mobile cellular services. 
Interestingly, the rate of mobile phone diffusion diminishes as units of NRI increased as 
shown in Figure 4.8. In the data analysis, the rate of mobile cellular diffusion plateaued and 
eventually began to decrease as levels of NRI increased. This behavior of mobile cellular diffusion 
suggests a saturation point. This mobile cellular diffusion saturation point occurs between 1.5 and 2 
standard deviations above the mean of NRI. Such a saturation point suggests that countries with a 
higher level of NRI have barriers that prevent higher rates of mobile cellular diffusion. These 
barriers are most likely to be technological and market-driven. Gruber and Verboven (2001) found 
that spectrum capacity had a major impact on diffusion of mobile cellular communication. 
Additionally, Boretos (2007) found that, apart from the very young or very old, almost every 




one of the early adopters of mobile communication technology and leaders in active mobile 
accounts (Boretos, 2007). 
The NRI is a composite index of three component indexes: environment, readiness, and 
usage. Given the amalgamated nature of such an index, it is important to examine particular 
elements within the index’s components. In any discussion that investigates the effects of ICT 
infrastructure, it is important to explore how particular technologies within the ICT domain 
moderate or mediate such relationships. This study explored two particular ICTs: Internet diffusion 
and Mobile diffusion. 
Internet diffusion, as measured through the Internet users (per 100 people) indicator from 
the World Bank World Development Indicators, had a significant effect on transparency and 
corruption. Internet diffusion had a strong positive effect on levels of transparency. By increasing 
Internet diffusion by 27.372 per 100 persons, there was an increase in transparency by 17.581%. In 
this study, Internet diffusion had large exploratory power (48.1%) on levels of transparency. 
Furthermore, Internet diffusion had a strong negative effect on levels of corruption. By increasing 
Internet diffusion by 27.372 people per 100 persons, corruption was reduced by 15.239%. 
Additionally, Internet diffusion had large exploratory power (57.9%) on levels of corruption. These 
results confirm what other scholars have found on the effects of Internet access on transparency and 
corruption (Cuillier & Piotrowski, 2009; García-Murillo, 2010; S. M. Johnson, 1998; Sturges, 
2004). 
Unexpectedly, mobile cellular diffusion, as measured through the Mobile cellular 
subscriptions (per 100 people) indicator of the World Bank World Development indicators, had 




people per 100 persons resulted in a negligible increase in transparency by 3.727%. Likewise, 
increasing mobile cellular diffusion by 40.961 people per 100 persons resulted in a reduction in 
corruption by 7.575%. It is possible that such minor effects on transparency and corruption are 
related to the nature of mobile cellular use. Kenichi (2004) found that mobile Internet usage was a 
more time-enhancing activity (e.g. access augmented some other activity). In other words, mobile 
Internet usage was not primarily for information seeking. Rather, it was for entertainment. Such a 
postulation would explain the marginal effect of mobile cellular diffusion on transparency. 
Although mobile cellular diffusion has a negligible positive effect on transparency, mobile cellular 
diffusion has a moderate negative effect on corruption. This negative effect may be the result of 
mobile cellular diffusion, including mobile Internet usage on other devices such as computers, 
laptops, and tablets. 
This study found that for each increase of 40.961 people per 100 persons in mobile cellular 
diffusion, there was a moderate increase in Internet diffusion of 10.839 people per 100 persons. 
Additionally, mobile cellular diffusion explained the level of Internet diffusion by 31.4%. This 
study found results similar to Beilock and Dimitrova (2003) in which openness of infrastructure—
namely, densities of mobile telephones and personal computers— proved to be an important 
determinant of Internet usage. Many mobile cellular customers access data and information via 
mobile cellular technologies such as phones and cellular data cards (H.-W. Kim et al., 2007). In 
Japan, for instance, approximately two-fifths of the population accesses the Internet via mobile 
cellular technology (Kenichi, 2004). As seen in this study’s results, increased access to the Internet 
leads to significant decreases in corruption. It is possible that the effects of mobile cellular diffusion 
on transparency and corruption are mediated through Internet diffusion. However, the results in this 




transparency, when meditated through Internet diffusion, was slightly greater (β = 0.268, ƒ
2
=0.109) 
than the direct effect of mobile cellular diffusion on transparency (β = 0.212, ƒ
2
=0.138). On the 
contrary, the effect of mobile cellular diffusion on corruption, when meditated through Internet 
diffusion, was much lower (β = -0.140, ƒ
2
=0.081) than the direct effect of mobile cellular diffusion 
on corruption (β = -0.341, ƒ
2
=0.197). 
As shown in the descriptive statistics in Table 4.3, diffusion of mobile cellular phone 
subscriptions has dramatically increased. Geiger and Mia (2009) detailed that, based on ITU data, 
mobile communications have boomed in developing countries. The data in this study mirrors the 
finding of Geiger and Mia (2009); mobile cellular diffusion greatly surpassed Internet diffusion. 
The diffusion of mobile cellular coupled with such things as mobile commerce (m-commerce) has 
become an important modality for receiving information (Geiger & Mia, 2009). Mobile 
communication has facilitated access to the Internet in developed and developing countries as well 
(Kenichi, 2004). 
Several macroeconomic factors influence ICT infrastructure and diffusion (Gholami et al., 
2006; Kshetri & Cheung, 2002; OECD, 1991; Suh & Khan, 2003). This study also examined how 
FDI and GDP per capita affected ICT infrastructure and diffusion. The results of this study showed 
that FDI has a marginal positive effect on ICT infrastructure. For example, increasing FDI by 
$26,795.79 only accounted for an increase in the NRI by 2.510%. Similarly, this study found that 
each FDI increase of $26,795.79 only accounted for marginal increases in Internet diffusion (4.160 
people per 100 persons) and mobile diffusion (5.038 people per 100 persons). FDI has been shown 
to present host countries with access to newer technology (OECD, 1991). In addition, Gholami et 
al. (2006) found that increases in FDI lead to growth in ICT investment and capacity. As 




translates to improvements in physical infrastructure and the political and business environment 
promoting ICT growth. However, this study did not demonstrate that the availability of newer 
technologies or the increase in ICT capacities through FDI inflows equate to the utilization or 
diffusion of such technologies.  
Another important finding in this study is that GDP per capita demonstrates a larger effect 
on ICT infrastructure and diffusion. For example, each GDP per capita increase of $19,686.25 
accounted for an increase in the NRI by 10.518%, Internet diffusion of 17.463 people per 100 
persons, and an increase in mobile diffusion of 21.095 people per 100 persons. Furthermore, GDP 
per capita had large exploratory power on the NRI (63.4%). Similarly, GDP per capita had large 
exploratory power on Internet diffusion (53.0%) and mobile diffusion (37.5%). These results 
confirm findings by Dewan et al. (2005) and Gholami et al. (2006) which demonstrated that GDP 
per capita have a positive effect on ICT infrastructure and diffusion. Similarly, Billon et al. (2009) 
showed that GDP was a major explanatory factor in countries with higher levels of ICT adoption. 
Additionally, Norris (2001) stated that economic development increases civil engagement and 
stimulates diffusion of technologies, including the Internet. 
Income inequality may be a possible cause for the strong effect of GDP per capita on ICT 
infrastructure and diffusion. In developing countries, Internet costs negatively impact ICT adoption 
(Billon et al., 2009). GDP per capita is considered a surrogate for the standard of living and 
economic output in a country (Easterlin, 2000; Ringen, 1991). As the standard of living rises, a 
greater proportion of income becomes available to acquire access to ICTs. This growth in GDP, and 
hence GDP per capita, precedes growth in ICT infrastructure and diffusion (Rasiah, 2006; Ringen, 
1991). Furthermore, prices for broadband Internet access and mobile cellular services have dropped. 




2010. During this same time period, prices for mobile cellular services decreased by 22%. In 
African nations, where the most significant price decreases occurred, broadband access fell by over 
55% and mobile cellular prices decreased by over 25%. Additionally, this increase in per capita 
income may provide more tax revenues to governments to invest in ICT infrastructure. For 
governments, GDP strongly influenced e-governance maturity and readiness through ICT 
infrastructure (Singh et al., 2007).  
It has been suggested by Baliamoune-Lutz (2003) that differences between communication 
technology (e.g. mobile cellular phones) and information technology (e.g. the Internet) have 
become blurred. However, this study did not find strong evidence to support the convergence of 
these two ICTs in terms of their effects on transparency and corruption. 
Some scholars have explored how potential influences of national cultural differences 
influence ICT adoption (de Mooij & Hofstede, 2002; Erumban & de Jong, 2006; Straub et al., 
1997). This study found that power distance and uncertainty avoidance had a negligible effect on 
corruption. In this study, power distance had a marginal positive effect on corruption. Corruption 
increased by 1.444% for each 18.094 point increase in power distance. This finding is consistent 
with Getz and Volkema (2001) who showed that power distance and uncertainty avoidance were 
positively associated with corruption. However, in this study, power distance had a negligible 
explanatory power on corruption (ƒ
2
 = 0.045 or 4.5%). Similarly, uncertainty avoidance had a 
marginal positive effect on corruption. Corruption increased by 1.888% for each 20.829 point 
increase in uncertainty avoidance. Likewise, other studies have found that greater levels of 
uncertainty avoidance are positively associated with higher levels of corruption (Husted, 1999; 
Kimbro, 2002; Robertson & Watson, 2004). However, in this study, uncertainty avoidance had a 
negligible explanatory power on corruption (ƒ
2




The effects of these two Hofstede Cultural Dimension indices on corruption may be a result 
of their effects on the ICT variables within the model. Other studies have demonstrated that national 
cultural differences have effects on ICT usage and adoption. Erumban and de Jong (2006) showed 
that power distance and uncertainty avoidance influence ICT adoption. Similarly, Straub et al. 
(1997) put forward that power distance and uncertainty avoidance accounts for differences in e-mail 
usage. Additionally, de Mooij and Hofstede (2002) identified that uncertainty avoidance was related 
to such things as embracement of the Internet and the ownership of computers and mobile cellular 
phones. 
A secondary focus of this study was to add to the existing literature on how transparency 
affects levels of corruption. This study did find that transparency had a significant negative effect 
on corruption. Increasing transparency by 0.879 reduces corruption by 9.063%. Furthermore, the 
effect of transparency has moderate explanatory power on corruption (ƒ
2
 = 0.348 or 34.8%). Such a 
finding was expected and consistent with similar findings from other studies. Transparency makes it 
more difficult to hide corrupt practices (Akpan-Obong, Alozie, & Foster, 2010; Bertot et al., 2010; 
Cho & Choi, 2005; Kolstad & Wiig, 2009). Transparency initiatives have been shown to be an 
effective anti-corruption instrument (Bertot et al., 2010). Also, there is a strong association between 
transparency through greater press freedom and lower levels of corruption (Brunetti & Weder, 
2003). On the contrary, a lack of transparency has been shown to intensify corruption-related 






This study examined the effects of macroeconomic and ICT variables on corruption and 
transparency. However, there are more avenues of research on this topic. This study did not 
separate the countries into distant clusters by geographic region, languages, Hofstede Cultural 
Dimension rankings, or other sociocultural variables such as levels of literacy or poverty. Such 
factors, in addition to ICT infrastructure and diffusion, could have an effect on transparency and 
corruption. Vinod (1999) found that schooling and income inequality are more relevant in fighting 
corruption rather than Internet use. Corruption is not merely a factor of available information. 
However, the finding of Vinod (1999) did not diminish other studies which found that access to 
information via the Internet was effective in reducing corruption (DiRienzo, Das, Cort, & 
Burbridge, 2007; García-Murillo, 2010). It does suggest, however, that the Internet and similar 
information technologies provide some intervening effect on corruption (Schroth & Sharma, 2003). 
It is possible that the reduction of corruption requires more fundamental changes in other aspects of 
a society coupled with improvements in ICT infrastructure and diffusion. 
In this study, extra statistical and explanatory power may have been achieved by examining 
additional years of the Networked Readiness Index; however between 2004 and 2005, the method 
for calculating the NRI changed significantly. Additionally, other ICT indicators could have been 
added for robustness such as number of radios, televisions, or personal computers per inhabitants. 
Since this study focuses on Internet and mobile cellular diffusion indicators, it was decided not to 
use other such indicators. In future research on this topic, the use of other such indicators may 
increase additional understanding of the relationships between ICT variables, transparency and 
corruption. 




The results of this study lead to several practical implications. As stated by Vinod (1999),  
the Internet’s potential for increasing transparency and reducing corruption is “promising and 
obviously vast” (p. 10). Similarly, Soper (2007) found that ICT diffusion, which includes Internet 
access, is negatively related to levels of corruption. This study has shown that ICT infrastructure 
and diffusion of Internet access does reduce corruption and increase transparency. Government 
officials and citizens wishing for more transparency in their governance should campaign for 
development in their country’s ICT infrastructure with a focus on providing access to information 
via the Internet.  
Vinod (1999) put forth  that the top five actions in reducing corruption, in order of 
importance, are as follows: 1) reducing bureaucratic overhead (e.g. red tape), 2) increasing judiciary 
efficiency, 3) increasing GNP per capita, 4), increasing education and economic freedoms, and 5) 
reducing inequalities in income. Government officials can use ICTs in the following ways to 
achieve some of the actions suggested by Vinod (1999) to promote increases in transparency and 
reductions in corruption. 
First, the diffusion of ICTs can reduce bureaucratic overhead through such initiatives as e-
governance (Bertot et al., 2010). Specifically, the Internet expands public access to government 
information (Cuillier & Piotrowski, 2009; S. M. Johnson, 1998). Secondly, reduced judiciary 
efficiency impacts economic growth and infrastructure development by adding additional costs to 
private transaction disputes (Buscaglia & Ulen, 1997). One way ICTs can improve judiciary 
efficiency is by modernizing (e.g. computerizing) the court case system, thereby giving litigants 
better access to the status of their cases (Buscaglia & Ulen, 1997). Diffusion of ICTs coupled with 
computerization of the judicial system can also assist attorneys and other legal representatives in 




Diffusion of ICTs may have some effect on increasing GNP per capita. ICTs have been 
found to be a contributing factor in economic growth (Avgerou, 1998). For example, mobile phone 
diffusion has been shown to have a positive effect on economic growth and poverty reduction 
(Geiger & Mia, 2009). ICTs can not only reduce poverty, but they can also meditate the effects of 
poverty by reducing information asymmetry (Sturges, 2004) and improve the quality of life 
(Forestier et al., 2002) of the poor. The diffusion of ICTs can also increase education and economic 
freedoms by informing citizens of relevant information on government and society. ICTs facilitate 
and improve political involvement (Krueger, 2002, 2006; Norris, 2001), and they foster civil and 
political freedoms (Baliamoune-Lutz, 2003). Access to ICTs allows citizens to become lifelong 
learners who can acquire new skills to meet the demands of changing economic markets (Noe & 
Peacock, 2002). 
Additionally, Kiiski and Pohjola (2002) found that, in OECD countries, GDP per capita and 
Internet access cost explained most of the growth in computer hosts per capita. Beilock and 
Dimitrova (2003) also found that Internet usage rates were significantly determined by per capita 
income. Future studies should explain GDP per capita as an independent variable effecting the NRI 
and Internet and mobile diffusion.  
In this study, mobile cellular diffusion did find a negligible negative effect on corruption 
and a moderate positive effect on transparency. However, Akpan-Obong et al. (2010) and Bailard 
(2009) found that mobile communication technologies significantly accounted for political 





The findings presented in this study are mostly consistent with those of other scholars on the 
effects of ICTs on improving transparency and governance. (Avgerou, 1998; Krueger, 2002; 
Opoku-Mensah, 2000; Soper, 2007). There is no doubt that corruption and transparency need to be 
addressed worldwide. As countries and their citizens rapidly adopt ICTs, there is hope that 
corruption will be exposed and eradicated through the increased transparency brought about by 
access to information. Increased transparency offers the promise of participatory governance, and 
technology is one avenue in fulfilling this promise. The results of this study should be taken as a 
positive message that ICT diffusion and adoption can decrease corruption and increase transparency 
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